Alicea v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 09 August 2013
• Docket Number: SJC–11293.
• Citation: 466 Mass. 228,993 N.E.2d 725
• Parties: Luis ALICEA v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

466 Mass. 228

993 N.E.2d 725

Luis ALICEA

v.COMMONWEALTH.

SJC–11293.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Submitted April 4, 2013.

Decided Aug. 9, 2013.

Dakota D. Martin, Boston, for the plaintiff.

Sarah M. Joss, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

Alex G. Philipson, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

DUFFLY, J.

After spending three and one-half years in State prison, Luis Alicea filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against his former defense counsel, Lawrence J. McGuire, an attorney employed by the Committee for Public Counsel Services. ¹ Alicea's complaint asserted claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.² These claims were based on Alicea's assertions that he should have received a one-year sentence in connection with his plea of guilty to a firearm offense, and that McGuire's conduct, allegedly having conspired with the prosecutor, had resulted in Alicea's serving an illegal sentence of three and one-half years. A judge granted summary judgment in favor of McGuire; the judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (First Circuit).

While his Federal court case was pending, Alicea commenced the underlying action in the Superior Court against the Commonwealth as McGuire's employer; McGuire was not named as a defendant. The Superior Court action asserted claims of malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress, premised on the allegation that McGuire had caused Alicea to serve an illegal sentence. Concluding that the judgment entered in the Federal action precluded Alicea from litigating the issue of his purported entitlement to a one-year sentence, a Superior Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment. Alicea appealed, and we transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion.

Because the issue central to Alicea's claims in the Superior Court was decided in the Federal action, application of the doctrine of issue preclusion under Federal common law prevents Alicea from relitigating the issue. We therefore conclude that the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment was properly allowed.³

Background facts and proceedings.⁴ In 2003, a grand jury returned indictments charging Alicea with three firearm offenses:discharge of a firearm within 500 feet of a dwelling, G.L. c. 269, § 12E; unlicensed possession of a firearm outside his residence or place of business, G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( a ) (carrying statute or § 10 [ a ] ), after having been convicted previously of two qualifying violent or drug-related offenses, G.L. c. 269, § 10G ( b ) (repeat offender statute or § 10G); and possession of a firearm without an FID card, G.L. c. 269, § 10 ( h ) ( § 10 [ h ] ). The most serious potential penal consequence was the enhanced penalty sought under the repeat offender statute, § 10G, for violation of § 10 ( a ), the carrying statute. Under the sentencing enhancement provisions of § 10G, Alicea faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in State prison, due to his prior convictions of drug-related offenses. At that time, the indictment for unlawful discharge of a firearm carried a maximum sentence of three months in a jail or house of correction, and the indictment for unlawful possession of a firearm carried a maximum sentence of one year in a jail or house of correction.⁵

McGuire, who had been appointed to represent Alicea, entered into plea negotiations with the prosecutor, and an agreement was reached whereby Alicea would plead guilty to unlawful carrying of a firearm in violation of § 10 ( a ), the underlying charge in the indictment that sought a sentencing enhancement pursuant to § 10G, and the Commonwealth would enter a nolle prosequi on so much of the indictment as provided for sentencing enhancement under § 10G.⁶ Without the repeat offender enhancement provided under § 10G, the maximum sentence on the § 10 ( a ) carrying charge was five years in State prison. In exchange for Alicea's guilty plea, the parties agreed that the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of from three to five years in State prison and file a nolle prosequi on the remaining indictments. Concerned by the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence he faced under § 10G, Alicea “took [the plea agreement] right away.”

