Redd v. Mcdowell Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:13–2015. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Parties | Bonita K. REDD, Plaintiff, v. McDOWELL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Bonita Redd, Welch, WV, pro se.
Chip E. Williams, Kevin J. Robinson, Pullin Fowler Flanagan Brown & Poe, Beckley, WV, for Defendants.
By Standing Order, this action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort for submission of findings and recommendations regarding disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Magistrate Judge VanDervort submitted to the court his Proposed Findings and Recommendations (“PF & R”) on August 20, 2013, in which he recommended that the court (1) grant in part and deny in part plaintiff's motion to remand; and (2) grant in part and deny in part defendants' motions to dismiss.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the parties were allotted fourteen days plus three mailing days in which to file any objections to Magistrate Judge VanDervort's Findings and Recommendations. The failure of any party to file such objections within the time allowed constitutes a waiver of such party's right to a de novo review by this court. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir.1989). On September 6, 2013, plaintiff filed her objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommendation.
On January 28, 2013, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of McDowell County. Named as defendants are the McDowell County Board of Education and the West Virginia Department of Education. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have engaged in “racial and sex discrimination” in violation of “federal, state, and local laws and statutes.” See Complaint. Plaintiff goes on to list 28 different federal, state, and local laws, statutes, regulations, and policies which she contends that defendants have violated, including Title VI, Title VII, and Title IX.
Based upon the federal questions presented in plaintiff's complaint, on February 5, 2013, defendants removed the case to this court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court while defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Finding that the court possessed federal question jurisdiction based upon the assertion of the aforementioned federal causes of action, Magistrate Judge VanDervort recommended that the district court deny plaintiff's motion to remand. The magistrate judge further recommended that the court grant defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims alleging race and sex discrimination, including violations of Title VI, Title VII, Title IX, and West Virginia Code § 5–11–9, on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint does not meet the threshold pleading standards set out by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Magistrate Judge VanDervort recommended dismissal of the favoritism and retaliation claims for the same reason. In addition, the PF & R recommended dismissal of plaintiff's claim under West Virginia Code § 5–11–20 because only the attorney general may bring a civil action pursuant to that statute. With respect to plaintiff's remaining claims, the magistrate judge recommended that the court decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over those claims and remand the case to state court.
Plaintiff's objections are largely repetitive and essentially demonstrate a failure to grasp the fundamental principles of federal question jurisdiction. Objections One and Three argue that this court is required to remand plaintiff's case to state court based upon defendants' alleged violation of McDowell Policy 8–001, a county policy. See Plaintiff's Objections at p. 1 ( ). Objection Five finds fault with the court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Objection Twelve contends that “at least thirty-two legal actions” against defendants have not been removed to federal court since Iqbal, see id. at p. 6, and that this somehow mandates remand to state court.
Without disputing that her complaint asserts several federal causes of action, plaintiff appears to contend that because it also contains state law claims, the whole case should be remanded to state court. This argument fails because the fact that a state court has concurrent jurisdiction over a cause of action does not require that the action be remanded from federal court back to state court. See Callison v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 909 F.Supp. 391, 394 (S.D.W.Va.1995) (); see also McWilliams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 98–1732, 1999 WL 64275, at *2 n. 1 (4th Cir. Feb. 11, 1999) (); Hupp v. First Care Services, Inc., No. Civ. A. 6:05CV00732, 2005 WL 2654231, *2 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 17, 2005) (). “Plaintiff may not simply rely upon concurrent jurisdiction, but must show an absence of any basis for subject-matter jurisdiction to accomplish remand once a case has been properly brought in this court.” Moody–Williams v. Liposcience, No. 5:12–CV–104–FL, 2013 WL 1246752, *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2013). Thus, this asserted ground for remand is without merit.
As to plaintiff's argument that this court is without jurisdiction to decide her state law claims, that argument is also without merit. Plaintiff clearly alleged claims invoking federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims was proper because those claims “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 644 (4th Cir.2011).
Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff argues that remand is required because state law issues predominate her case, that argument fails. This court is not permitted to decline jurisdiction over federal claims “on the grounds that there are more state statutes at issue than federal ones.” Benas v. Shea Mortgage, Inc., No. 11cv1461–IEG (BGS), 2011 WL 4635645, *2 (S.D.Cal. Oct. 4, 2011); see also Johnson v. Medisys Health Network, No. 10–CV–1596 (ERK)(WP), 2011 WL 5222917, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 1, 2011) ( ).
Finally, plaintiff's allegation that Magistrate Judge VanDervort “omitted McDowell County Policy 8–001” is incorrect. Magistrate Judge VanDervort found that she had failed to state a claim for race discrimination. See PF & R at pp. 852–53. Plaintiff concedes that the McDowell County Policy is grounded in Title VI and VII. In dismissing the federal and state law claims for race discrimination, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that defendant's allegations of race discrimination were “conclusory and speculative” and did not satisfy federal pleading standards.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff's objections to the recommended denial of her remand motion are OVERRULED.
In her objections numbered Two, Four, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven, plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge VanDervort erred in concluding that her complaint failed to satisfy the pleading standards and contained insufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) under Twombly and Iqbal. According to plaintiff, because the court was able to determine that federal question jurisdiction was present in denying her remand motion, dismissal for failure to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal was inappropriate.
Plaintiff misapprehends the nature of the “well-pleaded complaint” rule and Magistrate Judge VanDervort's use of the term in his PF & R. “The presence or absence of a federal question is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, the plaintiff is the master of his or her complaint, and a plaintiff may “avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id.;Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th Cir.1996). “[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule ordinarily directs us to look no further than the plaintiff's complaint in determining whether a lawsuit raises issues of federal law capable of creating federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331.” Custer, 89 F.3d at 1165 (internal quotations omitted).
However, a court's reliance on the well-pleaded complaint rule to determine whether federal question jurisdiction appears on the face of the complaint is not a stamp of approval by the court as to the sufficiency of that complaint. Virgilio v. Motorola, Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 504, 512 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, it is not unusual for a court to determine that it has jurisdiction over a complaint and then turn around and dismiss that same complaint as deficient pursuant to Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc. v. Patterson, Thuente, Skaar & Christensen, P.A., Civil No. 09–2493 (DWF/FLN), 2009 WL 5185770, *6–7 (D.Minn. Dec. 22, 2009) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Robinson v. Durham Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ.
...indicate that discovery will yield evidence of all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim. Redd v. McDowell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 976 F. Supp. 2d 838, 850 (S.D.W. Va. 2013), affd, 561 F. App'x 278 (4th Cir. 2014). However, it is not a solution to request that the Court "unlock the doors of ......
- Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Rea
-
Redd v. Mcdowell Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
...on "the [prior] decision to eliminate her position as an [a]ssistant [p]rincipal and transfer her to another non-administrative position."1 Redd v. McDowell Cty. Bd. of Educ. and W.Va. Dept. of Educ., No. 2012-0420-McDED, at *9 (W.Va. Pub. Emp. Griev. Bd. July 12, 2012).2 The ALJ determined......