Alonso v. Parfet, 41264

• Decision Date: 30 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 41264,41264
• Citation: 325 S.E.2d 152,253 Ga. 749
• Parties: , 52 A.L.R.4th 151 Kenneth B. ALONSO v. R.T. PARFET et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 152

325 S.E.2d 152

253 Ga. 749, 52 A.L.R.4th 151

Kenneth B. ALONSO v. R.T. PARFET et al.

No. 41264.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 30, 1985.

John W. Bonds, Jr., Thomas A. Varlan, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Atlanta, for Kenneth B. Alonso.

Matthew H. Patton, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, for R.T. Parfet et al.

SMITH, Justice.

Appellant, Dr. Kenneth Alonso, sued appellees to recover for the unsanctioned appropriation of his name. The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Alonso v. Parfet, 171 Ga.App. 74, 318 S.E.2d 696 (1984). We granted certiorari to determine whether appellees are entitled to a verdict as a matter of law. We reverse.

Appellant worked as a laboratory director for appellee Laboratory Procedures South, Inc. (LPS). His job was terminated in March 1979. Although appellant no longer worked for LPS, his name continued to appear along with the title "Laboratory Director" on a number of forms and documents that LPS continued to use. Appellant protested the use of his name by LPS at least twice over a period of months before his name stopped appearing on LPS's reports and documents. A more detailed account of the facts in this case may be found in the Court of Appeals' opinion. Alonso v. Parfet, supra.

The courts in this state have long recognized that one who makes an unsanctioned appropriation of another's name or likeness for his own benefit may be liable to that person in tort. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga.App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966). Here, appellees listed appellant's name on various forms and documents. The perception created by the use of appellant's name, that this medical doctor was in charge of the general operation of the lab and of some specific tests performed in the lab, could establish a benefit for appellees.

The crucial question here, as the Court of Appeals recognized, is whether the use of appellant's name was sanctioned. In answering this question, we must construe the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, here the appellant. Tri-Cities Hospital Authority v. Sheats, 247 Ga. 713, 279 S.E.2d 210 (1981).

In Tanner-Brice Co. v. Sims, 174 Ga. 13, 161 S.E. 819 (1931), we held that express consent to the use of an employee's surname in a trade name followed by expenditures in the use of the surname, will establish an irrevocable license to use the surname in the trade name. In Buchanan v. Foxfire Fund, 151 Ga.App. 90, 91-92, 258 S.E.2d 751 (1979), the Court of Appeals held that an employer gains an irrevocable license to use an employee's work product when the materials in question "[are] collected at a time when [the employee is] in the employ of [the employer]," and the employer incurs expenses in reliance upon the implied license to use the work. City Council of Augusta v. Burum, 93 Ga. 68, 19 S.E. 820 (1893), established limits in "irrevocable" licenses.

The evidence in this case, construed in favor of appellant, does not establish an express license to use appellant's name beyond the term of his employment. Appellant's claim does not involve the use of his name in connection with work performed while he was employed by LPS. Appellees admit that they used appellant's name on various documents unrelated to his employment even after he complained of that use.

While the expenditure of funds may convert an express or an implied license into an irrevocable license, the expenditure of funds cannot expand such a license beyond its original terms. As the Court of Appeals noted, the use of appellant's name on LPS's business documents arose "as a part of [appellan...