Allen v. Urdangen

• Decision Date: 17 February 1909
• Citation: 119 N.W. 724,141 Iowa 280
• Parties: ELI ALLEN, Appellee, v. B. URDANGEN, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

119 N.W. 724

141 Iowa 280

ELI ALLEN, Appellee, v. B. URDANGEN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 17, 1909

Appeal from Poweshiek District Court.--HON. K. E. WILCOCKSON, Judge.

THIS is an action on quantum meruit for balance due for the value of services rendered by plaintiff to defendant. The defendant admits the rendition of services, but avers that the same were rendered in pursuance of an express agreement that they should be paid for at the rate of $ 1 per day, and that the amount so agreed upon was so paid in full by the defendant to the plaintiff from time to time as the services were rendered. There was a trial before a jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

J. H Patton, for appellant.

Boyd & Bray, for appellee.

OPINION

EVANS, C. J.

In April, 1906, the plaintiff entered into the employment of the defendant for the performance of common labor, of a miscellaneous character. Shortly prior to this time the plaintiff had been in the employment of the defendant at an agreed wage of $ 1 per day. It is claimed by the plaintiff that at the time of the latter employment the defendant said to him that he would pay him as good wages as he could get anywhere, and that there was nothing else said on the subject of wages. The defendant contends that the plaintiff came to him to seek work and offered to work for $ 1 per day, and that the defendant accepted the offer and set him to work. The plaintiff worked under this employment with more or less regularity until about February 19, 1907. At the end of each week, usually, he presented to the defendant a statement of his time, and received pay therefor from the defendant at the rate of $ 1 per day. The defendant alleged an oral agreement for an express wage, and denied that the value of plaintiff's services was greater than $ 1 per day. The case is presented to us on this appeal upon four assignments of error, and we will consider them in the order of presentation by the appellant.

I William Vogt, a witness for defendant, testified in detail to a conversation had between himself and the plaintiff while the plaintiff was in defendant's employment. He testified that as a part of this conversation the plaintiff said to him that he was receiving as wages $ 1 per day. On cross-examination the following occurred: "A. Well, he was saying that he was working for Mr. Urdangen. Q. Was that all he said? A. Why, yes, sir." Redirect examination: "Q. Now, Mr. Vogt, he asked you if that was all that was said, that he was working for Mr. Urdangen. Do you want to be understood that that was all the conversation that was had, or do you want to be understood that the conversation was had as you testified first? A. Yes, sir. (Objected to as leading and suggestive, and putting words in the witness' mouth. Sustained.)" The appellant complains of this ruling. Whether right or wrong, he was in no manner hurt by it. The question could very properly have been permitted by the court under the circumstances. There was some apparent confusion as to what the witness meant by his answer on cross-examination; but his answer on the redirect examination did not clear the confusion to any extent. The question being in the alternative, an affirmative answer could not be other than ambiguous. Appellant's counsel did not attempt to question the witness further on the subject. This he could have done, notwithstanding the ruling of the court. Appellant has therefore no ground of complaint at this point.

II. The defendant testified as a witness in his own behalf. His counsel put to him the following question: "Q. Do you know as a matter of fact whether or not you have paid him in full for all the services and all the days he worked for you? (Objected to as asking for the conclusion of the witness. Sustained.)" The refusal of the court to permit this question could work no possible prejudice to the defendant. He had testified fully to the fact of paying the plaintiff $ 1 per day for all the time he had worked for him. He had also testified to the alleged oral agreement that $ 1 a day was to be the wage. The plaintiff conceded that he had received $ 1 per day. The defendant did not claim to have paid him any more. There was therefore nothing left to be covered by the question under consideration, and the court properly excluded it.

III. August Schrader was a witness for the defendant. He had worked for the defendant as a co-employee of the plaintiff for a number of days, and testified specifically as to the kind of work done by each. He had also described the physical condition of the plaintiff, as he saw it. The following...