AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott
| Citation | 785 N.E.2d 1068 |
| Decision Date | 25 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02S04-0111-CV-599.,02S04-0111-CV-599. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
| Parties | ALLIEDSIGNAL, INC., A.P. Green Industries, Inc., A.W. Chesterton, Inc., Armstrong World Industries, Inc., Asbestos Claims Management Corp., Asbestos Insulating & Roofing, Bondex International, Inc., Borg-Warner Corp., Brake Materials & Parts, Carlisle Corp., Chrysler Corp., Congoleum Corp., Crane Co., Dana Corp., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Flexitallic Gasket Co., Flintkote Co., Ford Motor Co., Gaf Corp., Garlock, Inc., General Motors Corp., General Refractories Co., Georgia-Pacific Corp., Hausman, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., Kelsey-Hayes Co., Lear Siegler Diversified Holding Corp., Mack Trucks, Inc., Mohawk Mfg. & Supply Co., Moog Automotive, Inc., Moog Automotive, McCord Gasket Co., Muncie Reclamation, Navistar International Transportation Corp., Northrup Grumman Corp., Nuturn Corp., Owens Corning, Owens-Illinois, Inc., Pneumo Abex Corp., Rapid American, Rayloc Co., U.S. Gypsum Co., Uniroyal, Inc., Vellumoid, Inc., W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Shirley OTT, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Michael A. Bergin, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Daniel M. Long, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for AlliedSignal, Inc.
R. Troy Mulder, Janelle K. Linder, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for McCord Gasket Co.
Douglas King, James M. Boyers, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Bondex International, Inc.
Donald Orzeske, Jennifer Blackwell, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Borg-Warner Corp.
Knight Anderson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for A.W. Chesterton.
Monika Talbot, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Ford Motor Co.
Jon L. Williams, Indianapolis, IN, Janet E. Golup, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Asbestos Corporation Limited and Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.
George T. Patton, Jr., Stephanie F. Holtzlander, Bryan H. Babb, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Indiana Legal Foundation.
Michael R. Fruehwald, Andrew J. Detherage, Shelese Emmons, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Indiana Manufacturers Association and Indiana Chamber of Commerce.
Neal Lewis, Orland, IN, Robert E. Paul, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Appellee.
ON INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Our state legislature has prescribed general rules governing lawsuits alleging injuries caused by products and special rules in asbestos cases. This opinion analyzes the interaction of these rules and their constitutionality.
Jerome Ott was diagnosed with lung cancer in August 1998. He and his wife, Shirley Ott, filed suit against Defendants, alleging that his lung cancer had been caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products while he was employed at the following times and locations: American Supply (1949-51); International Harvester (1951-53); Transport Motor Express (1953-54); and Jerry Ott Motors (1955-83). Jerome Ott died in January 2000. The complaint was then amended to allege that his death had been caused by the same exposure to asbestos.
The Indiana General Assembly has enacted two statutes that limit the period of time within which persons can file lawsuits alleging injuries caused by products. One of these statutes, Ind.Code § 34-20-3-1, generally applies to product liability claims; we will refer to this statute in this opinion as "Section 1." The second statute, Ind.Code § 34-20-3-2, specifically applies to at least some asbestos liability claims; we will refer to it as "Section 2." (We note that prior to recodification in 1998, Sections 1 and 2 appeared at Ind.Code § 33-1-1.5-5 and § 33-1-1.5-5.5, respectively.)
This opinion will parse these sections in some detail. For purposes of this Background section, it is sufficient to say that Section 2 gives plaintiffs more leeway in filing claims than does Section 1. The Defendants in this case argue that Section 2 only applies to a limited class of defendants and that they are not within that class. As such, they contend, the Otts must proceed against them under the more restrictive Section 1. The Otts respond that Section 2 allows them to proceed against these Defendants and that if it does not, then Section 1 violates Indiana Constitution art. I, § 12,1 as applied to asbestos plaintiffs, and Section 2 violates art. I, § 23.2
The trial court agreed with the Defendants that Section 2 did not apply to them but then agreed with the Otts that because it did not, Section 1 was unconstitutional.
