Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co.

Decision Date20 March 1995
Citation280 N.J.Super. 254,654 A.2d 1375
PartiesMichael ALLGOR, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Hack, Piro, O'Day, Merklinger, Wallace & McKenna, Florham Park, for appellant (William F. Murphy, on the brief).

George A. Vaccaro, Paramus, for respondent (Jacqueline C. Grindrod, Totowa, on the brief).

Before Judges MICHELS, KEEFE and HUMPHREYS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KEEFE, J.A.D.

The issue to be decided is whether an agreement by a named insured to submit all underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits disputes to binding arbitration precludes a minor, family member of the insured from seeking trial by jury as to such a dispute. The Law Division held that the minor was not bound by his father's agreement with the insurer, and denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The insurer appeals from that judgment which we now reverse for reasons stated herein. 1

The facts are not in dispute. Thomas W. Allgor, father of plaintiff Michael Allgor, purchased an automobile insurance policy from defendant Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers). The policy provided for, among other things, UIM coverage in the amount of $250,000 for each person and $500,000 for each accident.

On August 10, 1986, plaintiff, then a minor, was operating his father's vehicle when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Laura Overton. Ms. Overton's auto insurance policy provided the minimum liability limits of $15,000 per person per accident. Unfortunately, the injuries sustained by plaintiff were substantial. Ms. Overton's automobile insurer paid the limits of her liability policy in settlement of the claim.

Plaintiff had previously placed Travelers on notice of his UIM claim. Plaintiff was qualified to make such a claim because he was a "relative" of the named insured under the policy, and, thus, considered an "insured" for the purpose of making such a claim.

The matter eventually proceeded to arbitration and resulted in an award of $100,000 for plaintiff's non-economic loss. The arbitrators appropriately reduced the award by $15,000, the sum paid to plaintiff by Overton's insurer, and entered a net award of $85,000. Plaintiff rejected Travelers' tender of payment of the $85,000.

Thereafter, plaintiff instituted suit against Travelers and demanded a trial by jury "as to the value of his claim to the extent (sic) limit of the policy of insurance[.]" Travelers moved for summary judgment relying upon the provisions of the policy which provided that any disagreement as to the "amounts of damages" would be settled by arbitration. After providing the procedure by which three arbitrators would be appointed, the expense of arbitration, and its venue, the policy provided The written decision of any two arbitrators will be binding on both parties, subject to the terms of this insurance. Judgment on the award made by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction.

In a six page letter opinion, the Law Division judge held that "an insured who is not a party to a contract of insurance does not waive the right to trial by jury." The crux of the trial judge's reason for coming to that conclusion is found in the following passage from his opinion.

The arbitration clause, as it applies to an insured who is not the named insured or owner of the insurance policy, is violative of public policy. There can be no public policy consideration greater than that which is expressed in the Constitution of New Jersey, N.J. Const. 1947 Art. 1 p 9. The right to trial by jury is inviolable. The right is a personal right which can only be waived by the individual who asserts the right. The right "in law" cannot be bargained away without the consent or the knowledge of the individual who asserts the right.

The judge's opinion appears to apply to all insureds regardless of age, other than the name insured. On appeal, however, plaintiff focuses his argument on the narrower issue, i.e. his status as a minor.

UIM coverage is not mandated by statute. Rather, it is an option which must be offered by an insurer "to the named insured[.]" N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1; Prudential v. Travelers, 264 N.J.Super. 251, 259, 624 A.2d 600 (App.Div.1993). Except for the requirement that UIM coverage be offered up to certain limits, the Legislature imposed no other restrictions on the content of the coverage agreement. "It is fundamental that in the absence of a statutory prohibition to the contrary, an insurance company has a right to impose whatever conditions it desires prior to assuming its obligations, ..." including the provision that disputes be resolved by way of arbitration. Royal Ins. Co. v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 271 N.J.Super. 409, 419, 638 A.2d 924 (App.Div.1994).

