Allen v. District of Columbia, 86-679.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-679.,86-679.
• Citation: 533 A.2d 1259
• Parties: Henry ALLEN, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 1259

533 A.2d 1259

Henry ALLEN, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 86-679.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 3, 1987.

Decided November 25, 1987.

Ruth R. Banks, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Donna M. Murasky, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom James R. Murphy, Acting Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Michele Giuliani, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before MACK^* and NEWMAN, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Associate Judge, Retired.^**

NEBEKER, Associate Judge, Retired:

This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the District of Columbia and, thereby, denying appellant Henry Allen's claims of false arrest assault and battery, negligence, and malicious prosecution. It presents the question whether police reports and a notification letter sent by Allen to the Mayor of the District of Columbia provided sufficient information, as required by D.C.Code § 12-309 (1981),¹ to put the District on notice of impending legal action. We hold that the trial court did not err when it dismissed the false arrest, assault and battery, and negligence counts of the complaint on the basis that the police reports failed, under the terms of the statute, to give sufficient notice to the District that a claim might arise. With respect to the malicious prosecution count, we conclude that Allen's letter satisfied the requirements of § 12-309, and, therefore, the District was afforded adequate notice of the lawsuit that was to be filed. Thus, we reverse the order granting summary judgment on the claim of malicious prosecution.

Appellant Allen's claims against the District of Columbia were precipitated by an incident which occurred while he was employed by the District's Department of Motor Vehicles as a vehicle inspector. A complaint by taxi cab driver Eugene Curtis, alleging that Allen had insisted upon receiving a $20.00 bribe before he would approve Curtis' vehicle and give him an inspection sticker, led the District's Police Department to initiate an investigation of Allen. On September 1, 1982, with officers ready to observe from a distance any transaction between Allen and Curtis, the police arranged for the cab driver to return to the inspection station and make a marked $20.00 bill available to Allen. In order to record the events taking place, police were prepared to video tape the two men. In addition, Curtis was equipped with an audio recording device. At the inspection station, Curtis met with Allen and obtained an inspection sticker. Allen then appeared² to take possession of the $20.00 bill which Curtis, by prior arrangement with police, had left on the front seat of his cab. As Curtis was leaving the inspection station, he gave a predetermined signal to police indicating Allen had received the $20.00. Thereafter, the police arrested Allen and recovered the marked bill from his wallet.

Allen was charged with, and subsequently indicted on, one count of receiving a bribe, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-704(a) (1981). Following Allen's arrest, District police filed a number of reports pertaining to the incident. In addition, as part of their investigation, police took a statement from Allen while he was in detention in which he denied requesting a bribe from Curtis. Allen explained that Curtis had requested change for $20.00 and that the marked bill was received in return for one $10.00 and two $5.00 bills. On March 30, 1983, a jury acquitted Allen of the offense.

Allen's lawyer sent a letter, dated May 23, 1983, to District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry notifying him that Allen intended to file a lawsuit against the District. The letter read as follows:

Dear Mayor Barry,

In compliance with the requirements of D.C.Code § 12-309, notice is hereby given that suit will be filed against the District of Columbia by Henry and Diane Allen as co-plaintiffs.

Damage and injury was caused to Henry Allen on or about September 1, 1982 when he was arrested by officers of the Metropolitan Police Department at his place of employment, the N.E. Vehicle Inspection Station, and continued throughout his subsequent prosecution for the crime of bribery. Mr. Allen was found not guilty of this charge on or about March 30, 1983. Diane Allen's claim will be based on loss of consortium throughout this period.

This letter satisfies the six month notice requirement of D.C.Code § 12-309.

Allen and his wife Diane Allen filed an amended civil complaint in May 1984 against the District of Columbia and Eugene Curtis alleging false arrest, assault and battery, negligence, abuse of process, malicious prosecution and loss of consortium.³ The District subsequently made a motion to dismiss the complaint for its failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; alternatively, the motion asked for summary judgment. After a hearing on the motion in May 1985, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, thereby removing it as a defendant in the case.⁴ Allen's claims against Curtis remained intact.⁵

In granting the District's motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated that with respect to all counts in the complaint, except the one for malicious prosecution and the related claim for loss of consortium, the right to bring an action accrued at the time of Allen's arrest. Therefore, as to those four counts, Allen's letter to the Mayor failed to come within the six month notice requirement of § 12-309. In addition, the trial court determined that the police reports filed at the time of the arrest did "not satisfy the notice requirement because they failed to establish facts from which the District of Columbia could reasonably anticipate that a claim against the District would arise from Mr. Allen." Turning its attention to the claim of malicious prosecution, which accrued when Allen was acquitted of bribery, the trial court determined that here too summary judgment was appropriate, although for reasons different from those cited as the basis for denying the other claims. The court said that despite the fact Allen gave timely notification to the District of the intended legal action, the information in the letter did not adequately set forth either the "cause" or the "circumstances" of the injury, as required by § 12-309. Moreover, even when considering the police reports in conjunction with the letter of notice, the court ruled, the statutory prerequisites for bringing an action against the District were not met.

In March 1986, the jury returned a verdict in Allen's civil action against Curtis. The jury exonerated Curtis from any liability for either false arrest or malicious prosecution. Earlier, the trial court had directed a verdict in favor of Curtis on the claim of assault and battery. Following the final adjudication of his complaint against Curtis, Allen appealed from the summary judgment in favor of the District.⁶

When notifying the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C.Code § 12-309, there are four items of information that must be provided in order for the notice to comport with the terms of the statute. The District must be apprised of "the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage." Id. The statute allows for notification of the District through written notice from "the claimant, his agent, or attorney" or through "[a] report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty." Id. The provision in the statute that permits reports by the police to serve as an alternative form of notice is based on the idea that written notice by a claimant should not be a prerequisite to legal action if, in fact, actual notice in the form of a police report has been received by the District.⁷ However, we have recognized that the existence of a police report does not necessarily mean that the District has received the type of actual notice which § 12-309 contemplates—that is, information as to the time, place, cause and circumstances of the injury or damage which is the basis for the claim. See Miller v. Spencer, supra note 7, 330 A.2d at 252. Therefore, if a police report is the means by which the District is to be notified, then "[i]n order to protect the District against unreasonable claims, the actual notice provided by [the] police report must contain information as to time, place, cause and circumstances of injury or damage with at least the same degree of specificity required of a written notice." Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).

When providing information about the "cause" of an injury, the written notice or police report must "recite[] facts from which it could be reasonably anticipated that a claim against the District might arise." Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 808-09 (D.C. 1978). In Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), we further defined the requirements for proper notice by setting forth the specific information that § 12-309 demands with respect to the cause" element:

[T]he written notice or police report must disclose both the factual cause of the injury and a reasonable basis for anticipating legal action as a consequence. Such notice would suffice, therefore, if it either characterized the injury and asserted the right to recovery, or—without asserting a claim—described the injuring event with sufficient detail to reveal, in itself, a basis for the District's potential liability.

Id. at 1366. In addition to informing about the cause of an injury, § 12-309 also requires that notice to the District include details of the "circumstances" surrounding the injury. In Washington, we stated that the circumstances must be described with enough specificity to allow "the District to conduct a prompt, properly focused investigation of the claim." Id. at 1366.

Turning to the facts of this case, Allen...