Allegheny County v. Maryland Casualty Co.
Decision Date | 22 January 1943 |
Docket Number | No. 7962.,7962. |
Citation | 132 F.2d 894 |
Parties | ALLEGHENY COUNTY v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Edward G. Bothwell, of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Walter P. Smart, of Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Oliver K. Eaton, of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Duane R. Dills and Jack J. Levinson, both of New York City, and George W. Dexter, of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BIGGS and MARIS, Circuit Judges, and AVIS, District Judge.
The plaintiff, the County of Allegheny, in 1931 purchased 1100 voting machines from the Poole Engineering and Machine Company at a total price of $1,120,900. Alleging a breach of performance of the contract of purchase the county brought suit in a state court against the defendant as surety upon a bond for $200,000 which had been given by the vendor for the faithful performance of the contract. The suit was removed by the defendant to the federal district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and judgment for the full amount of the bond and interest. The defendant thereupon filed alternative motions to set aside the verdict and enter judgment in its favor and for a new trial as permitted by Civil Procedure Rule 50(b), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. After argument of the motions the court entered an order setting aside the verdict for the plaintiff and directing that judgment be entered for the defendant. It omitted to act upon the motion for a new trial Thereafter upon the motion of the plaintiff calling attention to this omission the court vacated its order entering judgment for the defendant and one day later disposed of both motions by entering the following orders:
The reasons given in the court's memorandum opinion for granting a new trial include errors in the admission of evidence, as well as the error involved in the court's refusal of the defendant's request for a directed verdict. The plaintiff has appealed.
We are confronted at the outset with the question whether the record discloses a final appealable judgment. The second order above quoted directed a new trial of the cause. While it recited that the defendant's motion upon which it was granted was alternative to the defendant's motion for judgment, the order itself was not made subject to the condition that it should become effective only if the judgment entered for the defendant should be reversed on appeal. On the contrary it granted the motion for a new trial in absolute and unconditional terms and its necessary effect, therefore, was to vacate the judgment just entered for the defendant n. o. v. which in turn had vacated the original judgment for the plaintiff. For it is settled that the granting of a new trial has the effect of vacating an existing judgment in the cause. United States v. Ayres, 1869, 9 Wall. 608, 76 U.S. 608, 19 L.Ed. 625, 627; United States v. Young, 1876, 94 U.S. 258, 24 L.Ed. 153. A subsisting order that the issues be tried again is obviously inconsistent with the continued existence of a judgment settling those issues.1 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said in March v. Philadelphia & West Chester Trac. Co., 1926, 285 Pa. 413, 416, 132 A. 355, 356, " * * * a new trial and a judgment cannot be in effect at the same time in the same case." It follows that the granting of a new trial sets aside both the verdict and the judgment entered upon it without any specific mention of either. Iacovino v. Caterino, 1939, 336 Pa. 308, 9 A.2d 620; Kingsdorf v. Frank Gamburg, Inc., 1942, 147 Pa.Super. 84, 24 A.2d 140.
The fact that both the judgment n. o. v. and the order for a new trial were entered at substantially the same time does not change the result. The order entering the judgment n. o. v. corrected the judgment previously entered on the verdict. It placed upon the record the judgment which would have been entered had the court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The judgment thus entered was in turn set aside by the new trial order which looked to the future and directed that the issues be tried again regardless of either judgment.
It is urged that the court's action was in accord with the procedure outlined by the Supreme Court in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 1940, 311 U.S. 243, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147. In that case it was said (pages 253, 254 of 311 U.S., page 195 of 61 S.Ct., 85 L.Ed. 147):
We may not assume that the Supreme Court by this language contemplated the entry of inconsistent orders such as were entered in the present case. On the contrary the last sentence quoted indicates that what that court had in mind was the entry of an order granting a new trial as an alternative in the sense of a succedaneum intended to take the place of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Nara v. Frank
...court's order null and void. United States v. Ayres, 9 Wall. 608, 76 U.S. 608, 609, 19 L.Ed. 625 (1869); Allegheny County v. Maryland Cas. Co., 132 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir.1943); Kuppel v. Auman, 365 Pa.Super. 175, 529 A.2d 29, 31 (1987) (citing McGine v. State Mut. Ben. Soc., 135 Pa.Super. 3......
-
Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co.
... ... such right. McPike v. St. Louis County Bank, 193 ... S.W.2d 962. (3) An appeal taken before final judgment is ... Hardware Dealers Mut ... F. Ins. Co., 112 F.2d 140; Allegheny County v ... Maryland Cas. Co., 132 F.2d 894 ... ...
-
Ford Motor Co. v. Busam Motor Sales, 11100.
...the case from which an appeal could be taken. The same reasoning, with the same result, was used by the Court in Allegheny County v. Maryland Casualty Co., 3 Cir., 132 F.2d 894. The correctness of such reasoning was recognized by the Court in McIlvaine Patent Corp. v. Walgreen Co., 7 Cir., ......
-
Johnson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.
...l.c. 155, re Federal Rule 50(b) like our Code Sec. 113; Pruitt v. Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co., 112 F. 2d 140; Allegheny County v. Maryland Cas. Co., 132 F. 2d 894. [4] Whether plaintiff made a submissible case on defendant's duty to slacken speed under the humanitarian doctrine calls ......