A claim presented under a UIM endorsement is essentially one of contract. Prudential, supra, 264 N.J.Super. at 257, 624 A.2d 600 (citing Christy v. City of Newark, 102 N.J. 598, 610, 510 A.2d 22 (1986)). At common law, a litigant who sued on contract for money damages enjoyed a right to trial by jury. See Weinisch v. Sawyer, 123 N.J. 333, 343, 587 A.2d 615 (1991). That is not to say, however, that a party to a contract cannot agree to a different forum for the resolution of a dispute arising out of the contract. That is what occurred here. The fact that the Travelers policy is a contract of adhesion does not automatically void the agreement. It "is the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry[.]" Rudbart v. Water Supply Comm'n., 127 N.J. 344, 354, 605 A.2d 681 (1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 203, 121 L.Ed.2d 145 (1992). The critical question is whether "as a matter of policy" the unilaterally fixed provision of the contract should be enforced. Ibid. It can no longer be doubted that where parties to a contract choose arbitration as the alternative forum for dispute resolution, such choice is in accord with the public policy of this State, and will be afforded respectful recognition with only a narrow scope of judicial review. Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Associates, Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 640 A.2d 788 (1994).

Although Thomas Allgor had no power to bargain out the arbitration clause, there was no degree of economic compulsion which required him to adhere to Travelers' choice of forum. As pointed out earlier, the Legislature made UIM coverage optional. Thomas Allgor could either elect or not elect its benefits. With the exception of the Legislature's demand that coverage be offered to certain limits, it did not choose to dictate further the terms of the UIM coverage agreement.

However, it is clear that the Legislature considered and approved arbitration as the forum for resolving uninsured motorist (UM) disputes. See N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1d. UM coverage is mandated by statute. N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1a. There is no reason to believe the Legislature would make a different choice for the resolution of UIM claims where the coverage is optional. In the absence of economic compulsion and in view of the fact that enforcement of the arbitration clause advances rather than contravenes public policy, the elements ordinarily relied upon to set aside provisions of a contract of adhesion are not present. Rudbart, supra, 127 N.J. at 356-359, 605 A.2d 681. Arbitration being a legislatively and judicially acknowledged and encouraged forum for the resolution of disputes, we perceive no violation of public policy simply because that election is contained in a contract of adhesion. Thus, we conclude that the named insured, Thomas Allgor, is bound by the arbitration clause of the UIM policy, although it cannot be said that he had a right to preclude that result.

The question then is whether non-parties to the insurance contract, who nonetheless may be defined as insureds under it, are also bound. An insurance policy is an integrated document and "operates as a single contract, rather than as separate contracts for each named insured." 1 Long The Law of Liability Insurance, § 2.02 (Bender ed. 1994). Aside from the named insured who elects UIM coverage, the Legislature does not mandate who else must be insured. See Handler v. State Farm Ins., 253 N.J.Super. 641, 602 A.2d 796 (App.Div.1992). Thus, plaintiff, in this case as a "relative" of the named insured, is simply a third-party beneficiary of the contract. The rights of such a beneficiary "depend upon, and are measured by, the terms of the contract between the promisor and the promisee." Roehrs v. Lees, 178 N.J.Super. 399, 409, 429 A.2d 388 (App.Div.1981). A third-party beneficiary may accept the benefits of the contract, but is also bound by any burdens or restrictions created by it. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 459-460 (1991). Specifically, a third-party beneficiary's rights against an insurer are no greater than those of the insured. 8 Appleman, Insurance Law And Practice, § 4811 (1981). As an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract, plaintiff in this case simply does not have greater rights than his father has as the named insured and maker of the contract. Thus, plaintiff is able to contest the terms of the contract only to the extent that his father can. Consequently, because the binding arbitration clause is enforceable against plaintiff's father, it is also enforceable against plaintiff.

Plaintiff also argues that arbitration is not appropriate when the best interests of a child are at stake and relies on Wertlake v. Wertlake, 127 N.J.Super. 595, 318 A.2d 446 (Ch.Div. 1974). This argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984) approved the arbitration of child support issues where arbitration was chosen as the forum for dispute resolution by the parties in their separation agreement. Id. at 108-110, 477 A.2d 1257. The Court held that an arbitrator's award will be valid, subject only to N.J.S.A....

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