Allen v. State, 8 Div. 72
| Decision Date | 28 October 1988 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 72 |
| Citation | 539 So.2d 1124 |
| Parties | Johnny C. ALLEN v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Bryce Graham, Jr., Tuscumbia, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Rivard Melson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
On July 1, 1986, a highly intoxicated Johnny C. Allen was driving his automobile at a high rate of speed when he crashed into the rear of the motorcycle driven by Carl Howard. Allen was convicted for the manslaughter of Mr. Howard and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender, fined $5,000, ordered to make restitution in the amount of $9,000, and further ordered to pay $1,000 to the victims' compensation fund. Three issues are raised on this appeal from that conviction.
The results of a test of a blood sample taken from the defendant at the hospital emergency room "for diagnostic purpose only" and as a part of routine hospital procedure was properly admitted into evidence even though the defendant had not been placed under arrest. "[W]here blood is seized only for medical purposes and not in furtherance of a criminal or accident investigation, the arrest requirement of Alabama's Implied Consent Law is not applicable." Veasey v. State, 531 So.2d 320 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).
Here, the record does contain a request for a blood sample signed by a Muscle Shoals police officer. However, other than the officer's signature, badge number, and police department, the form is blank. More significantly, the evidence is undisputed that the blood test was ordered by the treating physician for diagnostic purposes and not because of, or in conjunction with, the officer's request. Under these circumstances, the result of the blood test showing that the defendant had a blood-alcohol level of .393 was properly admitted into evidence.
The trial judge denied the defendant's pretrial motion for psychiatric examination, and, after an evidentiary hearing, denied the defendant's "motion to reconsider the application for mental evaluation."
The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to reconsider shows that the defendant was treated for alcohol abuse at two treatment facilities in 1983. A "psychiatric evaluation" report shows that "much of [the defendant's] trouble is characterological in nature, although, the diagnosis is one in which he does have some signs of a chronic brain syndrome 1 following a trauma and he also has preexisting alcoholism." An "assessment/screening" report states: "The client shows no signs of psychotic behavior or thinking." That report continues:
Robinson v. State, 428 So.2d 167, 170 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). See also Pace v. State, 284 Ala. 585, 587-88, 226 So.2d 645 (1969).
"Intoxication in itself does not constitute mental disease or defect...." Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-3-2(d). "Although excessive intoxication may produce insanity, ... 'legal insanity does not embrace every kind of mental disease and disorder that renders a person not responsible for his acts.' " Lister v. State, 437 So.2d 622, 624 (Ala.Cr.App.1983). Here, the defendant produced no evidence that his long-continued alcohol indulgence had resulted in a mental disease or defect which caused him to lack "the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." § 13A-3-1(a). Additionally, the defendant failed to present evidence generating a reasonable and bona fide doubt of his mental competency to stand trial.
The defendant was indicted for "reckless" murder under § 13A-6-2(a)(2). To this indictment, the defendant pleaded that "he is not guilty by reason of insanity or in the alternative was unable to form an intent due to alcohol and/or drug addiction." The trial judge instructed the jury on the elements of this offense and gave the statutory definition of "recklessly" contained in § 13A-2-2(3). The last sentence of that definition states: "A person who creates a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication, ... acts recklessly with respect thereto."
The trial judge did not charge the jury on the defense of mental disease or defect or the defense of intoxication. Defense counsel submitted no written requested charge, but did make two oral objections to the oral charge of the trial court: (1) "the charge of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect was not provided," and (2) the "failure to charge on intent."
The trial judge properly refused to charge on mental disease or defect because the only evidence presented at trial was that the defendant was suffering from voluntary intoxication. Young v. State, 428 So.2d 155, 160 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).
The only witness to testify for the defense was David Michael Cutler, the physician who treated the defendant in the emergency room after the collision. Dr. Cutler testified that, at that time, the defendant was disoriented from alcohol intoxication. He stated that with a blood-alcohol level of .393 it was "certainly possible" that an individual of the defendant's size could be very close to comatose or maybe even death; that the defendant was not comatose; and...
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