Page v. State Insurance Fund

• Decision Date: 24 May 1933
• Docket Number: 5968
• Citation: 53 Idaho 177,22 P.2d 681
• Parties: IRENE PAGE, Respondent, v. STATE INSURANCE FUND and IDAHO FALLS L. D. S. HOSPITAL, a Corporation, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

22 P.2d 681

53 Idaho 177

IRENE PAGE, Respondent, v. STATE INSURANCE FUND and IDAHO FALLS L. D. S. HOSPITAL, a Corporation, Appellants

No. 5968

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 24, 1933

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-NOTICE TO EMPLOYER.

1. Evidence supported award for hernia to housemaid in hospital striking groin against corner of table she was moving, as "arising out of and in course of employment."

2. Evidence showed hospital had actual knowledge through its agent of injury to housemaid on day following accident though housemaid did not specifically state she was suffering from hernia (I. C. A., sec. 43-1116).

3. Notice to employer of physical injury carries with it notice of all things which may be reasonably anticipated to result (I. C. A., sec. 43-1116).

4. Where employer possessed same knowledge as employee, mere fact that employee did not report injury as hernia when in fact it was such did not justify refusing compensation (I. C A., sec. 43-1116).

5. Workmen's Compensation Law must be liberally construed to effect its objects and promote justice (I. C. A., sec 43-1205).

6. Matron at hospital acting as general housekeeper and hiring and discharging help subject to superintendent's approval held "agent or representative" of hospital, so that housemaid's notice to matron of injuries was notice to hospital (I. C. A., sec. 43-1205).

7. Evidence showed that hospital's agent or representative had knowledge of injury to housemaid within time she was required to report injury, and within time she was required to give written notice (I. C. A., secs. 43-1116, 43-1202 to 43-1205).

APPEAL from the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, for Bonneville County. Hon. C. J. Taylor, Judge.

Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Law. Appeal from judgment of district court affirming order of Industrial Accident Board awarding compensation. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent. Petition for rehearing denied.

J. A. Carver, for Appellants.

Notice of an alleged accident and resulting injury given to a fellow employee, in charge of employer's work, at the particular place where the accident occurred, by casual conversation with such employee in charge, is not notice to the employer as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act. ( Herbert v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 200 Mich. 566, 166 N.W. 923.)

Chas. W. Sandles, for Respondent.

"The only notice here shown was notice in fact; there are no facts shown by the record, to call for the rule of inquiry and the court evidently intended to find actual knowledge. The findings should be so construed." (State ex rel. Crookston Lumber Co. v. District Court of Pennington County, 132 Minn. 251, 156 N.W. 278.)

The respondent contends that when notice in fact of the accident was given under the ruling above cited, it enforced upon the defendant L. D. S. Hospital a knowledge of the injury, and having knowledge of the injury, they had knowledge of the fact that such injury was a hernia.

"The actual knowledge which dispenses with the notice of an injury, is what would be called knowledge, in common parlance and does not mean the first hand knowledge of an eye-witness." (Allen v. Millville, 87 N.J.L. 356, 95 A. 130.)

BUDGE, C. J. Givens, Holden and Wernette, JJ., concur. Morgan, J., dissents.

OPINION

BUDGE, C. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court affirming an order of the Industrial Accident Board awarding respondent compensation on account of injuries sustained by her on December 4, 1931, arising out of and in the course of her employment with appellant Idaho Falls L. D. S. Hospital.

