Allen v. Helms
| Decision Date | 24 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D18-2417,1D18-2417 |
| Citation | 293 So.3d 572 |
| Parties | Oceana Star ALLEN and William Scott Allen, Appellants, v. Joseph K. HELMS, and GEICO General Insurance Company, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Mitchel E. Woodlief of Woodlief & Rush, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellants.
J. Stephen O'Hara, Jr. and James D. Morgan of O'Hara Law Firm, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellees.
Oceana Star Allen and William Scott Allen appeal the trial court's order granting Appellees' motions for costs and fees and declaring the Allens' Notice of Withdrawal of Proposals for Settlement "to be a nullity and of no force and effect." We affirm.
Despite the unremarkable prologue, this appeal presents issues that are anything but ordinary. In fact, the trial court commenced its thorough and precise analysis of the issues by noting that, to its knowledge, "the issues presented ... are matters of first impression, certainly in Florida, and, based on the Court's legal research, perhaps anywhere in the country." Our own research has led us to conclude that the trial court's assertion does not hit far from the mark. We, too, failed to locate a case directly on point: a case where the plaintiffs, in the course of their personal injury action, "purchased" from the trustee of the debtor/defendant's bankruptcy estate the defendant's earlier-served proposals for settlement, which the plaintiffs had earlier rejected, and which they later purported to withdraw to avoid paying attorney's fees and costs under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. Faced with those facts, the trial court ably construed nuanced principles of state and federal law to craft a well-reasoned decision.1
In May 2009, Oceana Star Allen and Joseph K. Helms were involved in an automobile collision. In August 2010, Mrs. Allen and her husband, William Scott Allen, filed a lawsuit naming Mr. Helms as the defendant and alleging damages suffered by the Allens arising from the accident. Mrs. Allen claimed direct damages for her alleged personal injuries, while Mr. Allen sought derivative damages for loss of consortium. Mr. Helms was insured by GEICO General Insurance Company, which ultimately shouldered his defense.
One year later, in September 2011, Mr. Helms served separate proposals for settlement pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442.2 The first proposal was made to Mrs. Allen for $99,000 in payment of the claims she alleged against him; the second offered Mr. Allen $1000 for his claim. The total of the proposals represented the bodily injury limits of Mr. Helms' policy with GEICO. The Allens rejected the proposals.
Next, in December 2011, Mr. Helms filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. His "Schedule F—Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Clams" listed the Allens' lawsuit against him as an asset of the bankruptcy estate and noted the limits of his insurance. In his "Schedule B—Personal Property," however, Mr. Helms did not list the proposals for settlement as assets. A suggestion of bankruptcy was filed in the civil action on January 24, 2012, resulting in an automatic stay. The Allens moved for relief from the stay by agreeing to proceed solely against the available insurance proceeds. The stay was lifted in February 2012. Mr. Helms was granted discharge from bankruptcy in April.
One year later, the Allens' personal injury action was tried before a jury, which rendered its verdict in April 2013. It found that Mr. Helms was 57% negligent and Mrs. Allen, 43% comparatively negligent. The jury's total monetary award to Mrs. Allen was $116,654.57. The jury did not, however, find that Mr. Allen suffered any damages for loss of consortium. The Allens' post-trial motions were denied.
Thereafter, on November 6, 2013, Mr. Helms' bankruptcy trustee filed and served his "Report and Notice of Trustee's Intention to Sell Property of the Estate." According to the trial court, the Notice advised "all interested parties of the trustee's intent to sell whatever right, title and interest [Mr. Helms'] bankruptcy estate may have in the proposals for settlement to [the Allens] ... for the sum of $3500." GEICO was not served with the Notice. On December 3, 2013, the trustee filed his Report of Sale of Property of the Estate in which he confirmed the sale of the proposals for settlement to the Allens.
On December 31, 2013, Mr. Helms filed Defendant's Motion for Costs and Fees. The motion specified that Helms, "for the use and benefit of his liability insurer, GEICO General Insurance Company," sought entry of an order that "he or GEICO or both" were entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees from the Allens pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442. On the same date, having learned of the "sale" of the proposals for settlement to the Allens, GEICO moved to intervene in the proceedings.
