Allis v. Hall

• Decision Date: 06 January 1904
• Citation: 56 A. 637,76 Conn. 322
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ALLIS v. HALL.

56 A. 637

76 Conn. 322

ALLIS

v. HALL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 6, 1904.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Alberto T. Roraback, Judge.

Suit by Fortis H. Allis against Henry F. Hall for the reformation of a mortgage deed, and to restrain the enforcement of a judgment. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Henry G. Newton and Harrison Hewitt, for appellant.

Charles E. Perkins and Frank L. Hungerford, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J. This case is a sequel to that of Hall v. Allis, 73 Conn. 238, 47 Atl. 114, 302, which was an action to recover damages for the breach of the covenants of a mortgage. The facts of that case and its history are pertinent to this. In so far as they are recited in the report of that case, they need not be here repeated. Upon the announcement of the decision of this court in the former action, the present plaintiff, being the defendant therein, moved for leave to file a cross-complaint asking, upon appropriate allegations of mistake, that the mortgage upon which the action was brought be reformed so that the principal of the Yale College mortgage should be excepted from the operation of its covenants, and it thus made to express what the proposed cross-complaint alleged was the agreement and intent of the parties thereto, which agreement and intent the then defendant had theretofore unsuccessfully contended was in fact expressed by the mortgage as drawn. This motion was denied upon the ground that it was made too late, and judgment was thereupon rendered that the plaintiff recover $7,821.70 damages and costs. After the denial of this motion, and before final judgment was rendered, the defendant therein brought this action to the superior court in Hartford county, seeking a reformation of said mortgage in the way already indicated, and an injunction restraining the plaintiff from taking out execution on the judgment rendered or to be rendered in the prior case, and from taking any measures or steps to enforce the collection or payment of the judgment. The complaint alleges, in substance, and the court finds, that the parties, prior to the execution of the mortgage, agreed that the principal of the Yale College mortgage should be excepted from the operation of its covenants; that it should be upon the equity in the property, subject to that mortgage, the mortgagor agreeing to pay the interest upon that mortgage debt, and the taxes on the property and keep the equity over and above the principal sum clear, but not to be holden to save the defendant mortgagee harmless from said principal, or protect him therefrom; that the mortgage, as drawn and executed, was intended by both the parties thereto to express said agreement; that, by the mistake of the scrivener who drew it, and the parties who executed it, it failed to do so; and that it was delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant under the mistaken belief, mutually entertained by them, that it did so express said prior agreement, and with the intention that it should. It is also alleged and found that the plaintiff, up to the time of said decision by this court, fully believed, as he was advised by competent counsel, that the covenants of said mortgage, as drawn, did not bind him to protect the defendant from the principal of the mortgage debt, and that his conduct theretofore and in said prior action was had in good faith, relying upon said belief. Other pertinent facts are that the transfer of the stock of the brick company by Sloper and his associates to the plaintiff was for the purposes of collateral security; that at some time within one or two years after the execution of said mortgage the defendant made a claim upon the plaintiff that by the legal construction thereof the latter was bound to protect the defendant from the principal of said mortgage debt to Yale College, and that the plaintiff repudiated said claim; that on December 23, 1896, the defendant brought an action of ejectment to obtain possession of the mortgaged property, said action being based upon his ownership of said second mortgage; that on February 5, 1897, the plaintiff, while said action of ejectment was pending, for the protection of Yale College under its first mortgage, surrendered to said college the possession of said premises by an instrument in writing which provided that the plaintiff should pay to the college any deficiency that might at any time be due to it, in case the rents of said property should not be sufficient to pay the taxes, insurance, repairs, and interest on its mortgage; that the college entered into possession and collected the rents; and that, before the law day for the redemption of the mortgaged premises by the defendant expired, the plaintiff had paid to Yale College all that was due upon said mortgage debt above the principal, and all the costs of the foreclosure proceedings, so that there remained due to said college on said law day the sum of $8,000, and no more. The facts involved in the prosecution of the former case are set up in the complaint and found.

