Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ferrante

• Citation: 201 Conn. 478,518 A.2d 373
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 02 December 1986
• Parties: ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Bennie FERRANTE, Administrator (ESTATE OF Sylvia FERRANTE).

Page 373

518 A.2d 373

201 Conn. 478

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Bennie FERRANTE, Administrator (ESTATE OF Sylvia FERRANTE).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 7, 1986.

Decided Dec. 2, 1986.

Jeffrey L. Williams, with whom, on brief, was Carl F. Yeich, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Stanley Cohen, with whom, on brief was Gary Greene, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and SAMUEL S. FREEDMAN, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The sole issue in this case, which comes to us by way of reservation, is whether an occupant of an automobile is entitled to aggregate uninsured motorist coverage for each of two automobiles separately covered by one automobile insurance policy. The plaintiff insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, brought this suit for a declaratory judgment, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29, ¹ to determine the extent of its potential liability to the defendant, Bennie Ferrante, administrator of the estate of Sylvia Ferrante, who died as a result of injuries sustained in a two car motor vehicle accident. ² The trial court granted a motion for reservation upon stipulated facts to determine the amount of uninsured motorist coverage available to satisfy the claim of the defendant administrator. We hold that the reserved question is to be answered in the affirmative.

The parties stipulated to the following facts. On October 7, 1982, Sylvia Ferrante was a passenger in an automobile owned by Frank DeSouza and operated by Carolyn DeSouza. Sylvia Ferrante died as a result of a collision on route 3, in Rhode Island, between the DeSouza automobile and an automobile owned by Rene Laliberte. Damages attributable to Sylvia Ferrante's fatal injuries could exceed $200,000.

Both of the automobiles involved in the accident were covered by insurance. A Continental Insurance Company policy, for the Laliberte automobile, provided bodily injury liability insurance up to a limit of $25,000 per person. Pursuant to that policy, Continental Insurance paid the defendant $25,000 on behalf of its insured, Laliberte.

Because this payment did not provide full compensation for the defendant's damages, the defendant then pursued his insurance claims under the insurance policy that the plaintiff Allstate had issued to Frank DeSouza. That multiple vehicle policy included underinsured and uninsured motorist insurance for each of DeSouza's two cars: the automobile involved in the accident and a second unrelated automobile. As to each automobile, this insurance policy provided liability coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident, and uninsured motorist coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. By the express terms of the policy, its uninsured motorist coverage included accidents involving underinsured as well as uninsured motorists. DeSouza had paid a separate premium for the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to each DeSouza automobile. Neither Sylvia Ferrante nor the defendant, her personal representative, was a named insured under the Allstate policy, and neither of them had paid any premiums under this policy.

The plaintiff paid the defendant $75,000, which represented the limit of its liability under the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to the DeSouza automobile in which the defendant was a passenger. The disagreement between the parties concerns the defendant's claim that he is also entitled to reach the uninsured motorist coverage applicable to the second DeSouza automobile. The defendant maintains that he may aggregate or "stack" the uninsured motorist coverage for the two DeSouza automobiles insured under the Allstate policy. The plaintiff responds that the insurance policy precludes stacking on behalf of someone who was merely a passenger in one of the covered vehicles.

In addressing the question that has been reserved to us, we may usefully begin by noting what is not at issue. There is no dispute that the Allstate insurance policy, in its uninsured motorist coverage, expressly creates two classes of insureds: (1) the named policyholder and resident members of his family, and (2) other occupants of an insured car. ³ There is likewise no dispute that the provisions of the insurance policy that define the scope of the plaintiff's liability make no express distinction between these two classes in defining the extent of coverage for injuries attributable to uninsured motorists. Furthermore, there is no dispute that, if the claimant had been either the policyholder or a resident member of his family, our prevailing case law would render unenforceable the language in the insurance policy that purports, without class distinction, to preclude "stacking." Finally, there is no dispute that, if the defendant were to be entitled to "stack," the recovery would not exceed the damages actually attributable to the injuries that Sylvia Ferrante sustained.

