Allen v. La Vaud

• Decision Date: 05 January 1915
• Citation: 213 N.Y. 322,107 N.E. 570
• Parties: ALLEN et al. v. LA VAUD et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

213 N.Y. 322

107 N.E. 570

ALLEN et al.

v.LA VAUD et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 5, 1915.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by Herbert R. Allen and others, by Hezekiah E. Lawrence, guardian ad litem, against Lillian F. La. Vaud and Louisa B. Biglin. There was judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division (159 App. Div. 914,144 N. Y. Supp. 1103), and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

Richmond J. Reese, of New York City, for appellants.

James E. Kelly, of New York City, for respondents.

HISCOCK, J.

This action was brought to set aside two deeds made by one Philip S. Biglin and his wife, the defendant Louisa A. Biglin, to his daughter, the defendant La Vaud, on the grounds that said Biglin was of unsound mind, and that said conveyances were procured by duress and undue influence exercised over him by the said defendant La Vaud. The conveyances were executed as part of one and the same transaction, and the defendant Mrs. Biglin joined in them simply for the purpose of cutting off her right of dower.

The trial justice announced at the close of plaintiffs' case, and without hearing any evidence offered in behalf of the defendants, that he would dismiss the action. This determination seems to have been largely based on the failure of proof that the grantor was incompetent mentally. What was then said by him would seem to indicate that his original purpose was to dismiss the action as on a nonsuit, because the plaintiffs had produced no evidence sustaining their cause of action, rather than on a consideration of the merits with findings of fact. In the end, however, such findings were made to the effect that said conveyances were valid, and that no undue or improper influence was exercised by the grantee over the grantor . While this theory of the disposition of the case is questioned by the appellants on this appeal, we shall accept it was controlling on us, and consider whether the findings made by the trial justice were supported by the evidence.

We think that credible evidence which the trial justice was bound to believe in the absence of contradiction and established the following facts at the time the trial closed:

The grantor was of an age which had permitted service in the Civil War. His wife was a physical and mental wreck and signed the deeds with a mark. His only next of kin were the defendant La Vaud, who was his daughter, living with her husband, and the plaintiffs, who were the children of a deceased daughter, ranging in age from about nine years upward. Until a comparatively short period before the execution of the conveyances these three families had lived in adjoining houses, but after the death of the plaintiffs' mother their father, having remarried, moved elsewhere, taking with him all of his children, except the youngest son, Philip, who was left with his grandparents. The grantor was especially attached to this grandchild, who had been named after him, and for whom he showed his fondness in various ways. The grandparents continued to live in their house by themselves until a few days before the occurrences in question, when the defendant La Vaud caused them to be moved to the house occupied by her. At the same time Philip's father was requested to take him away at once, and from the time the grantor was thus moved to this daughter's house there were no members of the household except his infirm wife, the defendant daughter, and her husband, and the deeds were executed inside of a week from the date of his removal. While two or three friends permitted to see him, a Catholic priest whom he had requested to visit him was not permitted to see him, the daughter assigning as a reason that her father was asleep, and the husband giving the more unfriendly and harsh excuse that he would not allow a priest to enter the house.

The grantor for at least two years before the execution of the deeds had been afflicted with heart disease and with degeneration of the arteries. Some weeks before their execution these diseases had become acute, resulting in a dropsical and seriously weakened condition which made him incapable of moving without help, and made him expectant of death. Stimulants were systematically administered to him. The diseases likewise impaired his mind, at least to the extent of making its operations slower and more difficult, and he died within about a week after the execution of the conveyances.

While the plaintiffs rather strangely omitted to give any evidence concerning the value of the real estate covered by the deeds, it apparently was of considerable value, and the conveyance thereof stripped the grantor of all of his property, so that at the time of his death a few days later he left no personal effects or estate. There was no evidence concerning the consideration for the conveyances, except as it is to be gathered from the recitals in the deeds, and from these recitals in connection with the grantor's lack of property at the time of his death we think it must fairly be inferred that one of them at least was executed for a nominal consideration.

On these facts the question is presented to us whether a court by its findings should give validity to a conveyance executed under such rather sinister conditions unrelieved by any word of explanation or evidence of honesty and fair dealing on the part of the person...