Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc.
| Citation | 486 F. Supp. 1195 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 16687,16761. |
| Parties | John T. ALLEN et al. v. TERMINAL TRANSPORT CO., INC. et al. UNITED STATES of America v. TERMINAL TRANSPORT CO., INC. et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Michael B. Trister, Thomas P. Carney, Jr., Justice Dept., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
Robert Beynart, Atlanta, Ga., for Terminal Transport.
HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation.
Presently pending in the above-styled case is the application of the private plaintiffs for attorneys' fees. To clarify the issues involved, a hearing on this matter was held on December 3, 1979.
In 1972, this class action was brought, on behalf of the Georgia applicants for employment and employees of Terminal Transport Company (hereinafter referred to as "Terminal"), against Terminal and two union defendants, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, and the Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union No. 728. (The International and the Local are sometimes collectively referred to as "the unions.") The complaint alleged Terminal discriminated against black employees and applicants, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq., and section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. The action was consolidated, by order of the court, with a similar suit filed shortly afterwards by the United States on behalf of Terminal employees nationwide.
While pre-trial proceedings continued, the private plaintiffs, the government and Terminal negotiated and arrived at a settlement, designated as a Consent Decree in Partial Resolution of Suit, which was signed by the court on August 4, 1975. The union defendants did not participate in this settlement. Terminal agreed to pay $200,000.00 to various class members as back pay, to offer preferential employment opportunities to the class members, to hire blacks and whites in equal numbers for each of its facilities, and to modify other employment practices that had stood as obstacles to equal employment of blacks. The consent decree expressly reserved the issue of employee seniority for subsequent determination. The decree provided that "Terminal shall pay counsel for the named Plaintiffs in the private class action $9,000.00 as counsel fees and reimbursement of costs and expenses."
In August, 1975, a trial was held to decide the seniority issue. In January, 1976, the court found that Terminal had discriminated on the basis of race in the employment and assignment of drivers at its Atlanta Cartersville facility, in violation of Title VII and § 1981, and ruled that class members who were incumbent employees were entitled to compensatory seniority. The court originally refused to award seniority to those class members whom Terminal had refused to hire, but, following the Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976), rejected applicants were awarded compensatory seniority on June 28, 1976.
After these orders issued, the parties began negotiations to determine the appropriate seniority relief for individual employees and applicants. Over the course of several years, the parties were able to reach agreement as to most employees, and the unresolved claims, together with other issues, were subsequently referred to a special master. The court adopted the special master's report and recommendations, with certain exceptions, on April 20, 1979.
Pursuant to the consent decree, several named plaintiffs and class members accepted employment as road drivers. Terminal treated these individuals as probationary employees for a period of thirty days, however, which had the effect of denying them the right to exercise their seniority in obtaining desirable job assignments. The plaintiffs brought this to the attention of the court, which directed the parties to try to resolve the question among themselves. After informal negotiations failed the questions were submitted to an employer-union grievance committee, which made a determination favorable to the plaintiffs on one issue only. The plaintiffs then brought the matter back to the court, and at a hearing held on June 1, 1979, Terminal agreed to provide most of the relief requested. Subsequently, the court held for the plaintiffs on the single remaining issue.
A threshold question is whether the August 4, 1975, consent decree operates to relieve Terminal of any liability for attorneys' fees.1 The consent decree was discussed at the fee hearing, but the parties were unable to add anything beyond the terms of the agreement. The consent decree expressly stated that "all questions relating to seniority are reserved for future adjudication by this Court," and further that "Terminal expressly reserves the right to contest the granting of retroactive or preferential seniority to any class member." Consent Decree ¶ 33. In view of the language of the order and the substantial questions it reserved for later resolution, the court agrees with the plaintiffs that "it would be unreasonable to construe paragraph 36 as barring fees for later proceedings in the case," Private Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Application for Attorney's Fees of July 17, 1979, at 6. Thus, although they may not recover for work respecting matters finally settled in the consent decree the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for attorneys' fees for work on the August, 1975 trial. The plaintiffs have assured the court that any time claimed for the period 1972 through 1975 relates to this trial and not to matters covered by the consent decree. Private Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum of September 5, 1979, at 2-3; Private Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of October 22, 1979, Trister Affidavit, at 4 ¶ 5.