What we must decide, therefore, is whether the fact that the defendant's decedent in this case was a mere passenger justifies enforcing a provision in an insurance contract that we have previously held unenforceable as violative of governing insurance statutes and regulations. That question cannot be answered without a careful review of the reasoning of our prior case law on "stacking."

This court has, on a number of occasions, considered the "stacking" of uninsured and underinsured automobile insurance coverage for two passenger cars. Three principles of law emerge from our cases. First, we have noted that the issue of aggregation of coverage for multiple vehicles can arise with regard either to "interpolicy stacking" under separate and distinct insurance policies, or to single policy, "intra-policy stacking." Regardless of this difference in form, we have repeatedly held that General Statutes § 38-175c permits an injured claimant to "stack" coverages. ⁴ Dixon v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 189 Conn. 449, 453, 456 A.2d 335 (1983); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 394-97, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Vetre, 174 Conn. 329, 333-35, 387 A.2d 539 (1978); Pecker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 171 Conn. 443, 448-49, 370 A.2d 1006 (1976). Second, in the context of cases involving "intra-policy stacking," such as the one presently before us, we have held that such stacking is particularly appropriate when, as here, " 'each of the insured vehicles is separately described, the coverage granted under the policy is separately listed for each vehicle and a separate premium is charged for the coverage afforded to each of the described vehicles.' " Safeco Ins. Co. v. Vetre, supra, 174 Conn. at 334, 387 A.2d 539; Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, supra, 187 Conn. at 395, 446 A.2d 1059. Third, relying on regulations enacted pursuant to General Statutes §§ 38-175a and 38-175c, we have concluded that an insurer may not, by contract, reduce its liability for such uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage except as § 38-175a-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies expressly authorizes. Dixon v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 189 Conn. at 452-53, 456 A.2d 335; Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, supra, 187 Conn. at 398-99, 446 A.2d 1059; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Vetre, supra, 174 Conn. at 332-33, 387 A.2d 539; Pecker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 171 Conn. at 448-51, 370 A.2d 1006. That regulation permits an insurer to limit its liability to the extent that damages have been paid by or on behalf of any person responsible for the injury, have been paid or are payable under any workers' compensation or disability benefits law, have been paid under the policy in settlement of a liability claim, or have been paid or are payable under any provisions of the policy for direct indemnity for medical expense or basic reparations benefits. The regulation nowhere authorizes an insurer contractually to interdict "stacking." ⁵ Accordingly, we have held that uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage can be "stacked" despite language in the relevant insurance policy that purports explicitly to prohibit "stacking" of such coverage in the event that two automobiles are insured under the same policy. Dixon v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., supra; Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, supra; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Vetre, supra; Pecker v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra.

The plaintiff argues that these principles do not apply here because the underlying cases are distinguishable. According to the plaintiff, a claimant who is a mere passenger has a lesser claim to "stack" uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, for two reasons. First, the plaintiff maintains that the statutes and the regulations requiring uninsured motorist coverage do not expressly require that such coverage be made available to the mere occupant of an insured automobile who is neither the policyholder nor a resident relative. Second, the plaintiff argues that "stacking" is contractually inappropriate because, while a policyholder who pays a separate premium for multiple coverages can reasonably expect to aggregate the amounts that he is entitled to recover, a mere occupant or passenger cannot reasonably be said to have entertained such expectations. The plaintiff urges us, therefore, to follow the rulings in other jurisdictions that have denied mere occupants the right to "stack" uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages under a single policy covering multiple automobiles. See, e.g., Hampton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 126 Ariz. 403, 405, 616 P.2d 78 (1980); Sharples v. General Casualty Co. of Illinois, 85 Ill.App.3d 899, 902, 41 Ill.Dec. 176, 407 N.E.2d 674 (1980); Pettid v. Edwards, 195 Neb. 713, 719, 240 N.W.2d 344 (1976); General Accident Ins. Co. v. St. Peter, 334 Pa.Super. 6, 11, 482 A.2d 1051 (1984); Abshere v. Prudential Ins. Co., 38 Wash.App. 1, 2-6, 683 P.2d 625, cert. denied, 102 Wash.2d 1013 (1984). ⁶ We find neither of the plaintiff's arguments persuasive. Addressing first the plaintiff's legislative argument, we note...