Alllen v. College of William & Mary
| Decision Date | 27 January 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.4:02-CV-31.,CIV.A.4:02-CV-31. |
| Citation | 245 F.Supp.2d 777 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | Lavonee A. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY, Rita Metcalfe, and the Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendants. |
Oscar Houser Blayton, Hampton, VA, for plaintiff.
Ondray Toney Harris, Office of Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, for defendants
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (hereinafter "Report") of Magistrate Judge Bradford F. Stillman in relation to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
In this case, Plaintiff claims that she was subject to discrimination during her employment with the College of William and Mary (hereinafter "William and Mary"), an agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia (hereinafter "Commonwealth"). Plaintiff states that she is a black female citizen of the United States and that she was employed at William and Mary as a Senior Fiscal Technician. Pl.'s Compl. at f 11(1); Defs' Answer at 1112.
Plaintiff states that she was hired by William and Mary on September 18, 1978, and that she has worked in the Human Resources Office since 1986. Pl.'s Compl. at H IV(A)(1). From June 1994 until October 23, 2000, Plaintiff worked as a Senior Fiscal Technician in the Human Resources Office under the direct supervision of Defendant Rita Metcalfe. Id. Defendant Metcalfe is a white female. Id. During her employment as a Senior Fiscal Technician at William and Mary, Plaintiff claims that she was subject to disparate treatment amounting to racial discrimination, discrimination on the basis of disability,1 and retaliatory discrimination.
In support of her claim of disparate treatment amounting to racial discrimination, Plaintiff proffers examples of how she was treated differently than other similarly situated white employees. First, Plaintiff claims that between June 1994 and October 2000, she was required to work unpaid overtime on weekends and that she began complaining to Defendant Metcalfe in January 1998. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(A)(2). Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Metcalfe was compensated for overtime and that a similarly situated white male received a cash payment of $950.00 for additional duties. Id. Second, Plaintiff alleges that since 1998 she has been "harassed and disciplined unfairly for errors that were common in the normal course of business in her office," and that other similarly situated employees were not disciplined for making the same types of errors. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(A)(3). Third, Plaintiff complains that she had to take phone calls in addition to performing other job duties, but a similarly situated white male did not have the same requirement. Id. Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that while she was required to have Defendant Metcalfe's permission to close her office door, a similarly situated white male did not have the same requirement. Id. Fifth, Plaintiff insists that Defendant Metcalfe denied her "flex time" while allowing it for a similarly situated white female. Id. However, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff worked a "flex schedule" of 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday through Thursday and that she did so of her own choosing. Defs.' Answer at ¶ 27. Finally, Plaintiff claims that she was denied a request to be transferred to another supervisor in July 1999, yet a similarly situated white male's transfer request was granted. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(A)(3).
Asserting a claim of discrimination because of disability, Plaintiff alleges that she was unjustly disciplined on various occasions. In October 1998, Defendant Metcalfe gave Plaintiff a notice of unsatisfactory job performance and failure to follow her supervisor's instructions. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(2); Defs.' Answer at ¶ 27. Plaintiff maintains that this action was taken upon her return from leave to care for her sick mother. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(2). In November 1998, Plaintiff claims she told Defendant Metcalfe that she was being treated for depression.2 Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(3). On January 8, 1999, Plaintiff was issued a written notice of unsatisfactory job performance and was suspended without pay for two days. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(4); Defs.' Answer at ¶ 29. Plaintiff claims that this disciplinary action was taken on the day that she returned from leave taken to care for her critically ill mother. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(4). Upon Plaintiffs appeal, the suspension was rescinded but the notice of unsatisfactory job performance was upheld. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(4); Defs.' Answer at ¶ 29.
From February 3, 1999, through April 26, 1999, Plaintiff maintains that she was on leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(4). On April 27, 1999, Defendant Metcalfe gave Plaintiff a notice of unsatisfactory job performance and suspended Plaintiff for two weeks. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(5); Defs.' Answer at ¶ 30. Upon receipt of this notice, Plaintiff resigned from her position. Id. A few hours later, Plaintiff claims that she requested to rescind her resignation but that her request was denied. Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(5). Plaintiff filed a grievance, and while the notice of unsatisfactory job performance and the two week suspension were upheld, Plaintiff was allowed to rescind her resignation. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(6).
Plaintiff received another notice of unsatisfactory job performance from Defendant Metcalfe in July 2000. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(7). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown which rendered her unable to work. Id. Plaintiff maintains that this was communicated to William and Mary by her physicians. Id. On October 17, 2000, Defendant Metcalfe sent Plaintiff a letter stating that Plaintiff was required to return to work on October 23, 2000. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(8); Defs.' Answer at ¶ 33. On the morning of October 23, 2000, Plaintiff telephoned Defendant Metcalfe and explained that she would not be able to return to work because her mother was seriously ill. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(8). Defendant Metcalfe then sent Plaintiff an overnight letter informing Plaintiff that she had been terminated as of October 23, 2000. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(8); Defs.' Answer at ¶ 33. Plaintiff alleges that she was not given an opportunity to request accommodation for her disability of depression and that she was terminated without advance notice, in violation of William and Mary's written policy. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(B)(9).
Plaintiff maintains that in grieving her two week suspension and William and Mary's refusal to allow her to rescind her resignation, she was opposing an unlawful employment practice. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(C)(1). After the grievance hearing, which was held in July 1999, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Metcalfe retaliated by denying Plaintiff "flex time" and by requiring Plaintiff to obtain permission before closing her office door. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(C)(2)-(4). Plaintiff also claims that soon after the grievance hearing she was given a list of rules to follow and the list of rules was not given to other similarly situated employees. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(C)(5).
Plaintiff states that she was terminated on October 23, 2000, by Defendant Metcalfe without notice, in violation of William and Mary's written policy. Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(C)(6). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Metcalfe's actions were intentional and done with malice so as to "injure Plaintiff in her reputation and in her profession." Pl's Compl. at ¶ IV(C)(8).
On February 28, 2001, Plaintiff filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"). Pl's Compl. at ¶ III. Plaintiff sent a letter to the EEOC amending her complaint to include discrimination based upon disparate treatment and retaliation on March 27, 2001. Id. The EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue with regard to her charge of discrimination on December 21, 2001. Id.
On March 21, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the grounds of race, disability, and retaliation. Defendants responded on August 9, 2002, by filing an Answer and a Motion to Dismiss with a memorandum in support thereof. Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs claims under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA"), the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief in Response to Defendants' Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, and on August 23, 2002, Defendants' filed a Rebuttal Brief. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Stillman for a report of proposed findings and recommendations.
On November 15, 2002, Magistrate Judge Stillman issued his Report recommending that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. More specifically, the Report made the following four recommendations: (1) The Court recommends that plaintiffs
claims for money damages under the ADA be dismissed as to defendants William and Mary and the Commonwealth. The Court does not recommend that plaintiffs claim for money damages against defendant Metcalfe, in her individual capacity, be dismissed. The Court recommends that plaintiffs claim under the ADA for the injunctive remedy of reinstatement against defendants William and Mary and the Commonwealth be dismissed; the Court recommends that plaintiffs claim under the ADA for the injunctive remedy of reinstatement against defendant Metcalfe not be dismissed; the Court...
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