Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neel, 7579-9-I
| Decision Date | 31 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 7579-9-I,7579-9-I |
| Citation | 25 Wn.App. 722,612 P.2d 6 |
| Parties | ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurance company, Respondent, v. Steven E. NEEL, Gerald Neel and Darlene Neel, husband and wife, Joseph T. Nadolski and "Jane Doe" Nadolski, husband and wife, and Mitchell A. Press and"Jane Doe" Press, husband and wife, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Curtis G. Johnson, Johnson & Williams, Port Angeles, for appellants.
Edward S. Winskill, Davies, Pearson, Anderson, Seinfeld, Gadbow, Hayes & Johnson, Tacoma, for respondent.
Allstate Insurance Company brought this action for a declaratory judgment against its insureds, the Neels, alleging the Neels' automobile liability insurance policy did not provide coverage for an accident in which their son, Steven, was involved. Allstate moved for summary judgment which was granted. The Neels appeal; we affirm.
The facts are these: On July 23, 1978, Steven Neel was driving a 1973 Jeep when it collided with another vehicle. The other driver and his passenger brought suit against Steven and his parents for damages.
The Jeep was not one of the automobiles described as an insured vehicle under the policy nor was Steven Neel a named insured. As a relative residing in his parents' home, though, Steven was insured with respect to his use of the "owned" or any "non-owned" automobile. As defined in the policy, an owned vehicle must be owned by the named insured; a non-owned vehicle cannot be owned by a resident of the named insured's household. On summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Steven Neel was the owner of the Jeep. Consequently, the policy did not provide coverage for the accident because the Jeep was neither an owned nor a non-owned automobile.
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mrs. Neel testified by affidavit that:
As regards to the 1973 Jeep, that vehicle was purchased by our son, Steven from a private party. I wrote the down payment and Steve was to pay us back. I was a co-signer on the title, so that our interest would be protected.
(Emphasis added.) In support of the motion, Allstate set forth deposition testimony of Mrs. Neel and Steven substantiating her affidavit. Thus, there is no dispute that Steven Neel was the purchaser of the Jeep. The question is whether he was the owner as that term is used in the policy.
The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law for the court. When the only dispute relates to the legal effect of language in a written contract, summary judgment is proper. Murray v. Western Pac. Ins. Co., 2 Wash.App. 985, 472 P.2d 611 (1970). The relationship between the parties to an insurance contract is a personal one. The intention of the insurer and the insured control the coverage provided, and, as with other written contracts, that intention is to be determined from the language of the contract viewed against the setting in which it is formed. Continental Volvo, Inc. v. Ross, 17 Wash.App. 316, 562 P.2d 1002 (1977). The terms of the policy must be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 549 P.2d 9 (1976).
The Neels argue that because they advanced the downpayment and co-signed the title, they had an insurable interest in the Jeep which amounts to "ownership"...
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