A plea hearing was conducted on March 18, 2004. During the hearing, the prosecutor erroneously informed the judge that Alicea had agreed to plead guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. As stated, at that time the maximum penalty for unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of § 10 ( h ) was a one-year sentence. The prosecutor correctly explained to the judge that, pursuant to the terms of the negotiated plea, the defendant had agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentencing recommendation of from three to five years in State prison and entry of a nolle prosequi on the indictment charging unlawful discharge in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 12E.⁷ The prosecutor's statement that the agreement included the filing of a nolle prosequi on the entire indictment charging a violationof § 10 ( a ) and a sentencing enhancement under § 10G, however, was only partially correct.⁸ McGuire did not correct the prosecutor's misstatement and did not inform the judge that Alicea had agreed to plead guilty to unlawful carrying of a firearm under § 10 ( a ), rather than to unlawful possession of a firearm under § 10 ( h ). Consistent with the prosecutor's representation regarding the agreed-upon sentence, the judge imposed a sentence of from three to five years in State prison. The prosecutor thereafter filed a nolle prosequi on the indictment that included both the underlying offense of unlawful carrying, § 10 ( a ), and the repeat offender provision of § 10G. The plea agreement, however, called for entry of a nolle prosequi to only that portion of the indictment seeking sentencing enhancement as a repeat offender. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the prosecutor also filed a nolle prosequi on the indictment charging unlawful discharge of a firearm.

These errors came to light several days later, when the Department of Correction informed the prosecutor that the three- to five-year sentence imposed did not conform to the statutory requirements of § 10 ( h ), the indictment for which the docket sheet and supporting documentation indicated that the defendant had been sentenced. The prosecutor contacted McGuire and informed him that an error had occurred, and that he intended to file a motion to amend the indictment so that it included the correct citation to § 10 ( a ), thereby “correspond[ing] to the plea deal that ... Alicea had accepted.” McGuire misinterpreted the prosecutor's message; he understood the prosecutor to mean that the indictment still referred, erroneously, to enhanced sentencing under § 10G. Without reviewing the motion or consulting Alicea, he agreed to assent to the prosecutor's motion to amend the indictment. McGuire did so “to preserve for [his] client ... the sentence that he had agreed to in the plea deal.” The judge who had conducted the plea colloquy allowed the motion to amend.

Alicea did not learn of the errors until shortly before September 4, 2007. On that date, he filed a motion for release from unlawful confinement, alleging that he had pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession charge, which supported a maximum sentence of only one year's incarceration. The same judge allowed Alicea's motion on October 19, 2007.

1. United States District Court action. Alicea filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against McGuire, asserting claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress; violations of his civil rights, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988; malpractice; and violations of G.L. c. 93A. McGuire's motion to dismiss Alicea's claims was allowed in part, resulting in dismissal of all but the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of Alicea's civil rights. In those claims, Alicea alleged that McGuire, in conspiracy with the prosecutor, had engaged in conduct that resulted in the imposition of an illegal sentence on Alicea.

McGuire's motion for summary judgment was allowed; the judge concluded that:

“[T]here was no ‘benefit’ to which Alicea was entitled after the plea hearing. Without such a possible benefit there is no reasonable inference of a conspiratorial agreement. Simply put, McGuire may have participated in actions that resulted in an illegal sentence, but on this record, there is neither evidence nor inferences to support the conclusion that McGuire agreed to inflict a wrong.”

As to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the judge concluded that Alicea had agreed to accept a plea to a sentence of from three to five years in exchange for dismissal of other charges; that plea was not illegal; and, “at the time of the motion to amend Alicea did not face, legally, only one year in custody.” In an unpublished decision, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment, concluding that “Alicea was not entitled to a sentence of only one year.” Alicea v.McGuire, U.S.Ct.App., No. 10–1329 (1st Cir. Dec. 7, 2010).

2. Superior Court action. Alicea filed the underlying action in the Superior Court on December 9, 2008, before the First Circuit decision issued. The complaint asserts claims of malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the Commonwealth, in its capacity as McGuire's employer; McGuire was not named as a defendant. The complaint alleges that McGuire acted negligently by failing to consult Alicea about the error made at the plea colloquy, and by assenting to the prosecutor's motion to amend the indictment absent such consultation. Both causes of action require a plaintiff to prove that he suffered harm...