Alie v. Nadeau

• Decision Date: 29 November 1899
• Citation: 44 A. 891,93 Me. 282
• Parties: ALIE v. NADEAU.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

44 A. 891

93 Me. 282

ALIE

v. NADEAU.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 29, 1899.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme Judicial court, York county.

Action by Eugene J. Alie against Onesime Nadeau. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant excepts. Exceptions sustained.

This was an action by the plaintiff to recover wages for the last two months of a period of six months, under an agreement entered into November 9, 1897, wherein defendant agreed to employ plaintiff for six months at wages of $10 per week, payable weekly.

After keeping plaintiff in his employ about two months, or to January 15, 1898, defendant discharged him without cause. March 12, 1898, the plaintiff brought suit to recover the wages due him up to that time, and on trial a jury found for the plaintiff on all the issues, and rendered judgment for the wages due up" to March 12, 1898. This judgment has been satisfied.

The present suit was brought at the expiration of the six-months period to recover the balance of wages due after March 12, 1898. The Jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant took exceptions to the refusal of the court to nonsuit the plaintiff, and also upon the court's refusing to make certain rulings requested by defendant, which appear in the opinion.

Argued before PETERS, C. J., and HASKELL, WISWELL, STROUT, and SAVAGE, JJ.

H. T. Waterhouse and B. F. Cleaves, for plaintiff.

F. W. Hovey, for defendant.

SAVAGE, J. The plaintiff brings this action to recover damages for the breach of a contract of service, whereby the plaintiff alleges that he agreed to enter and remain in the employment of the defendant for the period of six months from the 9th day of November, 1897, and that the defendant agreed to hire the plaintiff for the same period, and to pay him for his labor the sum of $10 per week. The plaintiff further alleges that he entered upon the performance of the contract upon his part, and continued to work until January 15, 1898, upon which day he was discharged by the defendant, without lawful cause.

The case shows that the plaintiff was paid all wages due him up to the time of his discharge. On March 12, 1898, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant for damages, alleging the same breach of the same contract as is alleged here, and claiming damages to the date of his writ. In that action he ultimately recovered judgment in damages for an amount equal to the weekly wages agreed upon from January 15, 1898, to March 12, 1898.

This action was commenced November 23, 1898, and the plaintiff now claims to recover damages from March 12, 1898, to May 9, 1898, the remainder of the period covered by the contract. At the close of the testimony, the defendant's counsel requested the presiding justice to instruct the jury that the judgment in the former action was a bar to recovery in this suit To a refusal to give this instruction the defendant excepted.

We think the requested instruction should have been given. Here is a single and indivisible contract, a hiring for the period of six months. When the defendant discharged the plaintiff, he broke the contract. He broke it altogether. But there was only one breach. The plaintiff urges that, while the contract was entire, the performance was divisible; that each week's work constituted a performance so far, and that the defendant was in default each week he failed to continue plaintiff in his employment. Hence the plaintiff claims that an action will lie for each default. A little examination will show that this position cannot be sustained.

The contract of the defendant may be viewed in a twofold...