Alire v. United States, 7049.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1963
• Docket Number: No. 7049.,7049.
• Citation: 313 F.2d 31
• Parties: Alfonso Juan ALIRE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

313 F.2d 31 (1962)

Alfonso Juan ALIRE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 7049.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

December 19, 1962.

Rehearing Denied January 30, 1963.

Daniel F. Lynch, Denver, Colo., for appellant.

James P. McGruder, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Lawrence M. Henry, U. S. Atty., was with him on the brief), for appellee.

Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and LEWIS and SETH, Circuit Judges.

SETH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was charged with the violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001, in making false statements and representations of a material fact in an application to the Post Office Department for temporary employment. He was tried and convicted by a jury and received a sentence of three years.

Among the questions on the application form was one which asked whether the applicant had ever been "arrested," "charged" or "held" for a violation of any federal, state, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance. The appellant answered "no" to this question and signed the application attesting to the truth of the answers. At the trial, the prosecution offered a number of "booking slips" from the Denver police department which were the original records of arrests. The court admitted a number of these slips which showed on their face that the appellant had been arrested for a specific offense but did not show that a charge had actually been filed. These exhibits showed arrests for traffic violations, for other city ordinance violations, for larceny, for robbery, and for homicide. There was also introduced the record of the Denver District Court, showing appellant's plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery.

Appellant urges several grounds for reversal. His first ground is that Congress did not intend that the statute under which appellant was convicted should apply to the situation at hand where the false statements were contained in an application for "menial or part-time employment." Appellant argues that the position sought was an unimportant one and that there were no factors or considerations of great national importance involved.

The statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001, provides:

"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up * * * a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined * * *."

This section contains no exceptions nor any separate of special treatment for false statements in any particular situation or type of employment. Following its amendment in 1934, the courts have uniformly applied it to a variety of situations and have applied it in its broad and general terms. There is no basis for this court to read into the section any exceptions or modifications. The intent of Congress, as shown by the 1934 amendment of the section and as indicated in the legislative history, is clear. The Supreme Court in United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 61 S.Ct. 518, 85 L.Ed. 598, stated that the scope of the statute had been greatly increased by reason of the 1934 amendment, and said the amendment showed the intent of Congress to protect the authorized functions of the various governmental departments from any type of deceptive practices, and saw no reason why the scope of the statute should be narrowed.

The appellant argues that there is no matter of great national interest or concern or any matter of national security involved in this case, as there is in cases concerned with false statements submitted for employment in national defense industries or those directly affected with the national security. Here again there is no provision in the act whereby it is limited to matters of great national concern, and in fact the intention is directly to the contrary as it covers any false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of an agency or department of the United States. Certainly appellant's argument to exclude matters which he considers of minor interest cannot be sustained against such plain wording. It is not questioned but that it was proper for the Post Office Department to inquire into the police record of applicants. The false answer given by the appellant was as to a material fact. Courts of other circuits have considered the scope of the statute as against somewhat similar arguments and have held that the statute cannot be limited. Pitts v. United States, 263 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.); United States v. Goldsmith, 108 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.). The Supreme Court again commented that the language called for an unrestricted interpretation in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 75 S. Ct. 504, 99 L.Ed. 594.

The appellant also argues that should the statute be applied to a false statement in an application for temporary employment as in this case, the statute is a violation of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Appellant's argument here is related to that advanced under his first point, and he admits that the act is for a legitimate purpose, but urges that Congress cannot provide for such severe penalties for even the most insignificant "...