Alonzi v. Ne. Generation Servs. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2007–039.,2007–039.
• Citation: 156 N.H. 656,940 A.2d 1153
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: Michelle ALONZI, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Hopkins v. NORTHEAST GENERATION SERVICES COMPANY and another.

156 N.H. 656

940 A.2d 1153

Michelle ALONZI, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Hopkins

v.NORTHEAST GENERATION SERVICES COMPANY and another.

No. 2007–039.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: Sept. 19, 2007.

Opinion Issued: Jan. 15, 2008.

Burns, Bryant, Cox, Rockefeller & Durkin, of Dover (Paul R. Cox and another, on the brief, and Sarah E. Cox orally), for the plaintiff.

Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., of Concord (Timothy A. Gudas and another, on the brief, and James E. Owers orally), for defendant Northeast Generation Services Company.

McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A., of Manchester (Patrick H. Taylor, on the brief), for the New Hampshire Trial Lawyers Association, as amicus curiae.

BRODERICK, C.J.

This case comes before us on interlocutory appeal from a ruling by the Superior Court (Mohl, J.), see Sup.Ct. R. 8, declining to dismiss negligence and wrongful death actions filed by the plaintiff, Michelle Alonzi, as administratrix of the estate of Glenn Hopkins, against defendant Northeast Generation Services Company (NGS). Because we overrule Park v. Rockwell International Corp., 121 N.H. 894, 436 A.2d 1136 (1981), the touchstone case relied upon by the trial court, and uphold the constitutionality of the challenged death benefit provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, see RSA 281–A:26, IV (1999), we reverse and remand.

I

We draw upon the interlocutory appeal statement for the facts. The decedent, Glenn Hopkins, was employed by NGS in June 2003. While acting within the scope of his employment, Hopkins accidentally died from electrocution. He left no dependents. The plaintiff brought an action on behalf of his estate, asserting negligence and wrongful death claims against three defendants: Waste Management of NH, Inc. T.R.E.E.; Transformer Services, Inc.; and NGS. NGS moved to dismiss the claims against it, asserting immunity from tort liability under the workers' compensation exclusivity provision, RSA 281–A:8 (Supp.2007), and death benefit provision, RSA 281–A:26, IV. The plaintiff objected, and the trial court denied the motion, relying upon our holding in Park. Subsequently, the trial court approved the following question for interlocutory appeal:

Did the Superior Court err in denying NGS' Motion to Dismiss, and in ruling that the estate of an employee who died without dependents may maintain a wrongful death action against the employer, on the basis that the provisions of RSA 281–A:8 and RSA 281–A:26, IV are unconstitutional according to Park v. Rockwell?

The plaintiff argues that the trial court properly followed the Park decision, which held that the exclusive nature of the death benefit available under the Workers' Compensation Law for employees who die without dependents in the course of their employment violated equal protection afforded under our State Constitution. Park, 121 N.H. at 900, 436 A.2d 1136. NGS, however, contends that because the rationale of Park has been eroded in subsequent cases, we should overrule it and uphold as constitutional the exclusivity of the death benefit available to the plaintiff under the Workers' Compensation Law.

In Park, we considered facts similar to those before us, and addressed the difference in the statutory remedies afforded to estates of dependentless decedents who are killed at work as compared to the estates of dependentless decedents who are killed outside of work. Under the former version of the Workers' Compensation Law, the estate of a dependentless decedent killed at work could recover no more than $1,200 in burial expenses. See id. at 897, 436 A.2d 1136. The statute remains the same, except that the maximum cap for burial expenses is now $5,000. See RSA 281–A:26, IV. The estate of a dependentless decedent who was killed outside of work, however, could pursue a wrongful death claim and recover up to $50,000 in damages. See RSA 556:13 (2007).

Using middle-tier scrutiny, we held that the different treatment of these two classes of estates violated equal protection under Part I, Article 12 of our State Constitution. Park, 121 N.H. at 899–900, 436 A.2d 1136. We declared the exclusivity of the death benefit provision under the Workers' Compensation Law to be unconstitutional

to the extent it applies to employees without dependents who are killed in the course of their employment ... and the plaintiff in this case is entitled to proceed with an action for wrongful death against his decedent's employer if he elects to forego the benefits otherwise provided under RSA ch. 281.

