Allen v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 07 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–16–0234–PR,CR–16–0234–PR |
| Citation | 240 Ariz. 569,751 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 6,382 P.3d 784 |
| Parties | Sammantha Allen, John Michael Allen, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge, State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Marty Lieberman, Legal Defender, Maricopa County Office of the Legal Defender, John Ronan Curry (argued), Jeremy Bogart, Deputy Legal Defenders, Phoenix, Attorneys for Sammantha Allen
Bruce Peterson, Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Kerri L. Chamberlin (argued), Gary Beren, Robert E. Reinhardt, Deputy Legal Advocates, Phoenix, Attorneys for John Allen
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Karen Kemper (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona
Amy P. Knight, Kuykendall & Associates, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
¶ 1 After a defendant is indicted for first degree murder, if the state intends to seek the death penalty, it provides notice and alleges aggravating circumstances. The defendant may then request the trial court to determine if probable cause exists for the aggravators under the procedures outlined in Chronis v. Steinle , 220 Ariz. 559, 560 ¶ 1, 208 P.3d 210, 211 (2009). In Sanchez v. Ainley , 234 Ariz. 250, 251–52 ¶ 1, 321 P.3d 415, 416–17 (2014), we held that a defendant is entitled to a “Chronis hearing” even if the grand jury determined that probable cause exists for the alleged aggravating circumstances.
¶ 2 In this case, the State seeks the death penalty and alleges aggravating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(2) based on the defendants' prospective convictions for “serious offenses” concurrently charged by the grand jury. The issue here concerns how the trial court, in the context of a Chronis hearing, should determine if probable cause exists to support that aggravator. We hold that the trial court must independently determine if a concurrently charged offense qualifies as a serious offense, but the court should accept the grand jury's determination that probable cause exists for the concurrently charged offense.
¶ 3 A grand jury indicted Sammantha Allen and her husband, John Allen, for the first degree felony murder of Sammantha's ten-year-old cousin, Ame. The indictment concurrently charged the Allens with multiple counts of child abuse in violation of A.R.S. § 13–3623(A)(1). The State subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and alleged the child abuse offenses as “serious offense” aggravating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(2). This aggravator applies when a defendant has been convicted of a “serious offense” either prior to or contemporaneously with the defendant's conviction for first degree murder in the case in which the death penalty is sought.
¶ 4 At the Allens' request, the trial court conducted a Chronis hearing pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(c). The court ruled that a conviction on any of the concurrently charged child-abuse counts would qualify as a conviction of a serious offense for the (F)(2) aggravator. The Allens argued that the court also should independently determine if probable cause exists for those counts. The court instead concluded that probable cause exists for the serious offense aggravators because the “grand jury found probable cause to support each [child abuse] count of the Indictment when it returned a true bill.”
¶ 5 The Allens filed a petition for special action in the court of appeals. A divided panel of the court granted relief, holding that Sanchez requires the trial court to independently determine whether probable cause supports the concurrently charged child-abuse offenses that the State alleges are (F)(2) serious offenses. Allen v. Sanders , 239 Ariz. 360, 362 ¶ 6, 372 P.3d 304, 306 (App. 2016). A dissenting judge concluded that the trial court did not err by relying on the grand jury's probable cause determination. Id. at 366 ¶ 25, 372 P.3d at 310 (Cattani, J., dissenting).
¶ 6 We granted the State's petition for review to resolve a recurring legal issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.
¶ 7 Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(c), the state's filing of a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and its list of aggravating circumstances serves to “amend the charging document, and no further pleading needs to be filed.” That rule also allows a defendant to “challenge the legal sufficiency of an alleged aggravating circumstance” by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 16. In Chronis, we held that Rule 13.5(c) entitles a defendant to request the trial court to determine, based on an evidentiary hearing, if probable cause exists to support the alleged aggravators. 220 Ariz. at 563 ¶ 20, 208 P.3d at 214.