Defendants then secured certification from the trial court of this interlocutory appeal. We held an extended oral argument on May 16, 2002.
At the same time that this case was proceeding, four other cases raising the same constellation of issues were presented to us. Harris v. A.C. & S., Inc., 766 N.E.2d 383 (Ind.Ct.App.2002); Jurich v. Garlock, Inc., 759 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind.Ct. App.2001); Allied Signal, Inc. v. Herring, 757 N.E.2d 1030 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); Black v. ACandS, Inc., 752 N.E.2d 148 (Ind.Ct. App.2001). In three of these cases, the respective panels of the Court of Appeals held that Section 2 applied to the defendants and so did not have to reach the constitutional issue. Harris, 766 N.E.2d at 391; Herring, 757 N.E.2d at 1035-37; Black, 752 N.E.2d at 154-55. In Jurich, the Court of Appeals panel found that Section 2 did not apply to the defendants but it found Section 1 unconstitutional. Jurich, 759 N.E.2d at 1070-74, 1077. In summary, the plaintiffs prevailed below in all five of these cases—in three on statutory grounds and in two on constitutional grounds.
Finding that the trial court in this case and the Court of Appeals in Harris, Jurich, Herring, and Black incorrectly analyzed these issues at least in part, we have accepted jurisdiction in each. (We resolve Harris,3 Jurich,4 Herring,5 and Black6 in separate opinions today.)
We will work our way through the statutory issues, turn to the two state constitutional claims, and then finish with a discussion of our Court's decision in Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 1989).
Section 1 provides:
Section 1(b). Section 2 excepts certain asbestos-related actions from the operation of Section 1's ten-year statute of repose. A product liability action based on personal injury, disability, disease, or death resulting from exposure to asbestos may be commenced within two years after the action accrues, without regard to the ten-year statute of repose. Section 2(a). For purposes of this section, "accrual" is defined as the date when the injured person knows that he or she has an asbestos-related disease or injury. Section 2(b). The exception applies only to:
In summary, the Indiana legislature has outlined the specific time requirements for at least some asbestos-related negligence actions in Section 2, a section distinct from the statute of limitations and period of repose for all other product liability actions outlined in Section 1. While product liability actions under Section 1 have a two-year statute of limitations and a ten-year statute of repose, asbestos-related actions under Section 1 enjoy a different timetable. When a product liability action qualifies under Section 2, there is no firm statute of repose. Rather, a lawsuit must be commenced within two years "after the cause of action accrues," which is defined as "the date when the injured person knows that the person has an asbestos related disease or injury." Sections 2(a) & (b).
The crucial language for our purposes arises in Section 2(d)(1). There the Legislature provided that Section 2 only applies if the defendant is a "person[ ] who mined and sold commercial asbestos." Defendants who do not fall within this classification are entitled to the protection offered by the ten-year statute of repose in Section 1. As such, Defendants argue vigorously that they are not "persons who mined and sold commercial asbestos"; the Otts argue that Defendants are.
When reviewing a statute, courts give effect and meaning to every word. Spaulding v. Int'l Bakers Servs., Inc., 550 N.E.2d 307, 309 (Ind.1990). This Court's primary goal when construing the meaning of a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent. Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ind.1996), appeal after remand, 695 N.E.2d 909 (Ind.1998) (citing Freeman v. State, 658 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind.1995)). Given such deference to legislative intentions, an unambiguous statute is interpreted to mean what it plainly states, and its plain and obvious meaning may not be enlarged or restricted. Ind. Dep't of State Rev. v. Horizon Bancorp, 644 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ind.1994).
We focus first on the expression "persons who mined and sold." The Defendants argue that to fall within this class of defendants, a person must both mine and sell. According to the Defendants, because none of them mine asbestos, they do not fall within this class. Prior to Black, this was the position taken by several panels of the Court of Appeals and by now-Chief Judge McKinney. Novicki v. Rapid-American Corp., 707 N.E.2d 322, 324 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Noppert, 705 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind.Ct. App.1999), trans. denied, 726 N.E.2d 300 (Ind.1999); Roberts v. A.C. & S., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22635, at *12-13 (S.D.Ind.1998). The Otts make several arguments in response.
First...
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