Allen v. Smylie

Decision Date18 March 1969
Docket NumberNo. 10113,10113
Citation92 Idaho 846,452 P.2d 343
PartiesFrank J. ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert E. SMYLIE, Louis E. Clapp, Allan Shepard, Attorney General, Joe Williams, State Auditor, and Delmer F. Engelking, Superintendent of Public Instruction, as State Board of Land Commissioners, and O. J. Buxton, Commissioner of the Department of Lands, and Monsanto Company, a corporation, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Givens & Givens, Boise, for appellant.

Allan G. Shepard, Atty. Gen., and Warren Felton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, Boise, Senior & Senior, Salt Lake City, Utah, for respondents.

PRATHER, District Judge.

This case concerns the validity of certain phosphate mineral leases of school lands granted by the State of Idaho to respondent Monsanto Company in 1958 for a term of ten years. Leases for five year terms were originally issued to Monsanto in 1948, under I.C. § 47-704, which then read, so far as pertinent, as follows:

'All mineral leases of state school land shall be for a period of five years, upon condition that at the end of each five-year period succeeding the first day of the year in which the lease is issued the leaseholder shall be given a preferential right of renewal under such readjustment of terms and conditions as the board may determine to be necessary in the interest of the state.

'All mineral leases for lands belonging to the state of Idaho other than school lands, including the lands in the beds of navigable rivers of the state, shall be for a period not exceeding ten years upon condition that at the end of said ten-year period the leaseholder shall be given a preferential right of renewal under such readjustment of terms and conditions as the board may determine to be necessary in the interest of the state.'

In 1949, I.C. § 47-704 1 was amended to provide that the term of state mineral leases for school lands 'shall be for a term of ten years and as long thereafter as such mineral is produced in paying quantities therefrom.' S.L.1949, Ch. 77, § 1, p. 135. The clauses of the earlier act specifically dealing with a preferential right of renewal were deleted.

In 1953, Monsanto was again issued leases for the five year period specified in the earlier of the two above versions of the statute.

In 1957, I.C. § 47-704 was amended, so far as pertinent, to read:

'All mineral leases, except leases for oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons, of state school lands and for lands belonging to the State of Idaho, other than school lands, shall be for a term of ten years, and so long thereafter as precious metals, minerals, and ores, or any of them, are produced in paying quantities, or as much longer thereafter as the lessee in good faith shall conduct mining operations thereon, together with the right to use and occupy so much of the surface of said land as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the prospecting for, exploration for, development of, production, refining, processing and marketing of said precious metals, minerals and ores produced from said lands, including the right to construct and maintain thereon all works, buildings, plants, waterways, roads, communication lines, reservoirs, tanks or other structures necessary to the full enjoyment thereon for the purposes of the lease.

'Application for mineral leases shall be made under oath in such form as the board may prescribe, and the applicant shall describe the land, indicate the annual rental and royalty offered by him, specify the particular mineral or minerals, and give such additional information as may be required by the rules and regulations of the board. * * *' S.L.1957, Ch. 210, Sec. 1, p. 439.

Pursuant to the above amendment, the State Board of Land Commissioners adopted a new form of lease, which form changed a number of terms of the old lease, among other things changing the term from five to ten years.

Monsanto's original leases had a five year term, which term began in January, 1948. The 1953 leases extended the term to January, 1958. In October, 1957, Monsanto began correspondence with the Land Commissioner of Idaho regarding new leases.

It is a point of contention between the parties whether the 1958 leases are renewals of the prior leases or are in fact new leases. In the correspondence of March 13, 1958, Dr. Emigh, Director of Mining for Monsanto, referred to this as 'converting our present state phosphate leases over into a new proposed form.' In a letter of October 7, 1957, Monsanto had agreed to the basic terms of the new form, suggested correction of certain minor errors, and requested that the new forms be forwarded so that the necessary company signatures might be affixed. The issuance of these ten year leases was unanimously approved by the State Board of Land Commissioners at the regular meetings of July 16, 1958, and October 13, 1958.

Under date of December 5, 1963, more than five years after the issuance of the 1958 leases, appellant Frank Allen filed in the office of the Idaho State Land Commissioner two applications for mineral leases covering a portion of the land covered by Monsanto's three phosphate leases. The appellant contended that there had been no application under oath by the prior lessee, and that therefore the pretended leases were invalid. The State Land Commissioner rejected these applications, in a letter of June 26, 1964, after obtaining an opinion of the attorney general on the ground that there were existing valid leases covering the property.

