Allen v. Spitler
| Docket Number | 23AP0013 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 2525 |
| Parties | MICHAEL J. ALLEN Petitioner v. THE HONORABLE COREY E. SPITLER Respondent |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
ORIGINAL ACTION IN PROHIBITION
CRAIG M. JAQUITH, Assistant State Public Defender, for Petitioner.
ANGELA WYPASEK, Prosecuting Attorney, and BARBARA BIRO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondent.
DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} Relator, Michael J. Allen, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking an order striking the September 3, 2020 sentencing entry entered by Respondent, Judge Corey Spitler. Respondent has moved to dismiss and Mr. Allen has replied. For the following reasons, this Court grants the petition.
{¶2} Generally, for this Court to issue a writ of prohibition, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) respondent is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) the denial of the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists. State ex rel. Jones v Garfield Hts. Mun. Court, 77 Ohio St.3d 447, 448 (1997). If the respondent's lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, the petitioner need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34 2016-Ohio-3529, ¶ 62. In those cases prohibition will lie both to prevent the unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction in the future and to provide relief from prior judicial actions taken without jurisdiction. State ex rel. Smith v. Frost, 74 Ohio St.3d 107, 109 (1995); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Kirby, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-782, ¶ 9.
{¶3} In many prohibition cases, the respondent seeks to prevent anticipated unauthorized judicial action. This reflects the well-established rule that the writ of prohibition provides a preventative rather than corrective remedy. (Quotation omitted) State ex rel. Feltner v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 160 Ohio St.3d 359, 2020-Ohio-3080, ¶ 6. In this case, however, Mr. Allen requests the writ to correct Respondent's past actions. For a corrective writ of prohibition to issue, Mr. Allen must demonstrate that Respondent patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to take the action about which he complains. Id. at ¶ 6, 8. As noted above, under these circumstances, Mr Allen is not required to demonstrate that he lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan, 68 Ohio St.3d 590 (1994).
{¶4} With these requirements in mind, we turn to considering the procedure that brought this action before us.
Sentencing followed by resentencing
{¶5} The issue before this Court is clear and the procedural history is undisputed. Respondent sentenced Mr. Allen on July 2, 2020, to a definite term of three years in prison in case number 2020 CRC-I 000156. Two months later, in the same case, and without a motion filed by any party, Respondent filed a new sentencing entry.
{¶6} The new sentencing entry changed only one provision of Mr. Allen's sentence. The July 2020 order imposed a definite sentence of three years. The September 2020 sentencing entry, however, imposed an indefinite sentence of three to four-and-a-half years. Neither party appealed the July or September 2020 orders.
{¶7} Mr. Allen contends that Respondent lacked jurisdiction to impose a new sentence in September 2020. Through his petition, he asks this Court to vacate the September 2020 sentencing entry, leaving in place the July 2020 sentencing entry imposing a definite sentence of three years.
{¶8} In addition to his petition, Mr. Allen filed a number of exhibits. Those exhibits included, among other things, copies of the July 2020 sentencing entry and the September 2020 sentencing entry. Upon review, this Court agrees that the only difference between the two entries is the change from a three-year definite sentence in the July 2020 order to an indefinite sentence of three to four-and-a-half years in the September 2020 sentencing entry.
{¶9} Respondent, in his motion to dismiss, acknowledged holding a resentencing hearing: "Unambiguously, there was an error in the July 2, 2020 sentencing entry which then was reconsidered and corrected by Respondent in the September 3 2020 resentencing entry." According to the motion to dismiss, the purpose of the new hearing, and the new sentencing entry, was to comply with the sentencing requirements of the Reagan Tokes Act. Respondent held a new sentencing hearing, allowed Mr. Allen the opportunity to speak, and then imposed an indefinite sentence, leaving all of the other provisions of the July 2020 sentence unchanged.
{¶10} Respondent argued that the July 2020 sentence was void because it failed to comply with the Reagan Tokes Act. He further argued that resentencing was conducted pursuant to statutory authority. He relied on R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) as the authority to reconsider his erroneous sentence, explaining in his motion that:
when the sentencing court determined that a prison term is necessary it retains continuing jurisdiction to correct any error not previously raised at sentencing in making the determination of the minimum and maximum prison terms imposed on the offender.
{¶11} This language, quoted from the motion to dismiss, actually appears in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), but not for the reason argued in the motion. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g) concerns the trial court's calculation of jail-time credit. Subsection (i) requires the trial court to calculate jail-time credit, notify the defendant, and include it in the sentencing entry. Subsection (iii) grants continuing jurisdiction to the trial court to correct any error not previously raised at sentencing in the calculation of jail time credit under subsection (i). Nothing in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g) authorizes the trial court to correct an error in the imposition of a term of imprisonment.
{¶12} Respondent also argued that the July 2020 sentence was voidable because of the error in imposing a sentence not in compliance with the Reagan Tokes Act. He noted that this issue was not raised before the September 2020 resentencing hearing so he could, pursuant to his continuing jurisdiction over the matter, reconsider and correct his error by resentencing Mr. Allen.
{¶13} Respondent's argument runs contrary to settled law on the finality of sentencing entries. "[A] court has no authority to reconsider its own valid final judgments in criminal cases." State ex rel. Hansen v. Reed, 63 Ohio St.3d 597, 599 (1992). See, also, State ex rel. White v. Junkin, 80 Ohio St.3d 335, 338 (1997). A criminal sentence is final upon the trial court's issuance of a final order. State v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553, ¶ 11. {¶14} Carlisle is analogous to this case. There, according to the Supreme Court's opinion, the trial court modified the sentence nearly two years after it was entered. Id. at ¶ 11. The Supreme Court concluded that the "trial court's attempt to do so was improper." Id. We must likewise conclude that Respondent's attempt to modify Mr. Allen's final sentence, the July 2020 sentence, was also improper. As the Supreme Court has explicitly held, "[a] trial court lacks authority to reconsider a final judgment in a criminal case." State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, paragraph one of the syllabus. This is so even if the trial court's sentence contains an error, making the sentence voidable, as discussed below.
{¶15} Respondent further argues that res judicata bars Mr. Allen's attempt to challenge the resentencing in this action because he could have raised it on direct appeal. While res judicata might bar a claim regarding trial court error in some cases, this is not one of those cases. As it relates to the September 2020 sentencing entry, Respondent did not simply commit an error in the imposition of the September 2020 sentence during an otherwise proper sentencing hearing. Instead, Respondent reconsidered the final July 2020 sentence in a hearing held without jurisdiction and issued the September 2020 sentencing entry without jurisdiction. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that a trial court lacks authority to reconsider its final judgment in a criminal case. Raber, 2012-Ohio-5636, paragraph one of the syllabus. The July 2020 sentence was a final order that Respondent lacked jurisdiction to reconsider or modify, and Mr. Allen was not limited to direct appeal to challenge that act.
{¶16} The analysis is different as it relates to the July 2020 sentencing entry. That sentence may have been erroneous, as Respondent contends, because it failed to comply with the Reagan Tokes Act. But that error in the otherwise properly imposed sentence made the sentence voidable, not void. See, e.g., State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 2020...
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