¶ 8 We subsequently ruled in Sanchez that a defendant is entitled to a Chronis hearing with respect to the state's alleged aggravating circumstances even if a grand jury has found that they are supported by probable cause. 234 Ariz. at 251–52 ¶ 1, 321 P.3d at 416–17. This holding reflected our conclusion that, under existing rules and statutes, a grand jury's duty is solely to charge “public offenses,” and thus “a grand jury is not permitted to determine whether probable cause supports aggravating circumstances alleged in a capital case.” Id. at 253 ¶ 11, 321 P.3d at 418. Apart from noting the grand jury's limited authority, we also observed that “because Rule 13.5(c) affords superior procedural rights to a defendant in a capital case, any grand jury findings concerning aggravating circumstances cannot deprive a defendant of a timely requested Chronis hearing.” Id. at 254 ¶ 17, 321 P.3d at 419.
¶ 9 This case poses an issue distinct from that addressed in Sanchez : if a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of an (F)(2) aggravating circumstance that depends on a concurrently charged offense for which a grand jury has found probable cause, must the trial court in a Chronis hearing independently determine probable cause for that offense? Because this issue involves the interpretation of statutes and rules, our review is de novo. Id. at 252 ¶ 6, 321 P.3d at 417.
¶ 10 In order to establish the (F)(2) aggravating circumstance, the state must prove that:
The defendant has been or was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether preparatory or completed. Convictions for serious offenses committed on the same occasion as the homicide, or not committed on the same occasion but consolidated for trial with the homicide, shall be treated as a serious offense under this paragraph.
A.R.S. § 13–751(F)(2). In this case, the State contends that the concurrently charged child-abuse counts are “serious offenses” that will establish the (F)(2) aggravator if the jury ultimately returns a guilty verdict on any of those counts.
¶ 11 The Allens timely challenged the legal sufficiency of this aggravating circumstance under Rule 13.5(c). After holding a Chronis hearing, the trial court found probable cause. The Allens do not challenge the trial court's legal conclusion that the concurrently charged child-abuse counts are “serious offenses”; they are “dangerous crimes against children.” See A.R.S. §§ 13–705(P), –751(J)(6). The Allens instead argue, and the court of appeals agreed, that the trial court erred by not independently determining if probable cause exists for the child-abuse counts and instead accepting the grand jury's findings in that regard.
¶ 12 Sanchez, the Allens note, states that a defendant's right to a Chronis hearing is not “affected by the grand jury's findings” of probable cause for alleged aggravating factors. See 234 Ariz. at 254 ¶ 14, 321 P.3d at 419. Sanchez also observed that “[a] Chronis hearing permits the defendant to review written statements made by the state's witnesses, cross-examine those witnesses, and present evidence to rebut the state's alleged aggravators.” Id. ¶ 15, 321 P.3d at 419. Consistent with these statements, and Sanchez 's recognition that Rule 13.5(c) affords “superior procedural rights to a defendant in a capital case,” id . ¶ 17, 321 P.3d at 419, the Allens argue that a trial court addressing a challenge to an (F)(2) aggravator based on a concurrently charged serious offense must permit the defendant to contest the state's evidence in a Chronis hearing and then independently determine if probable cause supports the charged offense.
¶ 13 We reject the Allens' interpretation of Sanchez and Rule 13.5(c) for several reasons. This case differs from Sanchez in that the grand jury here was not asked to find probable cause for the (F)(2) aggravator itself, but instead for the underlying child-abuse counts—a task within the grand jury's province—and the trial court did hold a Chronis hearing at the Allens' request. Moreover, although we spoke broadly in Sanchez about a defendant's right to an evidentiary hearing under Chronis, our statements should not be read as holding that Rule 13.5(c) invariably requires an evidentiary hearing whenever a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of an alleged aggravating circumstance.
¶ 14 Some challenges under Rule 13.5(c) turn on purely legal questions; others may turn on arguments over what a factfinder might reasonably conclude from facts that are not contested. In such circumstances, a trial court properly can determine the legal sufficiency of an alleged aggravator without holding an evidentiary hearing. In contrast, a defendant generally is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Chronis and Sanchez to determine whether probable cause exists for disputed factual elements of alleged...
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