Id. at 900, 436 A.2d 1136. While noting that "[o]bviously, in cases involving wrongful death, dependentless employees may be treated differently than other deceased persons who die without dependents ... [due to] the employer-employee status," id. at 898, 436 A.2d 1136 (citations omitted), we struck down the exclusive nature of the death benefit provision, id. at 900, 436 A.2d 1136. In so doing, we focused solely upon the disparity between the potential $50,000 recovery under the wrongful death statute and the limited burial expense benefit under the Workers' Compensation Law and reasoned:

In order to hold that [the challenged] provisions of our workmen's compensation law are constitutional, we would have to determine that the lives of the deceased employees, leaving no one dependent upon them at the time of their work-related deaths, are essentially "worthless." This we cannot do.

... It would not be just, under the pretext of qualifying the decedent for workmen's compensation benefits which under the terms of that statute he will never receive and which are nominal in nature, to foreclose the right of his estate, where the facts otherwise warrant it, to maintain a wrongful death action against the employer.

Id. at 899–900, 436 A.2d 1136.

NGS contends that a subsequent line of New Hampshire cases discredits our analysis in Park. See Estabrook v. American Hoist & Derrick, Inc., 127 N.H. 162, 498 A.2d 741 (1985), overruled by Young v. Prevue Products, Inc., 130 N.H. 84, 534 A.2d 714 (1987) ; Thone v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 130 N.H. 702, 549 A.2d 778 (1988) ; Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992). It argues that these cases, as well as foreign cases, establish that the proper constitutional framework requires review of the death benefit provision in light of the comprehensive scheme of benefits provided by the Workers' Compensation Law. Thus, it contends, the Park analysis in which we compared the recovery available under the death benefit provision in isolation to that available under the wrongful death statute is outmoded and no longer viable.

II

We do not lightly overrule a case that has been precedent for over twenty-five years. "The doctrine of stare decisis demands respect in a society governed by the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will with arbitrary and unpredictable results." Jacobs v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 149 N.H. 502, 504, 823 A.2d 752 (2003) (quotations omitted). When asked to overrule a prior holding, we do not look at the issues de novo; rather, we review "whether the ruling has come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed." Id. at 504–05, 823 A.2d 752 (quotation omitted).

Several factors inform our judgment, including: (1) whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling; (3) whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; and (4) whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

Id. at 505, 823 A.2d 752 (quotations and citations omitted). We have considered the status of the law in other jurisdictions to examine whether the challenged holding is unworkable or outside the development of the law. See id. After considering these various factors, we conclude that the legal landscape has changed to such a degree as to require us to overrule Park.

Four years after Park, we reviewed the constitutionality of a 1978 amendment to the Workers' Compensation Law that barred an injured employee's right to maintain non-intentional tort actions against a co-employee. Estabrook, 127 N.H. at 166, 498 A.2d 741. While the provisions were challenged on both due process and equal protection grounds, we did not analyze these grounds separately. Rather, we examined whether the 1978 amendment provided a quid pro quo, or an adequate substitute remedy, for the rights of action it otherwise extinguished. Id. at 172, 498 A.2d 741. Relying upon our narrow analytical framework in Park, we struck down the challenged provisions because the amendment itself provided no substitute remedy. Id. at 178, 498 A.2d 741. Justice Souter dissented. Id. at 181–87, 498 A.2d 741 (Souter, J., dissenting). He read the majority's opinion as deciding the matter on equal protection grounds, and for the reasons he stated in his dissent, we agree. Id. at 181, 498 A.2d 741 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter opined that the correct equal protection analysis of a limitation imposed by the Workers' Compensation Law requires review of the entire spectrum of benefits provided to employees under that law. See id. at 186, 498 A.2d 741 (Souter, J., dissenting).

Just two years later, we overruled Estabrook "[t]o the extent that [its] holding ... may be interpreted as requiring that a restrictive amendment to the workers' compensation law must be supported by a contemporaneously enacted provision for a new benefit."

Young, 130 N.H. at 88, 534 A.2d 714. The following year, we further clarified that when conducting a quid pro quo analysis to ensure that a particular workers' compensation provision does not...