Allen v. Glynn
Decision Date | 07 March 1892 |
Citation | 29 P. 670,17 Colo. 338 |
Parties | ALLEN v. GLYNN. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Proceeding by Charles L. Allen to contest the election of James Glynn to the office of district judge of the thirteenth judicial district. On motion to strike out parts of the complaint.
The other facts fully appear in the following statement by HAYT C.J.:
This is an original proceeding, instituted in this court for the purpose of contesting an election in the thirteenth judicial district. In 1891 the legislature adopted, in a modified form, the Australian ballot law. At the recent election, the first held since the provisions of the new law became operative, Charles L. Allen, contestor, James Glynn contestee, and William T. Skelton were opposing candidates for the office of district judge of the thirteenth judicial district of this state. The former received his nomination at the hands of the Republican party of the district, Skelton was nominated by the Democrats, while Glynn ran as candidate of a third party, commonly styled the From the petition filed it appears that the official count, made by the state canvassing board, gave contestee 862 votes, contestor 860, and Skelton 508. Contestee having been declared elected, this proceeding has been instituted by contestator. The following provisions of the statute are necessary to a correct understanding of the opinion, (Sess. Laws 1891, p. 143 et seq.:)
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H. B. Johnson and H. N. Haynes, for contestant.
H. Riddell, for respondent.
HAYT, C.J., ( after stating the facts.)
This is the first contest instituted in this court under the new election law, the Australian ballot system. Questions affecting the freedom and purity of elections are of vital importance under our system of government. While the present contest is important to the contestants and the people of the thirteenth judicial district, it is of still greater importance on account of its effect upon the cause of ballot reform. It is to be noted at the outset that, in common parlance, the Australian ballot system is a name applied indiscriminately to enactments of different states, widely dissimilar in many important particulars, so that with us the name is of little significance. It is doubtful if any state has yet, or will in the future, adopt, without change, the Australian ballot law as it is found in the island of its birth. Some of its essential features have been discarded as inapplicable to our institutions and theory of government. The act under which this contest must be determined contains 44 sections. It will only be necessary, however, to refer to a few of these sections in this opinion. By the first section provision is made for printing and distributing all ballots by public officers at public expense. Section 2 excepts certain school and special elections from the requirements of the first section. Sections 3 to 12, inclusive, provide in detail the manner of making, certifying, and publishing nominations. Section 13 provides the mode in which objections to certificates of nominations may be made and determined, and also provides how defects in such certification may be cured. Section 14 relates to acceptances of nominations, while by the next section provision is made for filling vacancies in nominations.
Turning to the complaint, we find that paragraphs 12 to 15 inclusive, against which (and paragraphs 16 and 17) this motion to strike is interposed, relate exclusively to the manner in which certain candidates were nominated and their names published, and the way in which Glynn's name was placed upon certain tickets. Paragraphs 16 and 17 have reference to the number of legal votes received and registered. If the allegations contained in these latter paragraphs are to be taken as true, then it appears that contestant received a majority of all the legal votes cast. It is probable these paragraphs were included in the motion to strike out by mistake. The allegations appear to be legal and proper, and, so far as the motion applies to them, it will be overruled without further comment. That part of the motion which is directed to paragraphs 12 to 15, inclusive, raises the principal question upon which we are called to pass at this time. It is alleged, in...
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