Before entering upon a discussion of the defendant's claims of error to which he has given most prominence, it is well to inquire whether, upon the facts found, the plaintiff would, in any event, be entitled to have a reformation of the mortgage as prayed for. The defendant insists that the mistake is one which equity will not undertake to correct. If this is so, the very foundation of the plaintiff's action is taken away, since he would be unable to show the loss in the former action of a meritorious defense. The full discussion of this subject had in the opinion in Park Bros. & Co., Limited, v. Blodgett & Clapp Co., 64 Conn. 28, 29 Atl. 133, and the conclusion there reached, render it unnecessary to renew the discussion here. Clearly, the circumstances relating to the mistake which are disclosed by the finding are such as, under the principles enunciated in that case, would justify a reformation in equity.

The defendant contends that the superior court in Hartford county has no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for and given, or, more strictly speaking, perhaps, the vital part of it involved in the prayer and judgment for an injunction restraining the defendant from making use of the judgment rendered in his behalf in the superior court in New Haven county. To the superior court is reserved, by statute, the exclusive power to grant equitable relief against causes pending or judgments rendered in that court. Gen. St. 1902, § 537. If, therefore, the contention made is well founded, it must be either for the reason that the present proceeding is so connected with the former action as to be in its essence a part of it, or for the reason that the superior court—which in this state is one tribunal over the whole state-has no jurisdiction in an independent action to enjoin parties from making use of a judgment rendered by that court in another county. The reasoning and conclusions in Smith v. Hall, 71 Conn. 427, 42 Atl. 86, are decisive against the existence of these conditions.

The present action is an entirely independent one. It does not seek anything directly or incidentally affecting the former case, nor is it in aid of any such attempt. A new trial of the former cause is not asked. It is not proposed to disturb the former judgment. No judgment is prayed for, affecting in any way the former proceedings. No process has issued or is asked to issue to the court which determined the former case. It is simply sought to prevent an individual availing himself, contrary to equity and good conscience, of a judgment which he has obtained, and which it is assumed will stand of record, unreversed and unmodified. Tyler v. Hamersley, 44 Conn. 419, 26 Am. Rep. 479.

That the power exists and must exist for one court to enjoin the use of a judgment obtained in another court of concurrent jurisdiction is clear. Erie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637. The reason, drawn by some courts from public policy, for the doctrine that courts should not be permitted to so interfere with the judgments of courts of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, is one which does not appertain—to the same extent, at least—under our organization of the superior court, as under judicial systems which create independent circuits, with a separate judge or judiciary for each circuit. We have not adopted that rule of policy. Smith v. Hall, 71 Conn. 427, 42 Atl. 86.

The defendant next relies upon the doctrine of res judicata. He says that the matters involved in the present action for a reformation have become adjudicated by the judgment in the former action. It is, of course, true that they have not in fact been adjudicated. The defendant's position, strictly speaking, is, therefore, that, as these matters are such as might have been pleaded defensively in the former action, he is now, by the judgment therein, as much precluded from availing himself of them as he would be, had he in fact pleaded them, or at least that he is so far concluded that a court of equity will not take cognizance of them to restrain the operation of the judgment.

The general rule has long been recognized that equity would not interpose to enjoin one from reaping the benefits of a judgment at law for reasons which might have been presented as a legal defense to the action. Post v. Tradesmen's Bank, 28 Conn. 420; McBride v. Little, 115 Mass. 308; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195. This rule has been extended to embrace equitable defenses, where such defenses were by statute or otherwise permitted to be made in actions at law (Wilson v. Buchanan, 170 Pa. 14, 32 Atl. 620), and to equitable defenses and counterclaims, where the functions of courts of common law and chancery have been united in one tribunal, and the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity and the forms of legal and equitable procedure have been abolished, as in most code states....