Allen v. City of Millville

• Decision Date: 09 July 1915
• Citation: 95 A. 130
• Parties: ALLEN v. CITY OF MILLVILLE.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

95 A. 130

ALLEN

v. CITY OF MILLVILLE.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 9, 1915.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Cumberland County.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Jesse A. Allen to obtain compensation for injuries, opposed by the City of Millville, the employer. Compensation was awarded, and the City brings certiorari. Affirmed.

This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Allen was employed by the city on street work. Kates was director of streets and public improvements of the city. In his private capacity he owned and employed teams on different kinds of work, but none of them were employed by or for the city of Millville.

In his employ was a driver, Robert Chambers, who, on the morning of the accident, was carting freight for Kates. Albert Thompson was an employé of the city who, by the direction of Kates, was to get certain planking and lay it on top of some newly laid concrete so that wagons could pass over. Thompson asked Chambers to take Kates' team and go after the planking, and requested Allen to go with Chambers, which Allen did. In some way Allen was thrown from the wagon and injured. This proceeding is brought to recover compensation of the city for his injuries.

Argued November term, 1914, before SWAYZE, PARKER, and KALISCH, JJ.

Louis H. Miller, of Millville, for prosecutor. Herbert C. Bartlett, of Vineland, for defendant.

SWAYZE, J. (after stating the facts as above). We think the evidence justified the finding by the trial judge that the accident arose out of, and in the course of, the employment. The question whether the city can be said to have had actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury is difficult. The words must mean something different from mere notice, since section 16 of the statute makes special provision for the service of notice in language that can only be satisfied by written notice, and this notice is the "notice referred to," which can mean only the notice mentioned in section 15. What the Legislature meant by actual knowledge is not clear. A private or a municipal corporation, as a legal entity, cannot itself have knowledge. If it can be said to have knowledge at all, that must be the imputed knowledge of some corporate agent. The act would fail of its purpose unless it were applicable to corporate, as well as to individual, employers. We think, therefore, that the knowledge of the proper corporate agent must be regarded as, in legal effect, the knowledge of the corporation. If we are right in this construction of the statute, there can be no doubt that the knowledge of Mr. Kates was the knowledge of the city, since he was the commissioner actually in charge of the work on which Allen was employed.

The next question is whether Kates had actual knowledge. He did not in the sense that he saw the injury and knew of it first hand, so that he could properly testify as a witness. We think, in spite of the use of the word "actual" to qualify the knowledge required, that first-hand personal knowledge is not what is meant. We rest this conclusion upon the subsequent language of section 15. This makes it clear that the knowledge required is that sort of knowledge which may be obtained, since it...