Grider v. State

• Citation: 766 So.2d 189
• Parties: Eddie Wayne GRIDER v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 29 October 1999
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

766 So.2d 189

Eddie Wayne GRIDER v. STATE.

CR-98-1595.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

October 29, 1999.

Rehearing Denied December 10, 1999.

Certiorari Denied March 24, 2000.

Winfred N. Watson, Fort Payne, for appellant.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Andy Scott Poole, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1990569.

FRY, Judge.

The appellant, Eddie Wayne Grider, was convicted of second-degree assault, a violation of § 13A-6-21, Ala.Code 1975. He was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to 32 years' imprisonment.

I.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a court-ordered mental examination. Specifically, he argues that because of his mental problems he was unable to effectively participate in his defense at trial.

According to Rule 11.2(a)(1), Ala. R.Crim.P., the defense may petition the circuit court for "an examination to assist in the determination of the defendant's present mental condition and competency to stand trial." The Committee Comments to Rule 11.2 state, in pertinent part, the following:

"Ordering an examination pursuant to this rule shall not be viewed as a perfunctory or ministerial act, but rather as a discretionary one, that should be exercised only if the circuit court has reasonable cause to believe the defendant may not be mentally competent. In exercising judicial discretion, the circuit court is authorized to deny the motion if there is no reasonable basis shown for questioning or examining the defendant's competency."

"`Common sense, as well as sound legal authority, dictates that the trial judge not grant a psychiatric examination at state expense unless there is some reason to believe the accused was incompetent or insane.'" Wisdom v. State, 515 So.2d 730, 733 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), quoting Bailey v. State, 421 So.2d 1364, 1367 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).

"`A defendant does not have a right to a mental examination whenever he requests one. Rather, this is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, with the defendant bearing the burden on a motion for a competency investigation of persuading the court that a reasonable and bona fide doubt exists as to the defendant's mental competency.' Robinson v. State, 428 So.2d 167, 170 (Ala.Cr.App.1982)."

Allen v. State, 539 So.2d 1124, 1126 (Ala. Cr.App.1988).

In Thomas v. State, 766 So.2d 860 (Ala. Cr.App.1998), this Court stated:

"Thomas simply assumes that evidence of mental problems automatically indicates incompetency. However, the law is clear that `[p]roof of the incompetency of an accused to stand trial involves more than simply showing that the accused has mental problems or psychological difficulties.' Bailey v. State, 421 So.2d 1364, 1366 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).

"`"A distinction must be made between mental illness and mental incompetency to stand trial, and the fact that a defendant is mentally ill does not necessarily mean that he is legally incompetent to stand trial. Thus, not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence of defendant's mental unfitness must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges."'

"Cowan v. State, 579 So.2d 13, 15 (Ala. Cr.App.1990) (quoting 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 550 (1989) (footnotes omitted))."

766 So.2d at 881.

The trial court's order denying the motion for a court-ordered mental examination stated, in pertinent part:

"This case came on for hearing on the defendant's motion for a mental examination to determine defendant's present mental condition and competency to stand trial. The defendant was present with his attorney, Finis Royal. The state was represented by the District Attorney, Charles Rhodes.

"In support of his motion, the defendant submitted reports prepared in 1997 for use in the connection with his request for Social Security disability benefits and a handwritten doctor's excuse for his absence from the original trial date of December 3, 1998. No testimony was presented in open court.

"The test for evaluating the defendant's competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has `sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceeding against him.' Ex parte Gordon, 556 So.2d 363 (Ala.1988).

"The defendant's burden for purposes of his motion is to establish a reasonable doubt as to his competency to stand trial. Russell v. State, 715 So.2d 866 (Ala.Cr.App.1997).

"The court has carefully considered the evidence submitted and observations of the defendant. The court finds that the defendant has failed to submit the records of the physician [who] treated him in December, 1998, or the specialists to [whom] he was referred as indicated in the physician's handwritten court excuse.

"Upon consideration of this matter, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant's motion for mental examination be, and it is hereby, denied."

(C. 48-49.)

During the hearing, reports indicating the appellant's psychological state when he applied for Social Security disability benefits in 1997 were submitted to the trial court. Our review of the record indicates that, after reviewing the psychological reports, the Social Security Administration determined that the appellant suffered from various mental disorders and that because of those mental disabilities he was entitled to disability insurance benefits. (C. 44.) One of the psychological reports indicated that, although the appellant did not possess sufficient judgment to make acceptable decisions in an employment setting, he was cooperative, his "stream of talk and mental activity were normal," and his "response to questions was adequate and relevant." (C. 37.)

Here, the appellant produced no evidence that a mental illness rendered him legally incompetent to assist in his defense or to understand the nature of the charges against him.¹ Furthermore, the trial court was able to observe the appellant's behavior during the motion hearing. Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that there was no reasonable basis shown for questioning or examining the defendant's competency.

II.

The appellant contends that the trial judge erred in not recusing herself from the sentencing proceedings.

Canon 3C.(1)(a), Canons of Judicial Ethics, provides:

"A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his disqualification is required by law or his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:

"(a) He has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding ...."

In Humphries v. Lynch, 579 So.2d 612 (Ala.1991), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

"In order for the probate judge to have erred in failing to recuse himself, he must have abused his discretion. Recusal is required under Canon 3 C(1), Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, when the facts are such that it is reasonable for a party, for members of the public, or for counsel to question the impartiality of the trial judge, but recusal is not required by mere accusations without proof of supporting facts. Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So.2d 1187 (Ala. Civ.App.1986) [citations omitted]. The test under that canon is: `"Would a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position knowing all of the facts known to the judge find that there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality?"' Bryars at 1189; Matter of Sheffield, 465 So.2d 350 (Ala. 1984)."

579 So.2d at 616.

Additionally, in Ex parte Cotton, 638 So.2d 870, 872 (Ala.1994), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

"The burden of proof is on the party seeking recusal. Prejudice on the part of a judge is not presumed. `"[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge who is already sworn to administer impartial justice and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea."' Ex parte Balogun, 516 So.2d 606, 609 (Ala.1987), quoting Fulton v. Longshore, 156 Ala. 611, 46 So. 989 (1908)."

In this case, before the sentencing hearing, the defense made a motion for the judge to recuse herself. In that motion, the appellant claimed that he had recently discovered that the judge had represented him in two assault cases when she was engaged in private practice, and that the judge had also represented opposing parties who had filed claims against him in a civil case. The trial judge stated that she did not recall dealing with any cases involving the appellant while she was in private practice. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced the appellant.

During the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the defense introduced court records that indicated that the trial judge had represented the appellant in two separate assault cases. The order of the trial court denying the motion for a new trial stated, in pertinent part:

"The defendant argues that the court should have recused from the case after notification by the defendant at the sentencing hearing that the court, during private practice, was attorney for the defendant on a prior case and was attorney for a party with whom the defendant had an opposing interest in a child-custody case. The defendant cites no grounds or rule of law requiring recusal of the court. The court has reviewed the case files numbered CC-92-334 and -335. The court has no independent recollection of representing the defendant in 1992 nor knowledge of the defendant's opposing interest in any custody case tried by the court [sic]. Upon review of the 1992 files, the court acknowledges that during private practice, the court was appointed to represent the defendant in two assault cases. The files reflect that a written waiver of arraignment and plea of not guilty was filed and soon thereafter the cases were dismissed against the defendant on his plea of guilty in an unrelated case wherein defendant

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