In March 2014, Mr. Helms sought entry of a final judgment. On June 2, following a hearing, the trial court granted GEICO's motion to intervene. GEICO then filed its own motion for costs and fees, arguing that "[Helms] ha[d] neither incurred nor paid litigation costs and attorneys' fees in his own defense," but that all costs and fees had been paid by GEICO. Its motion was based on the rejected proposals for settlement and the fact that the net judgment recovered by the Allens—allowing for set-offs for comparative negligence and taxable costs—was at least 25% less than the proposals for settlement.
The Allens objected to an award of fees and costs on the grounds that the proposals for settlement were effectively a "cause of action" traditionally considered property of a bankrupt's estate.3 Since they had purchased that property from Helms' bankruptcy trustee, they believed that they were the rightful owners of the proposals. On June 20, 2014, the Allens filed a notice that they were withdrawing the proposals for settlement in an effort to defeat Mr. Helms and GEICO's claim of entitlement to collect attorneys' fees and costs. The trial court rejected the Allens' claim in its Order on Motion for Costs and Fees.4 Instead, it found that "[t]he jury award, after deduction for set-offs and apportionment of liability, is less than 75% of the amount offered in the proposals for settlement, thus triggering the sanctions contemplated by Rule 1.442 and section 768.79, Florida Statutes."
We begin our analysis by first addressing the Allens' argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine that the bankruptcy trustee's sale of the two proposals for settlement was invalid. We will then speak to the merits of the trial court's ruling.
The Allens contend that the trial court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to, and invaded the province of the bankruptcy court by, determining that the trustee's sale of the proposals for settlement was invalid. That contention reveals not only a misunderstanding of the substance of the trial court's decision, but of the nature of subject matter jurisdiction.
"[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction concerns the power of the trial court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs." Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. , 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing Lovett v. Lovett , 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (1927) ). In Cunningham , the supreme court elaborated upon this fundamental maxim:
..."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Malone v. Meres , 91 Fla. 709, 109 So. 677, 683 (1926) ); see also Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. , 842 So. 2d 797, 801 n.3 (Fla. 2003) ; Viverette v. State, Dep't of Transp. , 227 So. 3d 1274, 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). "Stated differently, a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is proper only when the court lacks authority to hear a class of cases, rather than when it simply lacks authority to grant the relief requested in a particular case." In re Adoption of D.P.P. , 158 So. 3d 633, 636-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citing Cunningham , 630 So. 2d at 181 ). Thus, in D.P.P. , the Fifth District concluded that "the court had subject matter jurisdiction as it is without question that the circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all adoption matters" by virtue of section 63.102(1), Florida Statutes. Id. at 637.
Just as the trial court in D.P.P. had the power conferred upon it by statute to hear the class of cases involving adoption, here, too, the trial court unquestionably had the subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the statutory—and rule-based—motion for attorney's fees and costs. Rather, what the Allens mistake for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is actually the inability of a trial court to grant relief in a particular case over which it has subject matter jurisdiction. The decision in Tobkin v. State , 777 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), illustrates this point.
In Tobkin , the parties to an action for an injunction for protection against domestic violence and a subsequently filed dissolution of marriage action, reconciled, and the wife filed voluntary dismissals in both actions. Notwithstanding the dismissal of those cases, the trial court went on to rule on the wife's attorney's motion to withdraw and the husband's motion to disqualify the wife's counsel, and it also enforced its previously ordered requirement that the husband attend counseling and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Frank v. AGA Enters.
...charging lien is the existence of an express or implied contract between counsel and the party recovering funds, which does not exist here. Id. Indeed, the Franks argue (and the Gonzalez firm does contest) that the Franks “never retained or entered into a contractual relationship with Gonza......
-
Stokes v. Jones
...been voluntarily dismissed, thereby divesting the court of "case jurisdiction" to proceed on the matter); see also Allen v. Helms , 293 So. 3d 572, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing Tobkin approvingly and explaining case jurisdiction versus subject matter jurisdiction). There is no dispute th......
- Goldson v. State