Kendall v. Hoover Co., No. 83-3845

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtBefore EDWARDS and KEITH, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSTONE; KEITH
Citation36 F.E.P. Cases 891,751 F.2d 171
Decision Date27 December 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-3845
Parties36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 891, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,862, 1 Fed.R.Serv.3d 802 Ovall Dale KENDALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The HOOVER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 171

751 F.2d 171
36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 891,
35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,862, 1 Fed.R.Serv.3d 802
Ovall Dale KENDALL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The HOOVER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 83-3845.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 22, 1984.
Decided Dec. 27, 1984.

Page 172

Edward L. Gilbert (argued), Akron, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

John D. Jolliffe, Gust Callas (argued), Canton, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.

Before EDWARDS and KEITH, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSTONE, District Judge. *

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Ovall Dale Kendall, from an order entered by the Honorable George W. White of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Hoover Company. Mr. Kendall also appeals from an order denying his motion for relief from judgment. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision.

The plaintiff was hired by the Hoover Company as a machine load engineer in 1966. Mr. Kendall served in this position for a number of years. On May 31, 1982, Mr. Kendall was advised that he was "going to be let go" and "terminated" because economic conditions required the department to reduce manpower by one person, and that he was chosen as the person to be terminated because his absenteeism was higher than others in his department. Mr. Kendall was told he would be given six months severance pay, and that there was a possibility he could be recalled within the six months. He was also told if he had not returned by November 30, 1982 (the end of the six month period), then as of that date he would be fully terminated. Mr. Kendall was contacted in September 1982, told he would be terminated as of November 30, 1982, and that all of his employment benefits would terminate as of that date. However, he was informed that he could maintain his medical benefits by retiring. Mr. Kendall elected to retire, effective December 1, 1982, in order to maintain his medical benefits.

On November 10, 1982, Mr. Kendall filed suit against the Hoover Company alleging age discrimination. On December 1, 1982, appellant received his first retirement pension check from Hoover. However, on January 3, 1983, Hoover offered Mr. Kendall his old position, reinstated him at his prior wage rate and gave him his normal annual merit increase.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues, in essence, that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant was inappropriate in this case because it occurred without a hearing or notice that this matter was under consideration by the court, that summary judgment is unsuitable to civil rights cases and that the movant did not meet his burden of demonstrating there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. We find these arguments to be without merit.

We address first plaintiff's argument concerning the court's failure to hold a hearing. In the Northern District of Ohio, Rule 3.01 provides in part: "Motions, in general, shall be submitted and determined upon the motion papers hereafter referred to. Oral arguments of motions will be permitted on application and proper showing." Notwithstanding plaintiff's contention at oral argument that there were

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informal communications with the court, from the record it is indisputable that a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was never requested. Accordingly, plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing, and we find plaintiff's argument in this regard without merit. See Dayco Corporation v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 523 F.2d 389, 391-92 (6th Cir.1975) (upholding an earlier version of Rule 3.01).

Next, we address plaintiff's argument that summary judgment is unsuited to a civil rights case. It is true there is authority to the effect that "[c]ases premised on alleged violations of the constitutional or civil rights of plaintiffs frequently are unsuitable for summary judgment." 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 2732.2 at 340 (2d ed. 1983). However, these commentators also point out that "in a discrimination case, the court may grant the motion if it determines that no evidence has been presented indicating that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor." Id. at 364-65; cf. McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 486, 489 (E.D.Pa.1982) (in order for plaintiff to avoid summary judgment in a Title VII action after defendant employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for the firing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision), aff'd without published opinion, 707 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3123, 77 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1983).

In granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court noted "the plaintiff has not opposed the motion of defendant Hoover Company for summary judgment nor the affidavit filed thereto asserting that the plaintiff was laid off because of excessive absenteeism." Joint Appendix at Document 6 (Ordering granting summary judgment). This Court has held that the conclusory allegations of a complaint cannot be relied...

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1022 practice notes
  • Doe ex rel. Doe v. Warren Consolidated Schools, No. 00-CV-72956-DT.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • February 13, 2003
    ...or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or Page 874 defense asserted by the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 881 (6th ed.1979)) (citations omitted). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evid......
  • O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., No. C2-95-554.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 26, 1998
    ...v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original); Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury c......
  • Satterfield v. Karnes, Case No. 2:08-cv-387
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 23, 2010
    ...affect [the] application of [an] appropriate principle of law to the rights and obligations of the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.736 F.Supp.2d 1149An issue of material fact is "genuine" when "the evidenc......
  • Thompson v. Chase Bankcard Serv., Inc., Case No. 2:09-CV-293
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 23, 2010
    ...affect [the] application of [an] appropriate principle of law to the rights and obligations of the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue of material fact is "genuine" when "the evidence is such that a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1022 cases
  • Doe ex rel. Doe v. Warren Consolidated Schools, No. 00-CV-72956-DT.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • February 13, 2003
    ...or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or Page 874 defense asserted by the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 881 (6th ed.1979)) (citations omitted). A dispute over a material fact is genuine "if the evid......
  • O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., No. C2-95-554.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 26, 1998
    ...v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original); Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury c......
  • Satterfield v. Karnes, Case No. 2:08-cv-387
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 23, 2010
    ...affect [the] application of [an] appropriate principle of law to the rights and obligations of the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.736 F.Supp.2d 1149An issue of material fact is "genuine" when "the evidenc......
  • Thompson v. Chase Bankcard Serv., Inc., Case No. 2:09-CV-293
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • August 23, 2010
    ...affect [the] application of [an] appropriate principle of law to the rights and obligations of the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue of material fact is "genuine" when "the evidence is such that a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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