Allen v. Williams Motor Sales Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1931
• Citation: 277 Mass. 295,179 N.E. 159
• Parties: ALLEN v. WILLIAMS MOTOR SALES CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

277 Mass. 295

179 N.E. 159

ALLEN

v.WILLIAMS MOTOR SALES CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Dec. 15, 1931.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; Henry T. Lummus, Judge.

Action by Edward N. Allen against the Williams Motor Sales Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exception.

Exception sustained, and judgment for defendant.

George F. Leary and George D. Cummings, both of Springfield, for plaintiff.

John P. Kirby, of Springfield, for defendant.

SANDERSON, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful discharge of the plaintiff while under a contract of employment with the defendant. The jury would have been warranted in finding that in August or September, 1927, the plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement by virtue of which the plaintiff, who was then in the employ of the defendant on a commission basis with a drawing account of $50 a week, was to receive $5,000 a year for his services as salesman for one year beginning January 1, 1928, the defendant's president then stating to him that he wanted the plaintiff to build up the finest sales organization in the city. The statute of frauds was a defence to the enforcement of this contract and the jury were so instructed without objection. The plaintiff, however, contends that the statute of frauds does not apply because he made a new contract on January 7, 1928. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the question for decision is presented by the defendant's exception to the denial of its motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the contract was within the statute of frauds (G. L. c. 259, § 1, subd. 5) in that it was not to be performed within one year.

On January 7, 1928, when the plaintiff received but $50 in his pay envelope, he brought the attention of the defendant's secretary to the new contract under which he was then working. There was evidence that a new schedule was then prepared by the secretary by which he would be paid $300 a month for the first three months of the year and larger sums during the summer months, so that the payments for the year would be $5,000. The plaintiff testified that after his conference with the secretary, and on the same day, he saw the president of the defendant and directed his attention to some misunderstanding respecting what he should receive in January, because of the fact that he had been paid only $50 that day, and reminded him of the agreement they had made; that the president then said: ‘Don't you worry, Allen. I agreed to pay you five thousand dollars salary; I will pay you the five thousand dollars salary; don't you worry. * * * You are my right hand man and I want you to do everything you can to help me. I depend a lot upon you. I want you to build up this sales organization. * * * Don't worry, I will be glad to give you five thousand dollars for this year.’ The plaintiff also testified that he and the president were talking about ‘the contract that had been made.’ On the first Saturday of February the plaintiff was paid $300, and other payments were made amounting in all to $1,650 between January 1, 1928, and July 5 of the same year, when he was discharged. The manager in the defendant's employ testified to agreeing to the payment of $300 a month but only as a drawing account to be credited against commissions. He denied agreeing to any larger payments in the later months. The plaintiff testified that before January 7 no arrangement had been made about how much of the $5,000 he was to receive each month.

The contract made in September, 1927, was a valid subsisting contract notwithstanding the fact that it was unenforceable because of the statute of frauds. Amsinck v. American Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 185, 186. As a general rule a promise to pay one for doing what he is already legally bound to do is a promise without valid consideration for a contract. Parrot v. Mexican Central R. Co., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N. E. 590,34 L. R. A. ...