The following material facts are disclosed by the evidence and are substantially as found by the Industrial Accident Board and affirmed by the district court: Respondent was employed by said hospital as a housemaid in the nurses' quarters. On December 4, 1931, respondent, while so employed, and while attempting to move a table through a doorway, struck her right groin against a corner of said table, and immediately suffered severe pains in her groin and became nauseated and sick; that a swelling immediately appeared in her groin; that after vomiting and resting about fifteen minutes she resumed her work of dusting and sweeping the rooms in said nurses' quarters but was unable, by reason of the injury, to mop the floors or do other heavy work; that shortly after sustaining the injury respondent informed a co-worker thereof and on the following day notified Mrs. Agnes West, the matron in charge of said nurses' quarters, of such accident and injury; that on December 6, 1931, respondent was unable to work and remained in bed, and on account of such injuries was unable to work on three days between December 6th and December 23d; that on December 23d respondent was laid off from her employment as there was no work for her to do; that during most of the month of January, 1932, she was confined to her bed by reason of her condition due to said accident, and on February 7, 1932, consulted a physician who found she then had a direct inguinal hernia in the right groin, and furnished respondent with a truss; that on February 23, 1932, respondent made a claim in writing for compensation and filed the same with the Industrial Accident Board on March 12, 1932. The board also found that such hernia was the result of the accident on December 4, 1931; that such hernia did not exist in any degree prior to the accident, and that the same was reported to the employer within thirty days after the accident; and that by reason of said hernia respondent was totally disabled for work from February 7, 1932, until the hearing on June 17, 1932, and was still totally disabled for work, and awarded compensation. Upon appeal the district court, by its judgment, affirmed the findings, rulings of law and award made by the Industrial Accident Board, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

Appellants assert that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding, rulings of law and justify the award in that the evidence fails to prove (1) that the hernia was the result of the accident; (2) that the hernia appeared immediately following the alleged accident; and (3) that the hernia did not exist in any degree prior to the alleged accident.

Respondent testified that immediately after the accident she was sick and nauseated and could not work for the pain she suffered by reason of the injury; that prior to the injury she had no pain in the right groin; that a lump immediately appeared, which was felt by a co-worker; that she was compelled to quit work for three days on account of the pain, and stayed in bed for that reason most of January; that her right groin has been sore constantly since the accident; and when she consulted her physician she had no difficulty in remembering the cause of the injury. It was stipulated that a Mrs. Robinson would testify, if present, that she observed respondent's body before, on and after December 4, 1931, and that on and after that date there was a lump on her right groin which had not been there previously. The attending physician testified that at the time of hearing before the board respondent had a lump larger than an orange in her abdomen; that on February 7, 1932, he diagnosed her injury as a direct inguinal hernia, in a different position to the usual type of hernia, not congenital, and likely caused by a traumatism; that he fitted her with a truss and advised an operation; that she consulted him in October, 1931, for another ailment but made no mention of the rupture.

From the foregoing and other uncontradicted testimony and inferences to be drawn therefrom, we are convinced that there is sufficient competent evidence to support the findings, rulings of law and award complained of. As to sufficiency of evidence of immediate appearance of hernia following the injury and its nonexistence in any degree prior thereto, see In re Hillhouse, 46 Idaho 730, 271 P. 459.

It is also contended that the evidence fails to prove (a) that the hernia was reported to the employer within thirty days after the accident; (b) that any notice, written or otherwise, was given to the employer as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act; and (c) that the employer, its agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident or injury until more than sixty days following the accident.

I. C. A., sec. 43-1116, provides that:

"In all cases of hernia resulting from injury by accident alleged to have been sustained in the course of and resulting from the employee's employment it must be proved. . . .

"4. That the hernia was reported to the employer within thirty days after the accident."

In this connection it must be noted that the above section contains no provision that such report shall be in writing. Respondent testified that she did not know that she was suffering from hernia until so advised by her physician on February 7, 1932. The evidence conclusively shows, as hereinafter pointed out that the employer had actual knowledge through its agent of the accident and injury and respondent's condition the day following the accident, although respondent did not specifically state, in so many words, that as a result of the accident she was suffering from hernia. The reason she did not so state was that she did not know at that time nor until she was so informed by her physician. She gave the agent or representative of her employer all of the information concerning her injury. Notice of a physical injury carries with it notice of all things which may be reasonably anticipated to result from it. (Bates & Rogers Const. Co. v. Emmons, 205 Ky. 21, 265 S.W. 447, 448.) The requirement of the report necessarily implies...