The parties agree that the determination of reasonable attorneys' fees, which the private plaintiffs are entitled to recover under both section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1979 Supp.), should be guided by the standards articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Johnson recognizes that the award of attorneys' fees is to a great extent a matter of judgment, and that there is no way to lend "mathematical precision" to what is essentially a balancing process. 488 F.2d at 720. The request of the plaintiff class is a conservative one, refreshingly so, and, all things considered, the court finds it eminently fair. The parties have not discussed the point, but the fee in this case was contingent in the most extreme sense of the word. Plaintiffs' counsel will recover no more than that awarded by this court, and had it been requested this consideration would have justified a serious notion of some augmentation of the award. Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 577 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1978) (Judge Vance dissenting in part); Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718 ¶ 6. The plaintiffs will be satisfied if they receive approximately what they have requested, so no multiplier has been applied, but this certainly means there is great latitude through which the award cannot be criticised by the defendants. This point having been emphasized, there follows a somewhat detailed analysis of some of the matters considered in computing the award. This discussion is also intended to show that those issues stressed by the defendants do not justify reduction of the award, but even if this were otherwise, the conservative amount requested, and granted, would still be appropriate.2
A proper first step under Johnson is to multiply the hours of work performed by a reasonable hourly rate,3 to arrive at a base from which to work. The private plaintiffs have provided the data to perform this computation in their application of July 17, 1979, as supplemented by their memorandum of October 22, 1979. After reviewing the underlying facts, the court accepts as true and reasonable the following:
The award thus computed should be adjusted to reflect the several factors enumerated in Johnson. A consideration of the Johnson factors indicates that this award is extremely conservative.5
Some of the Johnson criteria require only brief comment. The court is satisfied that the plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to avoid duplicating the work of the government lawyers who were also involved in this case; a related issue is developed more fully below. While they cannot be described as novel, the issues involved in this case were difficult, and counsel was required to deal with a constantly changing law, especially in the areas of union liability and seniority. Plaintiffs' counsel brought great skill to bear on their tasks, and this skill was in no small part responsible for their success in negotiations and at trial. Both lawyers for the plaintiffs have extensive experience in civil rights cases, as their reputations reflect. Michael Trister may be said to have specialized in civil rights cases. Finally, counsel secured substantial non-pecuniary relief for the class and its individual members.
When this suit was brought, Trister was on the staff of the Washington Research Project, a public-interest law firm in Washington, D.C. He went into private practice in 1976, but continued to work on the case,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Brown v. Fairleigh Dickinson University
...447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980); Bradford v. Blum, 507 F.Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 486 F.Supp. 1195, 1201 (N.D. Ga.1980) (prevailing defendant), aff'd, 638 F.2d 1232, modified 653 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 98......
-
Ruiz v. Estelle, H-78-987-CA.
...faith on the preparation and pursuit of unsuccessful claims should not be excluded in computing the fee award.' Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc. 486 F.Supp. 1195 at 1201."); Smith v. Fletcher, 559 F.2d 1014, 1018 n. 9 (5th Cir.1977) ("Finally, defendant argued ... that the court should......
-
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
...have construed the statute to allow fee awards against "innocent" defendants and intervenors. See e.g., Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 486 F.Supp. 1195, 1202 (N.D.Ga.1980) (union defendant guilty of no discrimination held partially liable for Title VII attorneys' fees due to opposit......
-
Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc.
...fees should be assessed against the defendant unions. In support of this contention, Motor Convoy relies upon Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc., 486 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D.Ga.1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir.1981). In Allen, the plaintiffs brought a class action against the defendant emp......