Allen v. State

Decision Date24 September 2008
Docket NumberNo. 49A04-0710-CR-598.,49A04-0710-CR-598.
Citation893 N.E.2d 1092
PartiesKenneth ALLEN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Monica Foster, Foster & Long-Sharp, Eric Koselke, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Kelly A. Miklos, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Kenneth Allen raises the following dispositive issue: Whether he has standing to assert an unreasonable search and seizure claim pursuant to Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We affirm.1

The facts most favorable to the trial court's decision and the uncontradicted adverse evidence follow. On February 8, 2005, Allen and his sister, Kari Allen ("Kari"), were driving west on Interstate 70 through St. Charles County, Missouri. St. Charles County Deputy Sheriff Anthony Hojsik observed Allen speeding and changing lanes without signaling and initiated a traffic stop. Deputy Hojsik approached Allen's vehicle and asked Allen for proof of registration and a driver's license. Allen produced a Florida driver's license and an Indiana identification card. Kari did not have any identification.

Allen also produced a rental agreement showing that the vehicle was rented for a one-way trip from Indianapolis to Las Vegas. He told Deputy Hojsik that he was on his way to Las Vegas to "start a new life." Tr. at 24.2 Deputy Hojsik asked Allen whether he was employed, and he replied that he was not.

Deputy Hojsik asked Allen if he could search the car, and Allen consented. Deputy Hojsik found a number of identification cards, credit cards, and ATM cards in the names of Leander Bradley and Betty Bradley, who Deputy Hojsik learned were Allen and Kari's grandparents. In the trunk, Deputy Hojsik found a plastic bag with pillows, jeans, and a bloodstained bed sheet. There was also a satchel with a large amount of jewelry, a purse containing money, and a large soda bottle with a large number of cigarette butts in it. Allen and Kari's explanations regarding these items and their trip to Las Vegas were riddled with inconsistencies. Deputy Hojsik became concerned for the Bradleys' safety and contacted Indianapolis law enforcement to arrange a welfare check at the Bradleys' residence on Linwood Avenue in Indianapolis.

Indianapolis Police Officer Chris Edwards arrived at the Linwood residence first. He knocked on the front door and checked the windows. He reported that "everything was fine" and left. Id. at 70-71. In the meantime, Indianapolis Police Officer Michael Horn, thinking that it was unusual for an out-of-state law enforcement agency to request a welfare check, asked to be connected to Deputy Hojsik. Deputy Hojsik explained to Officer Horn why he had requested the welfare check, including the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop and the search of Allen's vehicle. Officer Horn told Deputy Hojsik that he would try to get into the Linwood residence. When he arrived, he knocked on the door loudly and circled the perimeter of the residence but did not observe anyone there.

A man across the street, neighbor Marlin Andrews, approached Officer Horn and expressed his opinion that "something's wrong in that house." Id. at 30. To help Officer Horn gain entry into the residence, Andrews, a locksmith, unsuccessfully attempted to pick the front door lock. Thereafter, they walked around the house and observed an air conditioning unit in one of the windows. Officer Horn removed the unit and entered the residence through the window. He unlocked the front door and looked in all the rooms but did not find anyone there. He went to the basement, where he saw a freshly poured slab of concrete. He left the house and contacted Deputy Hojsik.

Officer Horn asked Deputy Hojsik to ask the Allens what kind of vehicles the Bradleys owned. Kari described the vehicles to Deputy Hojsik, who relayed the information to Officer Horn. Kari's description confirmed that the vehicles in the driveway belonged to the Bradleys. Officer Horn told Deputy Hojsik, "They're there." Id. at 19. Deputy Hojsik replied, "Oh they're there?" Id. Kari overhead the deputy's remark and blurted out, "He killed `em, and buried `em in the basement." Id. at 20. Deputy Hojsik asked, "Who?" Id. She explained, "My brother killed them and buried them, and killed my mother, but I don't know what he did with her body." Id.

Meanwhile, Officer Horn and a supervising officer conducted a more thorough search of the Linwood residence but did not discover the Bradleys. A search warrant for the Linwood residence was issued that day and executed February 9, 2005. During the search, the basement floor was excavated and trash bags were found containing the body of Leander and the dismembered bodies of Betty and Sharon Allen, Allen and Kari's mother.

During an interview with Missouri law enforcement, Allen admitted that he killed his mother and grandparents. According to Allen, he had been released from prison November 26, 2004, and began living with his mother in her Noblesville apartment. State's Ex. 1 at 82, 85, 101. Allen stated that sometime in December 2004, he killed his mother by smothering and strangling her to death. Id. at 87. Approximately two weeks later, Allen lured his grandmother to the Noblesville apartment and strangled her to death. Id. at 89-91. He took the keys to the Linwood residence from his grandmother. He drove to the Linwood residence, let himself in the house, and waited for his grandfather to come out of his bedroom. Id. at 93. When his grandfather came out, he hit him with a hammer and strangled him to death. Id.

About a week later, Allen rented a car and transported the dismembered bodies of his mother and grandmother to the Linwood residence. Id. at 107-09. With a rented jackhammer, Allen dug a hole through the Bradleys' basement floor into which he placed the three bodies and covered them with fresh concrete. Id. at 109-12. Over the next month, Allen stayed in the Linwood residence and attempted to gain access to the Bradleys' bank accounts and lines of credit. Id. at 101-02, 108. Allen eventually decided to go to Las Vegas. He explained, "Once I felt like things were kinda-wrapped up and I got pretty much all the credit cards I could, had all the ATM cards. That was when I was ready to just—get on out of the area." State's Ex. 2 at 252.

On February 9, 2005, the State charged Allen with three counts of murder, three counts of conspiracy to commit murder, and two counts of robbery and sought the death penalty. On June 12, 2006, Allen filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the February 8 and 9 searches of the Linwood residence, claiming that they violated his rights pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Following hearings on July 20, 2006, and November 30, 2006, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon denying Allen's motion.3 The trial court found, inter alia, that Allen did not have "standing" to bring an unreasonable search and seizure claim under either the federal or state constitutions.

On appeal, Allen claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We review the denial of a motion to suppress as we do other claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Starks v. State, 846 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Ind. Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. We will not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision. Carroll v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Additionally, we will consider evidence favorable to the defendant that is uncontested. Best v. State, 821 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ind.Ct. App.2005), trans. denied. We will affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any legal grounds apparent in the record. Id. at 424.

Allen challenges the trial court's finding that he did not have standing to object to the searches of the Linwood residence based on alleged violations of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Standing is defined as a "party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed.2004).

We note that Allen does not dispute the trial court's ruling that he was unable to challenge the constitutionality of the searches under the Fourth Amendment. Allen does argue, however, that a different result is warranted under the Indiana Constitution because the Indiana standing analysis differs from the federal. The State agrees that there are some differences regarding "standing" under federal and state jurisprudence but disagrees as to the nature of these differences. Therefore, we will first examine the differences between the federal and state standing analyses before turning to the merits of Allen's claim.

To establish standing pursuant to Article 1, Section 11, our supreme court has stated that "a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in the premises searched or the property seized." Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996). The court has also stated that a "defendant must show a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the premises." Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 598 (Ind.2008) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979)). With respect to federal constitutional claims,

Fourth Amendment rights are personal and...

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