JL v. FRANCIS HOWELL R-3 SCHOOL DIST.

• Citation: 693 F. Supp.2d 1009
• Decision Date: 17 February 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:09CV457MLM.
• Parties: J.L. et al, Plaintiffs, v. FRANCIS HOWELL R-3 SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

693 F. Supp.2d 1009

J.L. et al, Plaintiffs, v. FRANCIS HOWELL R-3 SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Case No. 4:09CV457MLM.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

February 17, 2010.

Lawrence J. Altman, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

James G. Thomeczek, Thomeczek Law Firm, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARY ANN L. MEDLER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs J. L., by and through his next friends Deborah LaFond and Barry LaFond, and Deborah LaFond and Barry LaFond, individually (jointly, "Plaintiffs"). Doc. 21. Also before the court is the Motion for Judgment on the Record as to Counts I and II, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment as to Counts III and IV filed by Defendant Francis Howell R-3 School District (the "District"). Doc. 41. The parties have filed Responses and Replies to the respective pending motions.¹ The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the under signed United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Doc. 7.

I. STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT²

The court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. See also Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E.R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that an issue is genuine "if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party").

A moving party always bears the burden of informing the court of the basis of its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary" will not preclude summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Raschick v. Prudent Supply, Inc., 830 F.2d 1497, 1499 (8th Cir.1987). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position will be insufficient." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. With these principles in mind, the court turns to an analysis of the pending motions.

II. INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT COUNTS I AND II

A. Legal Framework of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"):³

As a preliminary matter, this court has jurisdiction as this matter arises under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (Supp. IV 1998), and, in particular, IDEA, § 1415(I)(3).

The IDEA is designed "to insure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs." IDEA, § 1400(d)(1)(A); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). "To accomplish this end, the IDEA provides federal money to state and local educational agencies that undertake to implement the substantive and procedural requirements of the IDEA." Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Ed. of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 368, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). Section 1412 provides that for a state to be eligible for assistance under the IDEA, it must demonstrate that it "has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that it meets specified criteria." In particular, to be eligible for IDEA assistance a state must, among other things, have policies and procedures which: (1) provide a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") for all children with disabilities (§ 1412(a)(1)(B)); (2) identify children in need of special education, known as Child Find (§ 1412(a)(3)); (3) establish an individualized education plan ("IEP"), which is developed, reviewed, and revised for each child with a disability (§ 1412(a)(4)); (4) provide procedural safeguards for children with disabilities and their parents (§ 1412(a)(6)); and (5) evaluate children with disabilities (§ 1412(a)(7)).

A FAPE means that special education and related services have been provided,

that they conform to applicable state standards, that they include an appropriate school, and that they are provided in conformity with the IEP required by § 1414(d). See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8)(A)(D). The Eighth Circuit has stated the following in regard to whether a child has received a FAPE:

A child receives a free appropriate public education if he receives "personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The IDEA requires that public school districts offer eligible children "instruction and supportive services reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit." Missouri Dept. of Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. Springfield, 358 F.3d 992, at 999 n. 7 (8th Cir. 2004). The statute also requires that students with disabilities be educated in the "least restrictive environment," 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A), reflecting a "strong preference" that disabled children attend regular classes with non-disabled children and a presumption in favor of placement in the public schools. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D., 88 F.3d 556, 561 (8th Cir.1996). "Children who can be mainstreamed should be mainstreamed, if not for the entire day, then for part of the day; similarly, children should be provided with an education close to their home, and residential placements should be resorted to only if these attempts fail or are plainly untenable." Evans v. Dist. No. 17, 841 F.2d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 1988).

T.F. v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 449 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir.2006) (emphasis added).

IDEA, § 1414 addresses evaluation procedures and specifically requires reevaluation "if conditions warrant ... or if the child's parent or teacher requests a reevaluation, but at the very least once every three years." IDEA, § 1414(a)(2). A team of professionals must develop an IEP "for each disabled student, taking into account that child's capabilities." Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir.2003). An IEP means "a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1414(d)." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(11). An IEP is required to set forth "the child's present educational performance, establish annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describe the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." Honig, 484 U.S. at 311, 108 S.Ct. 592.

"A school district must convene a team to formulate an IEP in light of the child's abilities and parental views about the child's education." Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1034 (8th Cir.2000) (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343(b)(2), 300.346(a)(1)). "The parents, the child's teacher, and a school official knowledgeable about special education must be included on the team which devises and reviews the IEP, and parents are free to invite other individuals with expertise to participate." Id. (citing Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 368, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985); Doe by Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1489 (9th Cir.1986)). "Parental consent must be obtained prior to the `initial placement of a handicapped child in a program providing special education and related services, 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(b)(1) (1985), unless the educational agency obtains an override through the applicable administrative procedures.'" Id. at 1489 n. 12. However, "the Act nowhere explicitly vests a child's parents with a veto power over any proposal or determination advanced by the educational agency regarding a change in placement." Id. at 1489. An "IEP must be reviewed at least once a year and be periodically revised in response to information provided by the parents and to ongoing evaluations of the child's progress." Gill, 217 F.3d at 1034. Whether an IEP is "reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit is a mixed question of law and fact." Id. at 1035 (citing § 300.343(c)(2)).

IDEA, § 1414(d) further requires that each IEP must include: a statement of the child's present levels of educational performance, including how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and progress; a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives; a statement of the specific educational services and supplementary aids to be provided to the child and the extent to which the child will be able to participate in regular educational programs; a...