Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar

• Decision Date: 14 March 2012
• Docket Number: 11–35670.,Nos. 11–35661,s. 11–35661
• Parties: ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES; Friends of the Clearwater; Wildearth Guardians, Plaintiffs–Appellants,andCenter for Biological Diversity; Cascadia Wildlands, Plaintiffs, v. Ken SALAZAR, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of the Interior; Rowan Gould, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service; United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Defendants–Appellees,andIdaho Farm Bureau Federation; Montana Farm Bureau Federation; Mountain States Legal Foundation; National Rifle Association of America; Safari Club International; Wildlife Conservation Groups, Intervenors.Center For Biological Diversity; Cascadia Wildlands; Western Watersheds Project, Plaintiffs–Appellants,andAlliance for the Wild Rockies; Friends of the Clearwater; Wildearth Guardians, Plaintiffs, v. Ken Salazar, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of the Interior; Rowan Gould, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service; United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Defendants–Appellees,andIdaho Farm Bureau Federation; Montana Farm Bureau Federation; Mountain States Legal Foundation; National Rifle Association of America; Safari Club International; Wildlife Conservation Groups, Intervenors.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3017

2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3376

672 F.3d 1170

ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES; Friends of the Clearwater; Wildearth Guardians, Plaintiffs–Appellants,andCenter for Biological Diversity; Cascadia Wildlands, Plaintiffs,

v.Ken SALAZAR, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of the Interior; Rowan Gould, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service; United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Defendants–Appellees,andIdaho Farm Bureau Federation; Montana Farm Bureau Federation; Mountain States Legal Foundation; National Rifle Association of America; Safari Club International; Wildlife Conservation Groups, Intervenors.Center For Biological Diversity; Cascadia Wildlands; Western Watersheds Project, Plaintiffs–Appellants,andAlliance for the Wild Rockies; Friends of the Clearwater; Wildearth Guardians, Plaintiffs,

v.Ken Salazar, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of the Interior; Rowan Gould, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service; United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Defendants–Appellees,andIdaho Farm Bureau Federation; Montana Farm Bureau Federation; Mountain States Legal Foundation; National Rifle Association of America; Safari Club International; Wildlife Conservation Groups, Intervenors.

Nos. 11–35661

11–35670.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 8, 2011.Filed March 14, 2012.

James J. Tutchton, Centennial, CO, and Amy Rae Atwood, Portland, OR, for the plaintiffs-appellants Alliance for the Wild Rockies, et al.

David C. Shilton, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the defendants-appellees Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

Steven J. Lechner, Lakewood, CO, for intervenors-appellees Safari Club International, et al.Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. Nos. 9:11–cv–00070–DWM, 9:11–cv–00071–DWM.Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, STEPHEN REINHARDT, and MARY H. MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff environmental groups seek to enjoin the implementation of a statute, Section 1713 of the 2011 Appropriations Act, that orders the Secretary of the Interior to remove a portion of a distinct population of gray wolves from the protections of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) without regard to any statute or regulation that might otherwise apply. Section 1713 effectively undid an earlier district court decision that found that such an action by the government, a “partial delisting,” would violate the ESA. Plaintiffs brought this action contending that Section 1713 violates the separation of powers. The district court rejected plaintiffs' claims on the ground that Congress had acted within its constitutional authority to change the laws applicable to pending litigation. Because this case is controlled by Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992), we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Over the last decade, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) has repeatedly attempted to remove all or parts of the distinct population of gray wolves in the northern Rocky Mountains from the protections of the ESA. These efforts have been struck down by the courts for violating the ESA. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Interior, 354 F.Supp.2d 1156 (D.Or.2005); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F.Supp.2d 1160 (D.Mont.2008). In 2009, the agency issued what is known as the “2009 Rule,” 50 C.F.R. Part 17, 74 Fed. Reg. 15,123. It designated a distinct population of gray wolves in the northern Rocky Mountains and removed ESA protection for all except those in Wyoming. The district court struck down the 2009 Rule as violating the ESA because the statute does not permit partial delisting of a distinct population segment. Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D.Mont.2010). The federal government, the states of Idaho and Montana, and various intervenors appealed, and that appeal, consolidated at No. 10–35885, has been stayed pending resolution of this case.

