Allan v. R.D. Offutt Co., A14–1555.

Citation869 N.W.2d 31
Decision Date31 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. A14–1555.,A14–1555.
PartiesTodd C. ALLAN, Respondent, v. R.D. OFFUTT CO., self-insured and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Relator.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Jeffrey R. Hannig, Hannig Law Office, P.A., Fargo, ND, for respondent.

George W. Kuehner, Allison A. Lindevig, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, PLLP, Lake Elmo, MN, for relators.

Sean M. Quinn, Falsani, Balmer, Peterson, Quinn & Beyer, Duluth, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.

Jeffrey J. Lindquist, Pustorino, Tilton, Parrington & Lindquist, PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

This dispute presents the question of whether a prior disability that does not affect an employee's ability to secure employment may be considered when determining whether the employee is eligible for permanent-total-disability benefits under Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2) (2014). The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) concluded that, when determining eligibility for permanent-total-disability benefits, any disability may contribute to the employee's permanent-partial-disability rating, regardless of whether that disability causes the employee to be unable to secure employment. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Respondent Todd C. Allan sustained a work-related injury to his lower back on September 28, 2010, while he was employed by relator R.D. Offutt Co. The steering rod broke on Allan's conveyor belt, which caused him to fly backwards, land on his back, and hit a tire with his left shoulder. An MRI revealed degenerative disc disease

caused by the fall, and Allan was restricted from performing many labor-related activities. Allan was 48 years old at the time of the injury.

Allan filed a petition seeking permanent-total-disability benefits in March 2013. Based on his age at the time of the injury, Allan was required to demonstrate “at least a 17 percent permanent-partial-disability rating of the whole body” in order to qualify for permanent-total-disability benefits. Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2)(i). To support his petition for benefits, Allan first relied on the September 28, 2010, back injury, which is assigned a permanent-partial-disability rating of 10 percent. See Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 3 (2013). Allan also relied on his non-work-related complete loss of teeth, which also is assigned a 10–percent rating. See Minn. R. 5223.0320, subp. 7 (2013). Relying on these two conditions, Allan claimed a permanent-partial-disability rating of 20 percent. Offutt opposed the petition for permanent-total-disability benefits, arguing that Allan's non-work-related loss of teeth cannot be considered in determining whether he has satisfied the 17–percent threshold in subdivision 5(2)(i).

The compensation judge concluded that Allan established a 10–percent permanent-partial-disability rating based on his September 2010 back injury. The judge did not consider Allan's complete loss of teeth in assessing his permanent-partial-disability whole-body rating, however, because the loss of teeth was fully corrected with dentures. Allan therefore did not satisfy the 17–percent threshold, and the compensation judge denied his petition for permanent-total-disability benefits.

Allan appealed and the WCCA reversed and remanded. Allan v. RD Offutt Co., 2014 WL 4253405 (Minn. WCCA Aug. 12, 2014). It concluded that the correctable nature of Allan's loss of teeth was irrelevant to whether that condition could contribute to his permanent-partial-disability rating.Id. at *3. Relying on its own prior decision in Metzger v. Turck, Inc., 59 Minn. Workers' Comp. Dec. 229 (WCCA 1999) (holding that a hysterectomy

that did not affect employability could nevertheless contribute to the employee's permanent-partial-disability rating), the WCCA further concluded that Allan's loss of teeth need not affect his employability in order to contribute to his permanent-partial-disability rating. Allan, 2014 WL 4253405, at *3–4. Offutt and its insurer now seek review by our court.

I.

The question presented here requires interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act, and therefore presents a question of law that we review de novo. Alcozer v. N. Country Food Bank, 635 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Minn.2001). “Our objective in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the legislature, reading the statute as a whole.” Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn.2012) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2014) ). In doing so, we “construe words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning,” and we “give effect to all of [the statute's] provisions; ‘no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ Am. Family Ins. Gp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000) (quoting Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.1999) ). “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must be given effect.” Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn.2001).

A.

We begin by summarizing the statutory framework for permanent-total- disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation for “personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2014) ; see also Minn.Stat. § 176.011, subd. 16 (2014) (“ ‘Personal injury’ means any ... physical injury arising out of and in the course of employment....”). Disability benefits are awarded in accordance with the duration (temporary or permanent) and severity (partial or total) of the personal injury. See Minn.Stat. § 176.101 (2014). An injury that causes permanent total disability is compensable if the employee establishes:

(1) the total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the loss of both arms at the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips that no effective artificial members can be used, complete and permanent paralysis, total and permanent loss of mental faculties; or
(2) any other injury which totally and permanently incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings the employee an income....

Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5. Subdivision 5(1), which contains a group of injuries that presumptively establish a permanent total disability, is not at issue here. Allan relies instead on subdivision 5(2), which requires that an employee demonstrate a permanent-partial-disability rating of 13, 15, or 17 percent, depending on the employee's age and education at the time of the injury.1 Id., subd. 5(2)(i)-(iii).

For purposes of [subdivision 5(2) ], “totally and permanently incapacitated” means that the employee's physical disability in combination with any one of item (i), (ii), or (iii) causes the employee to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income. Other factors not specified in item (i), (ii), or (iii), including the employee's age, education, training and experience, may only be considered in determining whether an employee is totally and permanently incapacitated after the employee meets the threshold criteria of item (i), (ii), or (iii).
Id., subd. 5. The meaning of this final paragraph is the subject of this appeal.
B.

We hold that Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2), unambiguously requires that disabilities that contribute to an employee's permanent-partial-disability rating must affect employability. Subdivision 5(2) provides that an employee is totally and permanently incapacitated if “the employee's physical disability in combination with [the applicable permanent-partial-disability rating] causes the employee to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.” We construe words and phrases “according to rules of grammar and according to their most natural and common usage....” ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. Cty. of Dakota, 693 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn.2005) (quoting Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2014) ). “Combination” is defined as “the result or product of combining” or “a union or aggregate made by combining one thing with another.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 452 (1976). “Cause,” in turn, means “a person, thing, fact, or condition that brings about an effect or that produces or calls forth a resultant action or state.” Id. at 356. With these definitions in mind, the phrase “in combination with ... causes” means that the relevant aggregate factors must cause the employee to be unable to secure employment. Thus, subdivision 5(2) necessarily contains a causal nexus between employability and the work-related injury, and between employability and the disabilities that contribute to the permanent-partial-disability rating. “When the plain meaning of a statute is clear, a court must apply its plain language.” Krueger v. Zeman Constr. Co., 781 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Minn.2010).

Our conclusion is consistent with the overall context of the statute. Subdivision 5(2) contains two references to employability, both of which must be given effect. See Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 277. The first clause states that the work-related injury must “totally and permanently incapacitate[ ] the employee from working at an occupation which brings the employee an income.” Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 5(2). The definition of “totally and permanently incapacitated,” in turn, contains a second reference to employability: it states that the “physical disability in combination with” the disabilities contributing to the permanent-partial-disability rating must “cause[ ] the employee to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income.” Id. If, as Allan and the dissent contend, the disabilities that contribute to the permanent-partial-disability rating are irrelevant to the employee's inability to secure an income, this second reference to employability would be meaningless. Put differently, any disability used to satisfy the...

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