Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 06 December 1985 |
| Citation | 484 So.2d 375 |
| Parties | ALLSTATE ENTERPRISES, INC. v. Wayne ALEXANDER. 84-637. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Vincent A. Noletto, Jr. for Brown, Hudgens, Richardson, Mobile, for appellant.
Rod M. Alexander, Moulton, for appellee.
There was a jury verdict for Wayne Alexander against Allstate Enterprises, Inc., in the amount of $25,000 for trespass and conversion. Allstate appeals.
Allstate financed an automobile for Alexander. In October 1983, Allstate assigned Alexander's account to Larry Hancock for repossession of the automobile. Hancock was not an employee of Allstate. He repossesses for Allstate and other lending institutions. He was not given any specific instructions as to how to repossess Alexander's automobile. His instructions were simply to repossess the automobile.
Hancock had a key made for the automobile and removed the automobile from the driveway of Alexander's home at approximately 2:00 A.M. The yard was not fenced. Hancock did not confront anyone while removing the vehicle from Alexander's yard. Hancock notified the sheriff that the automobile had been repossessed and delivered the automobile to Allstate.
Allstate provided Hancock with a "hold harmless" letter, which was not introduced. Hancock testified:
On the same evening that the automobile was taken by Hancock, Alexander's utility house was forcibly entered and a carpenter's line belt and other items were taken from the utility house. The carpenter's line belt was among the items of personal property which were returned to Alexander by Allstate as having been personal property of Alexander in the automobile at the time of repossession. Certain personal property which was in the automobile and which was in the utility house was not returned to Alexander.
At the close of Alexander's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, Allstate moved for a directed verdict.
After the verdict, Allstate moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
Even though Allstate's able counsel describes it as "that last bastion of refuge for a beleaguered plaintiff who otherwise has no case," the "scintilla of evidence" rule is given application in this jurisdiction. Penticost v. Massey, 202 Ala. 681, 81 So. 637 (1919).
It is conceivable that gibberish and jargon have caused form to encrust form until most vitality has been squeezed out of the scintilla rule. This Court, in some cases, while giving lip service to this standard, in fact, has applied a more stringent standard than those courts professing to apply the substantial evidence standard. See the excellent article by Professor Jerome A. Hoffman, Alabama's Scintilla Rule, 28 Ala.L.Rev. 592, 608-631 (1977). The scintilla rule should be revisited.
The scintilla rule of evidence is the unique sufficiency standard that most favors jury determination. Let the courts and bar recognize it as being that, and stop the rote recitation of gleam and glimmer, spark and trace which seems more like a chorus of "Glow Worm" than a definitive statement of the standard which was the prevailing rule or standard at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution, Company of Carpenters v. Hayward, 99 Eng.Rep. 241 (K.B.1780), and which was adopted as the rule or standard by the early American courts, see, e.g., Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 13 L.Ed. 730 (1850).
The "scintilla of evidence" rule or "any evidence" rule developed out of the device previously used by parties to test the sufficiency of their opponent's evidence prior to a verdict, i.e., the demurrer to the evidence. The demurrer to the evidence was designed to prevent verdicts contrary to law. In demurring to the evidence, the defendant was required to admit the truthfulness of all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, which removed all issues of credibility from the case. If there were facts from which the jury could reasonably infer the ultimate facts upon which the claim or defense depended, the party had to concede the inference. If the inferences were not logically unreasonable, even though they were not the most likely inferences to be drawn, this would defeat the demurrer to the evidence. By requiring the moving party to concede the truthfulness of the opponent's evidence, the demurrer operated without encroaching upon the jury's function of assessing credibility and weighing the evidence. To ensure that the judge did not usurp the function of the jury, the demurrer to the evidence incorporated the view that "any evidence" would take a...
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...infer the ultimate facts upon which the claim depends; if so, the case must be decided by the trier of facts. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Alexander, 484 So.2d 375 (Ala.1985). The scintilla rule must be applied to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. Loveless v......
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