Meanwhile, proponents of the 2009 Rule began exploring ways to delist the gray wolves through legislation. These efforts culminated in Section 1713 of the Department of Defense and Full–Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, which the President signed into law on April 15, 2011. Pub. L. 112–10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011). Section 1713 orders the Secretary of the Interior to reissue the 2009 Rule without regard to the ESA and without judicial review. Section 1713 provides in its entirety:

Before the end of the 60–day period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall reissue the final rule published on April 2, 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 15123 et seq.) without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule. Such reissuance (including this section) shall not be subject to judicial review and shall not abrogate or otherwise have any effect on the order and judgment issued by the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming in Case Numbers 09–CV–118J and 09–CV–138J on November 18, 2010 [involving Wyoming's management plan for gray wolves].

Id.

On May 5, 2011, FWS complied with Section 1713 by reissuing the 2009 Rule. 50 C.F.R. Part 17, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,590. That same day, plaintiffs filed this suit challenging the constitutionality of Section 1713 under the separation of powers doctrine, and relying on United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 80 U.S. 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871). On August 3, 2011, the district court granted summary judgment to the government defendants. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, et al. v. Salazar, 800 F.Supp.2d 1123 (D.Mont.2011). We review the legal ruling de novo and affirm.

II. ANALYSIS

The cornerstones of plaintiffs' separation of powers challenge were laid in the mid–19th century when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 80 U.S. 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871) and Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 18 How. 421, 15 L.Ed. 435 (1855).

In Klein, the Supreme Court struck down an act of Congress that dictated the result in pending litigation. The plaintiff in Klein sued the government for the proceeds of property sold during the Civil War. The suit was filed under a statute granting such a cause of action to noncombatant confederate landowners who could show proof of loyalty to the federal government. The Supreme Court, in an earlier case, had decided that receipt of a Presidential pardon was sufficient proof of “loyalty” under this law. The Court of Claims in Klein followed that decision and awarded recovery. While the government's appeal was pending, Congress passed a statute providing that no pardon could be admitted as proof of loyalty to the federal government and that acceptance of a pardon, under most circumstances, was conclusive evidence of disloyalty. The statute thus directed the Supreme Court and the Court of Claims to find that a claimant who had accepted a Presidential pardon was in fact disloyal and, therefore, not entitled to land sale proceeds. The newly enacted statute further directed the Supreme Court to dismiss any case, for want of jurisdiction, if the claimant had prevailed upon proof of loyalty by Presidential pardon.

In striking down the statute, the Supreme Court in Klein explained that the effect of the new law was to deny jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and Court of Claims in pending cases “solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.” Id. at 146. This, the Court held, Congress could not do: “It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power.” Id. Because Congress had “prescribe[d] a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way,” Congress “passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power,” and the provision was declared unconstitutional. Id. at 146–47.

The Court in Klein had to distinguish Wheeling Bridge. There, the Court had originally held that a bridge was an obstruction to navigation. 59 U.S. at 429. Intervening legislation, however, made the bridge a post-road for passage of the United States mail and forbade users of the river from interfering with the bridge. The Court concluded in Wheeling Bridge that this new statute had changed the earlier law that the bridge was obstructing navigation. “[A]lthough [the bridge] still may be an obstruction in fact,[it] is not so in the contemplation of law.” Id. at 430. The Court in Klein held Wheeling Bridge differed from Klein in a critically important aspect: Congress had changed the law, not told the Court that it should decide the case differently under the same law. “No arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in [ Wheeling Bridge ], but the court was left to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created by the act. In [ Klein ] no new circumstances have been created by legislation.” Klein, 80 U.S. at 146–47.

Klein, however, has remained an isolated Supreme Court application of the separation of powers doctrine to strike down a statute that dictated the result in pending litigation. This court relied on Klein in Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir.1990), rev'd, Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) to strike down a statute enacted to affect pending environmental litigation aimed at restricting logging and protecting the endangered spotted owl. While the litigation was still ongoing, and after the environmental groups had won a preliminary injunction on the ground that there had been inadequate study of the logging's environmental effects, Congress intervened and passed section 318 of the ...