Sumitomo Real Estate Sales Inc. v. Quantum Development Corp., Civil No. 05-2333 (JAG).
Decision Date | 12 June 2006 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 05-2333 (JAG). |
Citation | 434 F.Supp.2d 93 |
Parties | SUMITOMO REAL ESTATE SALES (N.Y.), INC., Plaintiff v. QUANTUM DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Jose A. Axtmayer-Balzac, Axtmayer, PSC, Axtmayer, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Antonio A. Arias-Larcada, McConnell Valdes, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
On December 27, 2005, plaintiff Sumitomo Real Estate Sales (N.Y.), Inc. ("Sumitomo") filed suit against Quantum Development Corp. ("Quantum"), Virtus Investments, Ltd., Desarrollos Urbanos Arloy, C.A., Eduardo Velazco Castillo, and Armando Loynaz Reveron (collectively "defendants"), seeking damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and "dolo" (fraud), or, in the alternative, restitution for unjust enrichment (Docket No. 1). The Court's jurisdiction is premised upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On February 16, 2006, defendant Quantum moved to dismiss Sumitomo's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of standing (Docket No. 9). On April 17, 2006, Sumitomo filed an opposition (Docket No. 11). On May 22, 2006, Quantum replied to Sumitomo's opposition (Docket No. 14). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Quantum's motion to dismiss.
In April, 2004, Sumitomo entered into a Mortgage Placement Agency Agreement (the "Agreement") with Quantum pursuant to which Sumitomo was appointed as defendants' "exclusive broker and agent with the right to negotiate and obtain a mortgage loan commitment(s) or other financing arrangement ... for the Property [then] referred to as Monte Palatium Condominium Project [(the "Project")]... ." . The Agreement further provided that Sumitomo would earn a commission equal to one percent of any commitment or financing arrangement entered into by defendants during the term of the Agreement or during the 120 days after its termination. The commission was to be due and payable in full upon initial funding of any such commitment or financing arrangement.
Thereafter, through Sumitomo's efforts, Quantum entered into a Commitment Letter (the "Commitment") with Scotiabank de Puerto Rico ("Scotiabank") for financing the development of the Project. Sumitomo claims to have earned a commission from the Commitment which, pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, is payable upon defendants' receipt of initial funding. Prior to such funding, however, Quantum entered into a financing arrangement with R-G Premier of Puerto Rico by which it refinanced the first mortgage lien on the Property on which it intends to develop the Project. Sumitomo believed defendants no longer intended to use financing provided by the Scotiabank Commitment and so invoiced defendants for the commission which Sumitomo claims is now due. To date, defendants have not paid the invoice.
A. Standard of Review for. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing
A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Since the justiciability requirement of standing is generally viewed as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1280-81 (1st Cir. 1996), standing challenges are more appropriately brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(1). See Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir.2001) ( ). Accordingly, this Court evaluates Quantum's motion to dismiss under the standard for motions brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts have the duty of narrowly construing jurisdictional grants. See, e.g., Alicea-Rivera v. SIMED, 12 F.Supp.2d 243, 245 (D.P.R.1998). Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) are subject to the same standard of review as Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1994); Torres Maysonet v. Drillex, S.E., 229 F.Supp.2d 105, 107 (D.P.R.2002). Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper "only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory." Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1990)). Under Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal would be proper if the facts alleged reveal a jurisdictional defect not otherwise remediable.
B. Choice of Law in Federal Diversity Suit
In moving to dismiss Sumitomo's complaint, Quantum relies on the doorclosing statute of the General Corporations Law of 1995 ("General Corporations Law") which denies standing to any foreign corporation "doing business" in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico without a certificate of authorization from the Department of State. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 3163(a) (2000). Because Sumitomo invoked the jurisdiction of this Court based solely on diversity of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), and its progeny are controlling. Accordingly, this Court's determination of whether to apply the door-closing statute of the General Corporations Law in the case at bar must be guided by Erie's twin aims of discouraging forum-shopping among potential litigants and avoiding inequitable administration of the law.
By reason of the twin aims expressed in Erie, the United States Supreme Court held in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949), that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply a state door-closing statute barring an unregistered foreign corporation from bringing suit in the state courts. Accord Tel-Pic Syndicate v. Station WIBS, 94 F.Supp. 888 (D.P.R.1951) ( ). In Woods the Court noted that when a party Woods, 337 U.S. at 538, 69 S.Ct. 1235. In keeping with cited precedent and the twin aims of Erie, this Court applies the door-closing statute of the General Corporations Law in this case.
C. General Corporations Law of 1995
The General Corporations Law requires foreign corporations to obtain a certificate of authorization from the Department of State before doing business in the Commonwealth. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 3162(a) (2000). "Any foreign corporation doing business in the Commonwealth without a certificate of authorization may not initiate any proceeding in any court of the Commonwealth until it obtains such certificate." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 3163(a) (2000). Sumitomo is a foreign corporation as defined by the General Corporations Law, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 14, § 3161 (2000), and, at the time of the filing of this suit, did not have a certificate of authorization from the Department of State (See Docket No. 9, Exh. 1). Sumitomo's acquisition of the Commitment letter for Quantum, however, does not constitute "doing business" in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and, as such, the door-closing statute of the General Corporations Law does not deny Sumitomo standing to bring this suit.
The General Corporations Law provides a non-exhaustive list of activities which do not constitute doing business in the Commonwealth. Among this list is the "[c]reat[ion] or acqui[sition of] debts, mortgages or personal and real property securities." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 3164(a)(7) (2000). Sumitomo's activities with Scotiabank fall squarely within this exception and, thus, Sumitomo is specifically exempted from the registration requirement.
Quantum urges a narrower reading of § 3164(a)(7), arguing that its application should be limited to the creation or acquisition of mortgages for the foreign corporation itself rather than for third persons. Although this argument is creative, this Court declines to read beyond the plain language of the statute to impute restrictions which are not facially apparent.1 Consequently, this Court relies on the plain language of § 3164(a)(7) and finds that Sumitomo's acquisition of the Commitment for Quantum does not constitute "doing business" in the Commonwealth so as to require a certificate of authorization and thus the door-closing statute of the General Corporations Law does not deny Sumitomo standing to bring this...
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