Algarin-Moure v. Baez-Lopez

• Docket Number: CIVIL 20-1234 (CVR)
• Decision Date: 30 August 2023
• Parties: EDWIN ANTONIO ALGARIN-MOURE, Plaintiff, v. PEDRO JOSE BAEZ-LOPEZ, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

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EDWIN ANTONIO ALGARIN-MOURE, Plaintiff,
v.
PEDRO JOSE BAEZ-LOPEZ, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 20-1234 (CVR)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

August 30, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER1

CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

This case stems from a car accident that took place on July 2, 2019, between Plaintiff Edwin A. Algarm^[1] Moure (“Plaintiff”) and co-defendant Pedro Jose Baez Lopez (“Defendant”).^[2] As a result of the accident, Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries to his “left knee, left shoulder, lumbar area, cervical area, and other areas” for which he sought medical treatment. (Docket No. 157 at pp. 18 and 20). Plaintiff then filed suit in this Court claiming damages in the amount of four million dollars ($4,000,000.00). (Docket No. 157).^[3]

After a complicated procedural history, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6) (“Motion to Dismiss”) alleging that diversity jurisdiction is lacking because Plaintiff has failed to meet the over seventy-

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five thousand dollar ($75,000.00) jurisdictional threshold amount. (Docket No. 306). Defendant's reasoning is premised chiefly on the fact that the medical evaluation and subsequent damages report performed by Plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. William Acevedo (“Dr. Acevedo”), is deficient because Plaintiff allegedly “failed to provide [Dr. Acevedo with] critical medical information and records about his pre-existing conditions.” (Docket No. 306 at p. 2). Defendant proffers his own medical expert's report of Plaintiff to contradict that of Dr. Acevedo's. Defendant contends that this willful omission on Plaintiff's part makes Plaintiff's damages less than Dr. Acevedo's report suggests, and consequently, less than the jurisdictional threshold amount. Id. Defendant also briefly mentions part of Plaintiff's deposition testimony and an extrajudicial letter of intent signed by Plaintiff's counsel as exhibits to further bolster his theory for dismissal. (Docket No. 306 Exhibit 1 and Docket No. 307, Exhibit 1).

On August 15, 2023, Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss arguing that his injuries as presented in the Complaint, taken as true, entitle him to receive damages more than the jurisdictional threshold amount, and that at this juncture, “[t]he conflict between the expert witness is something that will have to be decided by the jury at trial....” (Docket No. 310 at p. 12).

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although this rule does not require the complainant to provide “‘detailed factual allegations,'” it does require the complainant to present something “more than an

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unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1940 (2009).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (“Rule 12(b)(1)”), “[t]he district court must construe the Complaint liberally and treat all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1987)); Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing K.W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 836 F.2d 721, 726 (1st Cir. 1988)). In making its analysis, “the court may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as the depositions and exhibits submitted in this case.” Aversa v. United States, 99 F.32d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir. 1996); Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Hernandez-Santiago v. Ecolab, Inc., 397 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Where a party challenges the accuracy of the pleaded jurisdictional facts, the court may conduct a broad inquiry, taking evidence and making findings of fact.” (citing Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001)).

“A party, however, may not rest merely on ‘unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law.'” Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522 (citing Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993)). Similarly, “‘[s]ubjective characterizations or conclusory descriptions of a general scenario which could be dominated by unpleaded facts' will not defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing Coyne v. City of Sommerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir. 1992)) (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, “[d]ismissal is only proper [under Rule 12(b)(1)] if the facts alleged reveal a jurisdictional defect not otherwise remediable.” Klein v. ESJ Resort, LLC, Civil No. 21-1570 (ADC), 2022 WL 3227731, at *1 (D.P.R. Aug. 10, 2022)

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(citing Sumitomo Real Estate Sale (N.Y.), Inc. v. Quantum Dev. Corp., 434 F.Supp.2d 93, 95 (D.P.R. 2006)).

In the same vein, dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) requires the courts to take the facts alleged in the complaint as true, “draw[ing] all inferences in the pleader's favor.” Cebollero-Bertran v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 4 F.4th 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010)). “Threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements” do not meet the plausibility threshold that obliges the Court to take them as true. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)).

Under this standard, a plaintiff's complaint cannot simply be speculative in nature, but rather “must itself frame a viable constitutional claim.” Morales Tanon v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 524 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2008). See also Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011) (“A complaint only ‘shows' an entitlement to relief if its factual allegations are ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).'” (citing Twombly, 550 F.3d at 555)). However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 664.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff fails to meet the jurisdictional threshold amount because Dr. Acevedo's expert report is deficient insofar as it fails to consider Plaintiff's pre-existing medical conditions prior to the 2019 car accident. (Docket No. 306 at pp. 7-13).

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To this end, Defendant provides the following: (1) an independent medical evaluation done to Plaintiff by Defendant's own medical expert, Dr. Eric R. Javier (“Dr. Javier”), that contradicts Dr. Acevedo's report (Docket No. 306-3); (2) an excerpt of Plaintiff's deposition asserting that the injuries for which he seeks damages were present prior to the accident (Docket No. 306-1); and (3) a letter of intent to sue signed by Plaintiff's counsel in which Plaintiff “is claiming for damages an amount not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00). (Docket No. 307).

In turn, Plaintiff avers that the 2019 car accident exacerbated and aggravated the pre-existing injuries to such a degree as to entitle him to monetary relief more than the jurisdictional threshold amount. (Docket No. 310 at p. 11).

A. Expert Witness Testimony.

An expert witness's testimony is allowed “[i]f the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that the expert provides] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 702). The basis of said testimony may rely “on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” Fed.R.Evid. 703. The determination of whether or not to admit an expert witness's testimony at trial falls within the sound discretion the Court. Int'l Adhesive Coating Co., Inc. v. Bolton Emerson Int'l, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs., 830 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (1st Cir. 1987)).

Nevertheless, in making the analysis, an expert need not disclose whatever facts or data he uses for his testimony in order for said testimony to be admissible at trial. Int'l Adhesive Coating Co., Inc., 851 F.2d at 544 (citing Coleman v. DiMinico, 730 F.2d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1984)).

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Rather, “[t]he burden is on opposing counsel through cross-examination to explore and expose any weaknesses in the underpinnings of the expert's opinion.” I...