Alley v. Consolidation Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 21 October 1985 |
| Parties | Benjamin E. ALLEY, Appellee, v. CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY, Appellant. 699 S.W.2d 147 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Thomas M. Cole, Knoxville, for appellant; Arnett, Draper & Hagood, of counsel.
William R. Stanifer, Tazewell, for appellee; Stanifer and Stanifer, of counsel.
Consolidation Coal Company has appealed from the decree of the chancery court awarding plaintiff benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act. The chancellor based the award of benefits on his finding that the plaintiff, who worked in underground mines for forty-nine years, has pneumoconiosis and is totally and permanently disabled from performing his usual coal mine work or comparable work. Appellant, not being certain as to the applicable standard of appellate review since the passage of Chapter 393 of the Public Acts of 1985, argues both that there is no material evidence to support the chancellor's findings and that the evidence preponderates against his findings.
Chapter 393 of the Public Acts of 1985, which became effective July 1, 1985, amends the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Act in several material aspects, one of which is to replace the "material evidence" standard of appellate review with a new standard. Section 14 of Chapter 393 provides that on appeal:
Review of findings of fact by the trial court shall be de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
There is nothing in Chapter 393 to indicate whether the new appellate standard of review is to be applied prospectively or retroactively. In contrast, section 1 of the legislation, which raises the "maximum weekly benefit" payable under the Act, specifically provides for a prospective application of that portion of the legislation.
This court has previously held that Woods v. TRW, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tenn.1977). In the Woods case it was also noted that "[o]rdinarily, ..., statutes enacted by the General Assembly are given prospective operation and will be so construed unless a clear intention to the contrary is found in their provisions."
As heretofore noted, there is nothing in the Act itself that indicates any intention on the part of the legislature that Section 14, though it pertains to procedural matters, is to be applied retrospectively. Neither does the legislative history of the Act or tapes of legislative debates help in deciding the intent of the legislature. In fact, the debates show that the question of retrospective versus prospective application was never discussed. This leaves us in the position of having to follow basic rules of law in determining the intent of the legislature. Following our decision in the Woods case, supra, we conclude that it was the intent of the legislature that the new standard of appellate review be applied prospectively, i.e., to worker's compensation causes of action which arise on and after July 1, 1985.
There is no question but that the cause of action now on appeal arose prior to July 1, 1985. Consequently, the appellate review will be under the material evidence standard, which precludes this court from considering the preponderance of the evidence. Kingsport Press, Inc. v. Van Huss, 547 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn.1977). See also Gibson v. Consolidation Coal Co., 588 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn.1979).
The legislature in enacting the compensation act expressly entrusted the trial court with the power to find the facts and when such facts are supported by any material evidence, even if this court thinks the evidence points otherwise, the trial court must be affirmed.
Kingsport Press, Inc. v. Van Huss, supra at 574.
Under this standard of review, there is material evidence to show that the plaintiff worked underground at the face of the mine for forty-nine years and eight months, the last fourteen years of his employment being in mines operated by the defendant. The plaintiff ceased working in the mines in May, 1983, at a time when the defendant offered a retirement incentive. In November, 1983, a physician advised plaintiff that he had pneumoconiosis.
Plaintiff testified that during the last few years he worked in the mines, he was noticeably short of breath and could not perform all the tasks that fell to him as shift foreman. Specifically, he testified he was unable to wear the required self-rescue respirator, could not perform required cardio-pulmonary-resuscitation drills, could not participate in required emergency evacuation drills, and could not "walk out of...
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