Allison v. Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 30 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2819,95-2819
• Citation: 94 F.3d 494
• Parties: 6 A.D. Cases 621, 18 A.D.D. 213, 8 NDLR P 291 Jo Anne ALLISON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dora B. Schriro, Director, Department of Corrections; George Lombardi, Director, Division of Adult Institutions; Mike Groose, Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 494

94 F.3d 494

6 A.D. Cases 621, 18 A.D.D. 213, 8

NDLR P 291

Jo Anne ALLISON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Dora B. Schriro, Director Department of Corrections; George Lombardi, Director Division of Adult Institutions; Mike Groose Superintendent, Jefferson City Correctional Center Defendants-Appellants.

No. 95-2819.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 13, 1996.

Decided Aug. 30, 1996.

Sara L. Trower, argued (Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, John R. Munich, and Nancy Leonard, on the brief), Jefferson City, MO, for appellants.

Keith W. Brunstom, Jefferson City, MO, argued, for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Jo Anne Allison brought this action alleging claims of discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The individual defendants (Dora B. Schriro, Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections; George Lombardi, Director of Adult Institutions; and Mike Groose, Superintendent of the Jefferson City Correctional Center) appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We reverse.

I.

Jo Anne Allison is a former employee of the Missouri Department of Corrections, where she served the Department as a Correctional Officer I (CO I). The state merit system defines the CO I job classification, stating that a CO I "performs a variety of assignments involving the supervision, control and treatment of inmates in a state adult correctional facility." (Appellants' App. at 94.) The definition offers a nonexhaustive list of work examples that require a CO I, among other things, to work in all parts of the prison, to "[s]upervise[ ] movement of inmates inside and outside the facility," and to "take[ ] required action during emergencies to prevent escapes and suppress disorders." (Id.)

On May 13, 1992, Allison injured her back at work. In July 1992, after exhausting her sick leave, Allison took "leave without pay" status because she was physically unable to return to work. Following a fusion of her cervical spine and a period of rehabilitation, her physician reported to the Department that Allison could return to work in a control room position as of January 25, 1993. Allison's physician specifically noted, however, that she should not work in combat or conflict situations where she might have to restrain an inmate.

Given Allison's medical restrictions, George Lombardi, the Director of Adult Institutions, advised Allison that she would be terminated effective February 2, 1993, unless she could obtain a full release from her doctor that would allow her to perform all of the duties listed for the CO I classification. Allison never received a full release from her doctor, and the Department did not allow her to return to work with limitations that would prevent her from performing all of the duties required of a CO I, which include the ability to maintain physical control of inmates in conflict situations. The Department of Corrections terminated Allison's employment on February 2, 1993.

In October 1993, Allison filed an application for social security benefits, claiming that she was then totally disabled. On March 2, 1994, the Social Security Administration denied her application, finding as follows: "We realize you are unable to work at the present time, but you should recover within twelve months of October 1, 1993, to return to your past job as a correction officer." (Appellants' App. at 463.) The Missouri State Employees Retirement System allowed Allison to receive disability benefits without any adversarial proceeding.

In August 1994, Allison brought this action against the Department of Corrections, two individual department and division directors, and the superintendent of the facility where she was employed (Schriro, Lombardi, and Groose), alleging workplace discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 213.055.1(1). Specifically, Allison asserted that even with her physical restrictions, she was otherwise qualified to perform all of the duties required of a CO I that are necessary while stationed only in the control room or the guard towers. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that (1) Allison is not "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the ADA because (a) she previously stated that she is totally disabled and she should be judicially estopped from denying it now, and (b) she cannot perform the essential job functions of a CO I; (2) she is not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages; (3) Eleventh Amendment immunity bars jurisdiction of the pendent state claim; and (4) the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

The district court granted summary judgment in part, dismissing the pendent Missouri Human Rights Act count on Eleventh Amendment grounds and concluding that Allison is not entitled to punitive damages. The district court denied summary judgment on the remaining issues. Relevant to this appeal, the district court denied summary judgment to the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that material issues of fact existed on the issue of whether a reasonable official in the defendants' position would have known that the act of terminating Allison would violate her rights.

The individual defendants appeal the district court's denial of summary judgment on their claim of qualified immunity.

II.

We initially pause to consider our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. A district court's denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable as a final decision under the collateral order doctrine where "(1) the defendant [i]s a public official asserting a defense of 'qualified immunity,' and (2) the issue appealed concern[s], not which facts the parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts show[ ] a violation of 'clearly established' law." Johnson v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

Allison contends that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the district court denied summary judgment on the basis of disputed issues of fact. See id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2153 (holding that a determination of whether a triable issue of fact exists in the pretrial record is not immediately appealable). To the contrary, the individual defendants contend that the only issue in this appeal is a question of law. See id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2156 (noting that a denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable so long as it turns on an issue of law; namely, "the purely legal issue [of] what law was 'clearly established' "). The district court denied the individual defendants' claims of qualified immunity, stating, "[t]his court cannot say that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that their alleged actions violated plaintiff's rights." (Appellants' Addend. at 12.)

The crux of the individual defendants' argument is that their actions were reasonable given their knowledge at the time of Allison's termination. This issue is immediately appealable upon the denial of a qualified immunity claim. The Supreme Court has explained that "Johnson permits [a public official] to claim on appeal that all of the conduct which the District Court deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment met the Harlow [v. Fitzgerald] standard of 'objective legal reasonableness.' " Behrens v. Pelletier, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 834, 842, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (stating the standard of objectively reasonable conduct). Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the legal question of whether, in view of the facts that the district court deemed sufficiently supported for summary judgment purposes, the individual defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable given their knowledge and the clearly established law.

To the extent the individual defendants assert issues concerning what facts Allison may or may not be able to prove at trial, we lack jurisdiction to consider them in this qualified immunity appeal. For instance, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the individual defendants' arguments regarding allegedly conflicting statements made by Allison in a social security application and an affidavit. Because both statements were made after Allison was terminated, they are not relevant to the qualified immunity issue--whether the individual defendants acted reasonably given their knowledge at the time of her discharge. We likewise lack jurisdiction to review the district court's determination that material issues of fact remain for trial on the merits of Allison's claims, such as whether she is an otherwise qualified individual within the meaning of the relevant Acts and whether the ability to physically restrain inmates is an essential function of the CO I job classification. These issues will be resolved at trial and are appealable only after a final judgment has been rendered.

We now consider the merits of this limited appeal, which is whether the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ¹ Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. "[W]e must ask whether that...