Alley v. Schoolfield

• Decision Date: 05 June 1953
• Citation: 260 S.W.2d 281,195 Tenn. 541,31 Beeler 541
• Parties: , 195 Tenn. 541 ALLEY et al. v. SCHOOLFIELD, Judge, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 281

260 S.W.2d 281

31 Beeler 541, 195 Tenn. 541

ALLEY et al. v. SCHOOLFIELD, Judge, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 5, 1953.

On Petition for Rehearing July 17, 1953.

T. O. Jewell, Chattanooga, for appellant.

Raymond A. Graham, Ray L. Brock, Jr., and W. Corry Smith, Dist. Atty. Gen., Chattanooga, for appellees.

GAILOR, Justice.

The appellants, who were the Complainants in the original bill, filed the bill in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County, against the Criminal Judge, the Criminal Court Clerk, and the Sheriff of Hamilton County, to enjoin execution of criminal judgments against the Complainants, and to grant them new trials in the criminal causes out of which the judgments arose. The bill was met by demurrer, which the Chancellor sustained, and on appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the cause for hearing on the merits. On the remand, a demurrer, coupled with an answer, was filed, as was a stipulation of facts, and after a hearing on these pleadings and argument of counsel, the Chancellor entered a decree by which the bill of complaint was dismissed and the injunction theretofore granted, was continued in effect, pending the disposition of the cause in this Court. The Complainants have perfected this appeal.

The only question presented is whether on the facts stated in the stipulation, the Complainants are entitled to a decree for a new trial of the criminal cause out of which the criminal judgment arose. If the Complainants are not entitled to a new trial, the criminal judgments are final and enforcible. The stipulation is as follows:

'Come the complainants by their attorney, E. B. Baker, and the defendants by their counsel, Cardinal Woolsey, Assistant Attorney General, and make the following agreement and stipulation:

'1. That the criminal case was tried before Honorable Raulston Schoolfield on May 24, 1950, at which time the defendants in the State's case were found guilty.

'2. That motion for a new trial was heard and overruled on June 3, 1950, at which time defendants in the State's case were given 60 days in which to perfect and file their bill of exceptions, and that said bill of exceptions was signed by the trial judge on August 3, 1950.

'3. That the bill of exceptions filed in this cause did not include defendants' Exhibit 1, Search Warrant, but same was filed by order of Judge Schoolfield on September 14, 1950, said exhibit being made a part of the record.

'4. The sole assignment of error to the Supreme Court was that the conviction was invalid in that the search warrant used by the State was invalid; nevertheless said search warrant was not a part of the bill of exceptions as tendered to the trial judge, signed by him on August 3, 1950 because Richard Smith, court reporter, failed to include the said search warrant in the original bill of exceptions, as attested to by him by his oath, filed on September 14, 1950.

'5. That said search warrant was omitted from the bill of exceptions in the criminal case, by the court reporter.'

From this statement, it is clear that the only question undertaken to be presented on the former appeal of the criminal case, was the validity of the search warrant under which the evidence was obtained to support the conviction. It is equally clear that the search warrant, itself, which was the only evidence upon which this Court could have reviewed the evidence and its validity, was not properly preserved and presented to this Court on the former appeal. When the Trial Judge undertook to sign the search warrant and incorporate it in the bill of exceptions, he had lost jurisdiction of the cause and was without authority so to do. Fine v. State, 183 Tenn. 117, 191 S.W.2d 173; Turner v. State, 187 Tenn. 309, 321, 213 S.W.2d 281; Bass v. State, 191 Tenn. 259, 267, 231 S.W.2d 707; State ex rel. Britt v. Burns, 192 Tenn. 514, 516, 241 S.W.2d 551.

While the stipulation does not disclose that the Complainants, individually, were guilty of negligence, yet it specifically shows that the agent of the Complainants, the Court Reporter was...