Ali v. Fisher
| Decision Date | 25 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. E2003-00255-SC-R11-CV,E2003-00255-SC-R11-CV |
| Citation | 145 S.W.3d 557 |
| Parties | Jasmine A. ALI v. Eric N. FISHER, et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Sullivan County, John S. McLellan III, J Jack M. Vaughn and Daniel D. Coughlin, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Jasmine A. Ali.
Charles T. Herndon, IV, and Bradley E. Griffith, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Thomas Scheve.
E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and ADOLOPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.
We granted this appeal to determine whether an owner who negligently entrusted his car to another may be held vicariously liable for the driver's negligence in the operation of the car. The trial court submitted the case to the jury for allocation of fault on comparative fault principles, and the jury found the owner twenty percent (20%) at fault and the driver eighty percent (80%) at fault. The trial court later amended the judgment by holding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and thus liable for all of the compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding that the owner-entrustor was vicariously liable for the driver-entrustee's actions and reinstated the initial judgment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that an owner-entrustor's liability for negligent entrustment does not result in vicarious liability for the negligence of the driver-entrustee and that the trial court erred in holding the owner-entrustor liable for all the damages. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On November 25, 2000, at about 11:00 p.m., the plaintiff, Jasmine Ali ("Ali"), suffered serious injuries when her car was struck by a car driven by defendant Eric N. Fisher ("Fisher") and owned by defendant Thomas Scheve ("Scheve"). The accident occurred at the intersection of Lynn Garden Drive and Center Street in Kingsport, Tennessee.
Kingsport Police Officer Burke Murray testified that on the night of November 25, 2000, he saw a car on I-181 that had been reported to the police dispatcher as being driven erratically by a possibly intoxicated driver. When officers turned on their blue lights, the car exited the interstate and turned right on Lynn Garden Drive. The car accelerated to a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour, ran a red light at the intersection of Lynn Garden Drive and Center Street, struck Ali's car, became airborne, struck a traffic light pole, and landed on top of her car. Ali suffered severe injuries to her collar bone and right ankle.
Fisher had a blood-alcohol content of 0.21% — more than double the legal limit. Fisher testified that he had become intoxicated from drinking at least eight bottles of six-percent-alcohol beer, smoking marijuana, and taking four Benadryl pills. He said that on the night of the accident, he suffered a "black out" while playing an internet video game. Fisher testified: "the last thing I honestly remember is a — it's like a mix between seeing the — the beer and the visuals on the video game, the smoke from the missiles [part of the video game graphics], and the next thing I knew, I was looking at my mom in the hospital." In addition, Fisher testified that it was his "choice to do the drugs and the alcohol that led to the accident" and that he "took responsibility for it [in] criminal court."1
Fisher testified that he had been driving a car owned by Scheve, who was a co-worker at a restaurant called the Minglewood Mountain Bistro ("Minglewood") in downtown Johnson City, Tennessee. Fisher testified that in the two months that he worked with Scheve, the two became close friends. They "partied" a lot together, drank at work and off work, and smoked marijuana. Fisher, who lived in a cabin several miles from Minglewood, stated that he frequently rode to and from work with Scheve. At the time of the accident, Scheve had gone out of town for the Thanksgiving holiday and had loaned his car and his apartment to Fisher.
Fisher asserted that his alcohol and drug abuse was well known among his acquaintances and stated that "everyone knew that [I was] unstable and likely to commit jackassery" after drinking and taking drugs. Fisher testified that the fact that his driver's license had been suspended was also common knowledge among his friends and co-workers and evident by the fact that he rarely drove. Fisher stated his opinion that Scheve knew of the suspended license prior to the accident.
Scheve testified, however, that he and Fisher were only casual acquaintances who worked together and had occasion to "hang around" with some of the same people. Scheve stated that he occasionally drove Fisher home from work because Fisher had no other transportation. After the accident, Scheve admitted that he had loaned his car to Fisher and that he had signed the following statement that had been prepared by Officer Murray:
On 11-21-00 I was leaving to go out of town for the holidays. I was at my place of employment, at Minglewood Mtn Bistro, in Johnson City, Tenn. I was talking to my friend/coworker Eric Fisher. I don't recall if I offered to let Eric use the car or if he asked to do so. I remember telling him if he didn't have any other way to work or was in a bind, he could use it. I also told him he could use my apartment since its (sic) close to my work. He told me that he would be careful and wouldn't drive it if he was "messed up." After that I left for the airport.
Scheve testified that he had offered to allow Fisher to stay in his apartment, which was one block from work, so that Fisher would not need to use his car to get to work. Scheve testified that he did not know of Fisher's alcohol and drug problems and that he had never seen Fisher inebriated or using any illegal drugs. He testified that he did not know that Fisher's driver's license was suspended and that he would not have allowed Fisher to use his car had he known of Fisher's substance abuse and legal problems. Officer Murray, however, testified that when he asked Scheve what he meant by "messed up," Scheve responded that Fisher had been known to drink and drive, and that Scheve did not want Fisher to drive his car while drinking.
The case was submitted to the jury by the trial judge for allocation of fault on comparative fault principles. The jury returned a verdict finding that Fisher, the driver, was eighty percent (80%) at fault and Scheve, the owner, was twenty percent (20%) at fault in causing the accident. The jury awarded Ali $500,000 in compensatory damages, which the trial court apportioned as $400,000 against Fisher and $100,000 against Scheve.2 In addition, the jury awarded $25,000 in punitive damages which the trial court apportioned as $20,000 against Fisher and $5,000 against Scheve. After the entry of the judgment, however, the trial court granted Ali's motion to alter or amend and entered an amended judgment ordering that
Defendant Scheve is vicariously liable for the fault of Defendant Fisher and all the damages awarded to Plaintiff by the jury. Thus, Plaintiff Jasmine A. Ali shall have and recover the amount of $500,000.00 in compensatory damages and $25,000.00 in punitive damages from Defendant Scheve, Defendant Fisher, or both.
The Court of Appeals reversed the amended judgment after concluding that Scheve's negligent entrustment did not result in vicarious liability for the conduct of Fisher. The court reinstated the trial court's initial judgment.
We granted review.
The principal issue in this appeal and a question of first impression for this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the owner-entrustor could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of the driver-entrustee and, accordingly, reinstating the trial court's initial judgment. This issue presents a question of law, which we review de novo without a presumption of correctness to the conclusions reached below. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993).
Plaintiff Ali argues that one who negligently entrusts a chattel to another is vicariously liable "for the consequences of any foreseeable tortious acts" that the entrustee commits. She reasons that vicarious liability for negligent entrustment is derivative of the entrustee's negligence because there is no cause of action for negligent entrustment unless there is negligence by the entrustee.
On the other hand, defendant Scheve contends that the Court of Appeals correctly held that he was not vicariously liable for Fisher's conduct because negligent entrustment is an independent tort based upon the negligence of the entrustor rather than the entrustee. Scheve also argues that there was no relationship between him and Fisher upon which vicarious liability could otherwise be imposed and that the trial court's amended judgment violated the principles of Tennessee's comparative fault-based tort system. Finally, Scheve argues that the trial court's decision to impose vicarious liability was prejudicial because he had prepared for trial in reliance on the trial court's pre-trial ruling that damages would be apportioned based upon the jury's allocation of fault under comparative fault principles.
We begin our analysis by reviewing the familiar principles of comparative fault established in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992). In McIntyre, we adopted a system of modified comparative fault by which a plaintiff who is less than fifty percent (50%) at fault may recover damages in an amount reduced by the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff. Id. at 57. At the same time, we abandoned the concept of joint and...
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