Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co. v. Todaro

• Decision Date: 05 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 19-cv-11833
• Citation: 443 F.Supp.3d 801
• Parties: ALLSTATE VEHICLE AND PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Valentina TODARO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

443 F.Supp.3d 801

ALLSTATE VEHICLE AND PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.Valentina TODARO, Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-11833

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed March 5, 2020

Cary R. Berlin, Patrick, Johnson & Mott, P.C., Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.

Mark Alan Proudman, Shawn C. Cabot, Christopher Trainer and Assoc., White Lake, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 21)

Paul D. Borman, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this declaratory judgment action, Plaintiff Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company (Allstate) seeks an order of summary judgment "declaring that Allstate does not have to continue defending, and that it does not have a duty to indemnify Amber, Michael, or Michelle Montoya against the allegations brought against them by Valentina Todaro." (ECF No. 21, MSJ, PgID 293.) Defendant Valentina Todaro, the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit, opposes Allstate's Motion. (ECF No. 23, Response.)

At issue is whether Allstate, which provided home insurance to the Montoyas during the relevant time period, is required to defend the Montoyas against Todaro's assault, battery, and vicarious parental liability claims in the underlying lawsuit in Lapeer County Circuit Court. Allstate argues that Amber Montoya's alleged actions—pushing Todaro into a bus seat, holding her down, and punching her multiple times in the face and head—were intentional and not accidental, so they are not covered by the insurance policy. (ECF No. 21, MSJ, PgID 281–93.) Todaro argues that the policy language is ambiguous and contrary to public policy and therefore it should be read in favor of coverage. (ECF No. 23, Response, PgID 396–402.) Todaro's position is contrary to Michigan law and requires an unduly strained reading of the contract language. Therefore, the Court grants Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment and declares that Allstate has no duty to defend or indemnify the Montoyas in the underlying action.

II. FACTS

The facts are undisputed. Allstate issued a "House & Home Policy" to Michael and Michelle M. Montoya, covering them from July 17, 2016 until July 17, 2017. The policy contained the following relevant provisions:

Definitions Used in This Policy

Throughout this policy, when the following words appear in bold type, they are defined as follows:

1. Bodily Injury— means physical harm to the body ...

5. Insured person(s)— means you and, if a resident of your household:

(a) any relative; and

(b) any person under the age of 21 in your care ...

7. Occurrence— means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions during the policy period, resulting in bodily injury ...

12. We , us , or our— means the company named on the Policy Declarations [Allstate]....

14. You or your— means the person listed under Named Insured(s) on the Policy Declarations as the insured [Michael and Michelle M. Montoya] and that person's resident spouse....

Family Liability Protection–Coverage X

Losses We Cover Under Coverage X:

Subject to the terms, conditions and limitations of this policy, we will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an occurrence to which this policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy....

Losses We Do Not Cover Under Coverage X:

1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person ....

Guest Medical Protection—Coverage Y

Losses We Cover Under Coverage Y:

We will pay the reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services, ambulance ... and pharmaceuticals. These expenses must be incurred and the services performed within three years from the date of an occurrence causing bodily injury to which this policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy.

Each person who sustains bodily injury is entitled to this protection when that person is: ...

2. off the insured premises , if the bodily injury : ...

b) is caused by the activities of an insured person ...

Losses We Do Not Cover Under Coverage Y:

1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person ....

(ECF No. 21-3, Policy, PgID 341–42, 360, 325, 362.) The policy also contains a choice-of-law provision that says, "the laws of the state in which the residence premises is located shall govern any and all claims or disputes in any way related to this policy." (Id. at PgID 343.)

On April 29, 2019, Defendant Valentina Todaro filed a Complaint against Amber Montoya, Michael and Michelle Montoya's daughter, for assault and battery in Lapeer County Circuit Court. (ECF No. 21-2, Underlying Complaint, PgID 306–07.) Todaro's claims arose out of an alleged incident on May 2, 2017. (Id. at PgID 303–07.)

According to the Complaint, Todaro was on a school bus heading to the Ed Tech building from Almont High School, attempting to move into a seat when, without provocation, Amber Montoya yelled "something to the effect of, ‘move out of my fucking way, bitch.’ " (Id. at PgID 303.) Todaro continued to try to move into her seat, but Amber pushed her "down into the seat," held her down, and "proceeded to punch [Todaro] in the right side of her face." (Id. at PgID 304.) As a result, Todaro "experienced bruises on her head

, headaches, blurred vision and damage to her jaw" which required significant medical treatment, including wearing a mouth brace "to prevent her jaw from clicking painfully and locking up." (Id. at PgID 306.) Todaro further alleged that Amber had previously yelled at her and threatened violence against her, and that Amber continued to subject her to verbal abuse and threats throughout the rest of the 2016-2017 school year as well as the 2017-2018 school year. (Id. at PgID 304–05.)

Todaro also alleged that Michael and Michelle Montoya are vicariously liable for Amber's assault and battery under Michigan's parental liability statute, Mich. Comp. L. 600.2913. (Id. ) The Michigan parental liability statute says:

A municipal corporation, county, township, village, school district, department of the state, person, partnership, corporation, association, or an incorporated or unincorporated religious organization may recover damages in an amount not to exceed $2,500.00 in a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the parents or parent of an unemancipated minor, living with his or her parents or parent, who has maliciously or wilfully destroyed real, personal, or mixed property which belongs to the municipal corporation, county, township, village, school district, department of the state, person, partnership, corporation, association, or religious organization incorporated or unincorporated or who has maliciously or wilfully caused bodily harm or injury to a person.

Mich. Comp. L. 600.2913.

The Montoyas asked Allstate to defend and indemnify them against Todaro's claims under the House & Home Policy. Allstate agreed to provide a defense, subject to a reservation of the right to deny the obligation to defend and indemnify in the future. (ECF No. 1-3, Reservation of Rights Letter, PgID 86–90.) In its reservation of rights letter, Allstate specifically identified the provisions of the House & Home Policy now at issue. (Id. at PgID 87–89.) Allstate initiated the current action on June 20, 2019, naming the Montoyas and Todaro as defendants. (ECF No. 1, Complaint.) Allstate asks the Court to find that it has no duty to defend or indemnify the Montoyas against Todaro's claims. (ECF No. 21, MSJ.)

The Montoyas, whose 2016-2017 House & Home Policy is the subject of the controversy, are no longer parties—they agreed to be bound by the findings of this Court and were dismissed by stipulated order on August 8, 2019. (ECF No. 10, Consent Order, PgID 119–20.) Todaro is the sole remaining defendant.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" for purposes of a summary judgment motion where proof of that fact "would have [the] effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties." Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio , 503 F.3d 456, 469 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kendall v. Hoover Co. , 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984) ). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In making the determination whether there are genuine issues of material fact for trial, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Moran v. Al Basit LLC , 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015). At the same time, the non-moving party must produce enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in its favor by a preponderance of the evidence. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "The ‘mere possibility’ of a factual dispute is not enough." Martin v. Toledo Cardiology Consultants, Inc. , 548 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. , 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) ). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted). A court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097,...