A hearing before the State Land Board was held on March 20, 1965. On October 28, 1965, the Board unanimously rejected appellant's applications.

Appellant, on August 4, 1966, filed the pending suit, in which he requested alternative writs of prohibition and mandate ordering the Board to 'cease its enforcement' of the Monsanto leases and requiring it to issue leases based on appellant's applications. From a summary judgment entered in favor of respondent, Monsanto, appellant Allen has brought this appeal.

Respondents first contend that even if the purported leases were void, and if a writ of prohibition did lie, then appellant still could not maintain a writ of mandate, since the matter in question is one which concerns discretionary action by the State Land Board. 2 I.C. § R7-303 provides that the writ issue 'in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.'

This court has held that mandamus may well lie against decisions of the State Board of Land Commissioners. East Side Blaine County Livestock Association v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 34 Idaho 807, 198 P. 760 (1921); Furbee v. Alexander, 31 Idaho 738, 176 P. 97 (1918).

However, I.C. § 7-302 3 states additional prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of mandate. This court has had occasion to interpret this statute, and the following rule has emerged:

'Under this section this court has repeatedly held that mandamus will not lie unless party seeking it has clear legal right to have act done for which he seeks the writ and unless it is clear legal duty of officer to act; and will not lie to coerce or control discretion of the district court. Board of Commissioners of Shoshone County v. Mayhew, 5 Idaho 572, 51 P. 411; Connolly v. Woods, 13 Idaho 591, 92 P. 573; Olden v. Paxton, 27 Idaho 597, 150 P. 40; Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Flynn, 27 Idaho 632, 150 P. 42; Saint Michael's Monastery v. Steele, 30 Idaho 609, 167 P. 349; Brooks v. Edgington, 40 Idaho 432, 233 P. 514; Logan v. Carter, 49 Idaho 393, 288 P. 424; Aker v. Aker, 51 Idaho 555, 8 P.2d 777; Vandenberg v. Welker, 74 Idaho 508, 264 P.2d 1029; Leuhrs v. Spaulding, 80 Idaho 326, 328 P.2d 582.' Freeman v. McQuade, 80 Idaho 387, 331 P.2d 263 (1958).

In deciding whether a writ of mandate could properly issue in the present case, thus requiring the State Board of Land Commissioners to grant mineral leases to appellant, the court must first decide what function the Board plays in the issuing of leases. If, when proper applications for a lease are filed, the Board must grant the leases, then-again, assuming arguendo the Monsanto leases are void-a writ of mandate would be an available remedy. On the other hand, if the question whether to grant mineral leases is one which is left within the sound judgment and discretion of the State Board of Land Commissioners, then a writ of mandate would not be available to compel the issuance of such a lease.

Art. IX, Sec. 8 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, so far as relevant, provides that, 'It shall be the duty of the state board of land commissioners to provide for the location, protection, sale or rental of all the lands heretofore, or which may hereafter be granted to the state by the general government, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and in such manner as will secure the maximum possible amount therefor.' I.C. § 47-701 specifically reserves to the state all mineral deposits on state lands until the rights to such deposits are specifically sold or leased. I.C. § 47-704 provides the following guidelines for leases of mineral rights in state lands:

'The state board of land commissioners may lease in tracts not exceeding 640 acres for prospecting and mining purposes, and mineral deposits * * * that may be contained in any portion of * * * (state lands) * * * for such annual rental, not less than twenty-five cents (25cents) per acre per annum, and for such royalty upon the product as the board may deem fair and in the interest of the state * * *' (emphasis supplied)

From the above constitutional and statutory language, it is apparent that the State Board of Land Commissioners is required to use considerable judgment in the granting of mineral leases. The constitution required the Board to 'secure the maximum possible amount therefor.' It is with the judgment of the Board whether the leasing to a particular lessee of particular land at a...

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8 cases
  • Thompson v. Engelking
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 1, 1975
    ...required to perform an act unless it be a clear legal duty. Vandenberg v. Welker, 74 Idaho 508, 264 P.2d 1029 (1953); Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846, 452 P.2d 343 (1969); Felton v. Prather, 95 Idaho 280, 506 P.2d 1353 (1973). As clearly recognized by the trial court, it is within the plenary......
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