Allen v. State

Decision Date21 April 2021
Docket NumberNo. 4D20-1553,4D20-1553
Citation316 So.3d 719
Parties Lizett Alexis ALLEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Ross F. Berlin and Claire Victoria Madill, Assistant Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Forst, J.

Appellant Lizett Allen appeals from her conviction and sentence for grand theft over $20,000 following a jury trial. Appellant raises five issues on appeal, but we write only to address the third issue—that the trial court erred by prohibiting the introduction of relevant evidence. We agree with Appellant's third contention and, as explained below, conclude that the evidence was relevant to the defense's effort to establish a motive for the purported victim to fabricate her testimony against Appellant. The State has failed to establish that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and we thus reverse and remand for a new trial.

Background

The State charged Appellant with grand theft over $20,000, alleging that Appellant routinely overcharged the credit card of the purported victim, who was a client at Appellant's hair salon. The primary evidence against Appellant consisted of the purported victim's testimony, bank records showing excessive charges with the funds going into Appellant's personal accounts, and a text message exchange between the purported victim and Appellant.

The purported victim testified that she discovered the alleged fraudulent charges after checking her bank account statement in February 2017. After this discovery, she called Appellant to determine why her account had been overcharged by substantial amounts. Appellant told her that she had switched merchant accounts, and that the switch must have caused the errors. Appellant indicated that she would follow up with the purported victim and provide her with a case ID number from the help-desk ticket she would file. However, instead of providing the purported victim with a help-desk ticket number, Appellant texted her a message stating "I'm so sorry can I call you in the morning and we will talk." The purported victim agreed, but she also asked if the merchants called back with an ID number. Appellant responded "no," and then told the purported victim "I f****d up im so sorry my life went down the drain I will fix it can we talk when you come in at 3" and "I'm sorry I never thought it was that amount please let me fix it if you have to report it I understand." The purported victim made a police report the next morning.

The purported victim explained that she and Appellant were friends, but that she never authorized the excessive charges. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if she had ever purchased drugs from Appellant. The purported victim denied she had ever done so.

Following up on this line of questioning, defense counsel called Appellant to the stand. Appellant testified that she never charged the purported victim's credit card without her consent and that the charges were all authorized. She explained that, after the first year of knowing the purported victim, first as a client and then as both a client and a friend, Appellant would acquire drugs for her. The two agreed that the drug purchases would be covered by charges to the purported victim's credit card, which was on file at the salon. This payment method was intended to conceal the charges from the purported victim's husband.

Appellant further explained that the text message conversation introduced into evidence was a plan to "smooth over the explanation" to the purported victim's husband. The messages were intended to show him that the overcharges were attributable to Appellant, and thus conceal the purported victim's drug purchases. In furtherance of her defense of consent, Appellant attempted to testify that concealment of the purported victim's drug purchases and use was necessary, as this drug use created friction between the purported victim and her husband and ultimately caused the purported victim's divorce. When the State objected, defense counsel maintained that Appellant overheard arguments between the purported victim and her then-husband related to the purported victim's drug purchases and that their "marriage troubles" were related to the wife's drug use. Despite defense counsel's argument that testimony regarding the impact that the purported victim's drug purchases had on her marriage went "to motive as to why she would make up an allegation that this was fraud and not purchasing drugs[,]" the trial court sustained the State's relevancy objection to questions concerning the purported victim's marriage and divorce.

Following Appellant's testimony, the case proceeded to closing arguments and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. This appeal timely followed.

Analysis

"The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion. However, a trial court's discretion is limited by the rules of evidence." Harris v. State , 289 So. 3d 962, 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Orton v. State , 212 So. 3d 377, 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ).

"A party is given wide latitude to develop motive or bias in a witness's testimony." Roman v. State , 165 So. 3d 723, 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing Mardis v. State , 122 So. 3d 950, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ). "The ability to expose an improper impetus for a witness’ testimony is an essential component of the right to a jury trial." Jones v. State , 678 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). "Included in the types of matters that demonstrate bias are prejudice, interest in the outcome of a case, and any motivation for a witness to testify untruthfully." Id. As explained by this court in Elder v. State , 296 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) :

"[W]here evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a reasonable doubt of [the] defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its admission." Rivera v. State , 561 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990). Put differently, "[i]f there is any possibility of a tendency of evidence to create a reasonable doubt, the rules of evidence are usually construed to allow for its admissibility." Vannier v. State , 714 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

Id. at 446 (alterations in original).

Here, Appellant sought to testify that the purported victim's divorce was precipitated by substance abuse issues. Following the State's relevancy objection, defense counsel explained that the desired testimony was an important component of establishing a motive for the purported victim to testify untruthfully. Counsel explained that, during her deposition, the purported victim indicated "basically that she got divorced because of her drug use." Additionally, defense counsel provided a proffer of the...

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