Allen v. State
| Decision Date | 08 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2015–KA–00506–COA,2015–KA–00506–COA |
| Citation | 212 So.3d 98 |
| Parties | Jeremiah ALLEN a/k/a Jeremiah F. Allen, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
PHILLIP BROADHEAD, FOR APPELLANT
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE, FOR APPELLEE
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND FAIR, JJ.
FAIR, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶ 1. Jeremiah Allen,1 an employee at Wendy's in Richland, Mississippi, confessed to helping his brother rob the restaurant. The Rankin County Circuit Court rejected Allen's claims that his confession was involuntary because it was elicited by promises from law enforcement. While we find that the confession was properly admitted, the trial court did err in denying Allen the opportunity to present evidence to the jury attacking the confession's truthfulness. This error denied Allen a fair trial, and so we reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new trial. We address Allen's remaining contentions because they concern the sufficiency of the evidence or are "likely to arise once again on remand." Newell v. State , 175 So.3d 1260, 1268 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2015) (citations omitted).2
DISCUSSION
¶ 2. Allen unsuccessfully moved at trial to suppress his confession based on his claim that it was elicited through promises of leniency from the interviewing police officers. Allen initially became a suspect after surveillance video showed him talking on a cell phone and moving around near a door that had been left unlocked, through which the robber entered the restaurant after it closed. Allen actually made several statements on two separate days separated by about a week, and some of the statements concerned another robbery in another county. The first day, Allen was without the benefit of counsel, but he made a second and final statement in the presence of his defense attorney, Sarah Gregory, who ultimately did not represent him at trial.
¶ 3. "The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily, and not as the result of any promises, threats[,] or other inducements." Giles v. State , 187 So.3d 116, 125 (¶ 31) (Miss. 2016) (citation omitted). "A confession is voluntary when, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice." Wilson v. State , 936 So.2d 357, 361–62 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2006). "The burden lies with the State to prove that a confession is voluntary." Scott v. State , 8 So.3d 855, 861 (¶ 24) (Miss. 2008). Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). In order to admit the statement after hearing all the evidence, the trial judge must find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was given voluntarily. Id. at (¶ 23).
¶ 4. Each of the three officers involved in questioning Allen testified unequivocally that no one ever promised him leniency or otherwise led him to believe he would receive it if he confessed. According to the officers, Allen had attempted to elicit a promise of leniency by writing out a confession but refusing to sign it unless he was given a deal. Allen's offer was refused, and some time later, after retaining counsel, he gave another statement and signed it, all without ever receiving any promises.
¶ 5. Conversely, Allen testified that two of the officers had at several points offered him a lower bond and a reduction in his charges from armed robbery to conspiracy in exchange for his statement. In support of his claims, Allen points to the fact that after his final confession, the municipal court lowered his bond and apparently3 reduced his charges to conspiracy. Also, Gregory testified that she believed one of the officers had offered to reduce the charges in exchange for Allen's statement. Based on this evidence, Allen contends on appeal that the trial court's decision to admit the statement was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶ 6. "The circuit court sits as a fact finder when determining [the] voluntariness of a confession, and its determination will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong." Horne v. State , 825 So.2d 627, 639 (¶ 44) (Miss. 2002). This Court can reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress "only when an incorrect legal standard was applied, manifest error was committed, or the decision is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Williams v. State , 115 So.3d 774, 778 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2013) (quoting Martin v. State , 871 So.2d 693, 701 (¶ 30) (Miss. 2004) ). Most importantly, "the resolution of conflicting testimony regarding voluntariness is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial judge at the suppression hearing." Chase v. State , 645 So.2d 829, 841 (Miss. 1994) (citation omitted).
¶ 7. We reiterate that the officers testified that no promises were made to anyone. In response to Allen's claims, the officers admitted they did not know why his charges were noted to be reduced on the mittimus. And they conceded they would have expected to be consulted as to the charges to be brought. But the prosecutors and the grand jury had the authority to make the charging decision, not the police. There was also testimony that it was routine in the jurisdiction to reduce bond when an accused waived his right to a preliminary hearing, which Allen did.
¶ 8. In addition to the officers' testimony, there was other evidence refuting Allen's claims. His second written statement, which he signed, recites that it was given "without promises of any kind." Allen likewise executed a written Miranda waiver immediately prior to giving that statement; it too recited that no promises had been made. The waiver was signed by Allen's attorney, Gregory, as a witness. And Gregory admitted she had represented Allen and was acting as his attorney at the time, his decision to speak with law enforcement the second time was made after consulting with her, and she was present during the interview.4 Presumably, Gregory knew that prosecutors, not police officers, have the authority to reduce charges against a defendant.
¶ 9. At one point in her testimony, Gregory conceded that "there was no specific promise" but simply an "understanding [of some benefit] any time I let my client speak to law enforcement." Later, she did seem to suggest there was a more specific promise from one of the officers, but she could not remember when it was made or who had made it. Gregory also could not exclude the possibility that her understanding of a promise may have come from Allen himself.
¶ 10. Keeping in mind our deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court's resolution of the conflicting testimony here was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶ 11. While we find no error in the decision to admit Allen's confession into evidence, the trial judge also found that Allen's contentions regarding the surrounding circumstances were irrelevant and precluded Allen from presenting evidence attacking the confessions to the jury.
¶ 12. During the prosecution's case-in-chief, Allen attempted to set up this defense by asking one of the interviewing officers, Detective Lee Drake, about what Gregory, Allen's former defense attorney, had testified at the suppression hearing. The trial judge opined that he did not believe the question called for hearsay, but he sustained an objection that the question of whether leniency had been offered was irrelevant, remarking that it was "a matter for the court" and "not relevant to whether or not [Allen] committed this crime." After hearing more arguments, the judge reiterated: "It all goes to the issue of his expectation of leniency, and that's not relevant as to his guilt or innocence." Allen's attorney nonetheless proceeded to ask Detective Drake whether there had been any offers of leniency, which Drake denied, and then the attorney asked about how they would go about deciding what charges to bring against a suspect. But when Allen attempted to question Drake about the apparent reduction in Allen's charges after his confession, the prosecution objected, and the objection was sustained. This exchange followed:
The judge then asked the prosecutor for a response, and the prosecutor suggested that there might be a question about whether Detective Drake had personal knowledge about what charges were brought against Allen. The judge then asked the prosecutor whether that was an objection, and the prosecutor responded that he "thought so." The judge ruled that it was "[s]ustained as to relevancy, it's the same issue."
¶ 13. Thus, it is apparent that the trial court did not simply rule on objections to individual questions or answers on the cross-examination of Detective Drake; it made a sweeping finding of irrelevance that precluded Allen from presenting to the jury his version of the circumstances of his confession. This was contrary to well-settled Mississippi law, which our supreme...
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