Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co., S088829.

• Decision Date: 13 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. S088829.,S088829.
• Citation: 47 P.3d 639,120 Cal.Rptr.2d 795,28 Cal.4th 222
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Dacus Wade ALLEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SULLY-MILLER CONTRACTING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

120 Cal.Rptr.2d 795

28 Cal.4th 222

47 P.3d 639

Dacus Wade ALLEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SULLY-MILLER CONTRACTING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S088829.

Supreme Court of California.

June 13, 2002.

Law Offices of Greg W. Garrotto and Greg W. Garrotto, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kirtland & Packard and Robert A. Muhlbach, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

Civil Code section 3333.4 (section 3333.4) was enacted through passage of Proposition 213 in the November 5, 1996 General Election. Known as The Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, Proposition 213 sought to restrict the ability of uninsured motorists, convicted drunk drivers, and convicted felons to recover for losses suffered in accidents.

In this case, an uninsured motorcyclist was injured in a single-vehicle accident while turning across an unmarked elevated "bus pad" on a public roadway. We shall address whether section 3333.4 bars the motorcyclist from recovering noneconomic losses in his premises liability action against the private construction company that maintained control over the roadway at the time of the accident. We conclude that it does.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The City of Los Angeles (the City) hired Sully-Miller Contracting Company (Sully-Miller) as the prime contractor for certain road construction work, including street widening and the installation of concrete bus pads on the road at bus stop locations. Sully-Miller, in turn, subcontracted with Daniel J. Lopez Concrete Construction (Lopez Construction) to construct the bus pads. Sully-Miller retained responsibility for providing traffic control at the construction sites, which entailed the installation and maintenance of road barriers and delineators to warn motorists and others of ditches and uneven road surfaces.

One of the bus pads constructed by Lopez Construction was not level with the asphalt surface of the street; it rose three inches above the street surface in some places. On the night of August 13, 1996, there were no barricades or delineators marking the differentiated height of the pad when Dacus Wade Allen (Allen), who was driving his motorcycle, attempted to make a right-hand turn across the pad. Allen's tire caught on the elevated lip of the pad and his motorcycle fell, causing injuries to his knee.

Allen brought a negligence and premises liability action against the City, Sully-Miller, and Lopez Construction. On the day scheduled for trial, defendants moved to preclude the introduction of evidence of Allen's noneconomic damages based on Allen's admission that he did not have liability insurance for his motorcycle at the time of the accident. The trial court granted the motion, finding the action subject to the restrictions of section 3333.4.

At the close of Allen's case, the trial court granted a nonsuit in favor of Lopez Construction. Subsequently, the jury found, by special verdict, that the public property in question was in a dangerous condition at the time of Allen's accident. Although the jury found that the City was not liable because it had no actual or constructive notice of the condition, it evidently accepted Allen's theory that Sully-Miller was negligent in failing to install barriers or delineators to warn of the elevated nature of the bus pad. Allen was not assessed with any comparative negligence. The jury awarded Allen $24,080 in economic damages for his medical expenses and lost earnings. The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict and denied Allen's motion for a new trial.

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial. Relying on Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884, 980 P.2d 433 (Hodges), the appellate court concluded that section 3333.4 does not apply in an action for premises liability against a private entity.

We granted review and held the matter pending our decision in Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196 (Day), which involved the question whether section 3333.4 applied in an action against two local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property.

After we decided Day, we ordered briefing limited to the issue whether section 3333.4 bars recovery of noneconomic losses in this premises liability action against a private construction company.

DISCUSSION

Section 3333.4 provides in pertinent part: "(a) ... [I]n any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages if any of the following applies: [¶] ... [¶] (2) The injured person was the owner of a vehicle involved in the accident and the vehicle was not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state. [¶] (3) The injured person was the operator of a vehicle involved in the accident and the operator can not establish his or her financial responsibility as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state."¹

In this case, the question is whether an action to recover damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident caused by a private construction company's negligent creation or maintenance of a dangerous road condition is an "action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle" within the meaning of section 3333.4, subdivision (a).

Where, as here, the issue presented is one of statutory construction, our fundamental task is "to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute." (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196; see People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 240, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) We begin by examining the statutory language because it generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (People v. Trevino, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 241, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) We give the language its usual and ordinary meaning, and "[i]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs." (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196.) If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, "we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history." (Ibid.) Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute. (Ibid.; Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57.) Any interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided. (Ibid.)

Applying these rules of statutory construction, we conclude that Allen's action falls squarely within the terms of section 3333.4. First, Allen did not have liability insurance on his motorcycle at the time of the accident. Second, his action seeks to recover for damages that occurred when the tire of the uninsured motorcycle he was operating caught on an uneven street surface, causing his motorcycle to fall. The factual circumstances here raise no ambiguity or uncertainty as to the application of the statute, which precludes recovery of noneconomic damages "in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle" (§ 3333.4, subd. (a)), if the injured person was not insured as the owner or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident (id., subd. (a)(2), (3)). Accordingly, Allen "shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages." (Id., subd. (a).)

We compare the instant action with the one at issue in Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th 268, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196, which involved an uninsured motorcyclist who was struck by a car in an intersection. In that case, the jury determined that overgrown vegetation on public property surrounding the intersection had obstructed the motorists' views and contributed to the accident. Since such facts demonstrated "a necessary and causal relationship between the plaintiffs operation of his motorcycle and the accident for which he claimed the public entities were responsible;" Day concluded that the plaintiffs action sought to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of that motor vehicle within the contemplation of section 3333.4. (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 274, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196.)

As in Day, the facts here establish "a necessary and causal relationship" between Allen's operation of his uninsured motorcycle and the accident for which he claims Sully-Miller was responsible by virtue of its negligence in creating or maintaining a dangerous road condition. Just as in Day, then, Allen may recover for his economic losses, but he is statutorily barred from seeking noneconomic recovery. Contrary to the assertions of Allen and the dissenting justices, neither Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109,86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884,980 P.2d 433, nor Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927, compels a different construction. In both cases, we found the language of section 3333.4, subdivision (a) ambiguous with respect to the particular factual circumstances before us. (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 113,86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884,980 P.2d 433; Horwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 277, 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927.) In Hodges, which involved an uninsured plaintiffs action against the manufacturer of a defective vehicle, there was no necessary connection between the plaintiffs "operation or use" of a vehicle and the injuries he suffered. In Horwich v. Superior Court, recovery of noneconomic damages was sought by "a person" who was not the uninsured owner or operator of the...