Alphonso v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans

• Decision Date: 16 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 12901,12901
• Parties: Lori Jean ALPHONSO v. CHARITY HOSPITAL OF LOUISIANA AT NEW ORLEANS, et al.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 982

413 So.2d 982

Lori Jean ALPHONSO v. CHARITY HOSPITAL OF LOUISIANA AT NEW ORLEANS, et al.

No. 12901.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Fourth Circuit.

April 16, 1982.

Writ Denied June 11, 1982.

Robert D. Bjork, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.

Harry A. Burglass, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellant.

Before SCHOTT, WARD and KLEES, JJ.

WARD, Judge.

Lori Jean Alphonso was the victim of two rapes while she was a mental patient confined in the psychiatric ward of Charity Hospital, an agency of the State of Louisiana. She filed suit in the Civil District Court, claiming that Charity Hospital personnel were negligent in caring for her, and she has asked for damages for her injuries. The case was tried before the District Judge. His verdict was that Charity Hospital personnel were negligent in their care, and because of their negligence, Miss Alphonso was raped, and the State is liable for $50,000.00 damages for her injuries.

Although the State did not appeal, Miss Alphonso has, and the State has answered. Miss Alphonso contends the award is grossly inadequate to compensate for her physical injuries with the attendant pain and suffering, her emotional injuries, and for the medical expenses, past and future, directly related to those rapes. The State contends that the Trial Judge's award is fair and adequate, that it should not be disturbed because it was made after lengthy and thoughtful consideration, and that certainly the trial judge did not abuse his great discretion in determining the question of damages. Since the State did not appeal the trial court judgment that it is liable for damages, the only issue in this appeal is whether the Trial Judge's award of $50,000.00 is adequate. Although liability is not now questioned, we believe a brief review of Miss Alphonso's medical history and the facts proven at trial is essential to understand the nature and extent of Miss Alphonso's injuries and to answer the question of whether the award is adequate.

Before the rapes, Miss Alphonso had a history of mental illness which had been diagnosed as chronic paranoid schizophrenia, and treatment before this incident had consisted of hospital care and various psychotropic drugs. In April 1978, when she was eighteen, Miss Alphonso was committed to Charity Hospital by her parents after she suffered a severe psychotic episode. During her short stay there, Miss Alphonso was raped twice by a mental patient who was also confined to the psychiatric ward of Charity Hospital. The rapes occurred shortly after Miss Alphonso was admitted to the ward. The first occurred in the bathroom adjacent to her bedroom while she was heavily sedated; the second rape occurred the next afternoon in her bedroom while Miss Alphonso was fully awake. Because she was delusional and heavily sedated, Miss Alphonso's resistance to the first rape was minimal; however, she violently resisted the second rape, and her muffled screams were heard by hospital personnel, who caught the rapist in the act.

Miss Alphonso was taken out of Charity by her parents and was immediately admitted to Southern Baptist Hospital; later she was released and admitted to Touro Infirmary. After weeks of confinement, she was brought home, where she stayed with her mother and father. In May 1979, after returning home, Miss Alphonso discovered a love letter which had been written to her by the rapist, a deranged sexual deviant, and which expressed his intention to ravish her. Miss Alphonso's whereabouts had been discovered by the rapist through the negligence of Charity Hospital personnel. Because of the letter, Miss Alphonso became psychotic and irrationally believed she could protect herself through self-mutilation. In an attempt to save herself from any future rape attack, Miss Alphonso slashed most of her body--neck, chest, legs and abdomen--with a razor, to prevent the rapist from recognizing her and to make herself sexually unattractive to the rapist if she were recognized. She was immediately taken from her home and brought to Ochsner Foundation Hospital for treatment of her extensive wounds and her psychosis.

Miss Alphonso was released from Ochsner after two weeks, but the pattern of brief admittance to various mental institutions continued after the rape to the time of trial. While waiting for the trial, Miss Alphonso was confined in Coliseum House, and there Dr. Anastasio, a psychiatrist, assumed responsibility for her medical care. After psychiatric and psychological evaluations, he concluded that Miss Alphonso was still seriously troubled by the rapes. After a brief stay for evaluation and treatment, she was released from Coliseum House. Unfortunately, stress in anticipation of the trial caused her condition to deteriorate, and she was confined a second time at Coliseum House for two weeks. After she was released, the case was brought to trial without a jury, since the State was a party defendant, and the complex issue of a proper award for damages was presented to the trial judge.

In deciding the issue of damages, several questions must be answered: (1) were physical injuries--the self-mutilation--proven by a preponderance of the evidence to have resulted from the rape, and were they erroneously omitted from the judgment awarding damages?; (2) were the damages awarded ($50,000.00) for emotional injuries--post-traumatic stress disorder and rape-trauma--sufficient compensation for the particular injuries to this particular plaintiff?; (3) were medical expenses, past and future, proven by a preponderance of the evidence to have resulted from the rapes?

Before answering these questions, we believe we should state our understanding of the role of appellate courts in reviewing a trial court's award of damages. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1977), stated:

We do re-emphasize, however, that before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made by a trial court that the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award. Only after making the finding that the record supports that the lower court abused its much discretion can the appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court. It is never appropriate for a Court of Appeal, having found that the trial court has abused its discretion, simply to decide what it considers an appropriate award on the basis of the evidence.

And in Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979):

Thus, the initial inquiry must always be directed at whether the trial court's award for the particular injuries and their effects upon the particular injured person is a clear abuse of the trier of fact's "much discretion" ... in the award of damages. It is only after an articulated analysis of the facts discloses an abuse of discretion, that the award may on appellate review, for articulated reasons, be considered either excessive ... or insufficient ...

However, absent an initial determination that the trial court's very great discretion in the award of general damages has been abused under the facts of this case, the reviewing court should not disturb the trier's award....

Where error of a factual determination by the trial judge is alleged, however, a different standard is applicable. The Supreme Court in Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978), stated that there must be

... a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court; there must be a further determination that the record establishes that the finding is not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).

So when a trial judge has considered a particular element of damages, the award for those damages should not be changed unless the record shows that the trial judge abused his great discretion. When, however, as here, it is argued that the trial judge has overlooked injuries clearly proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the issue is not whether this is an abuse of discretion; the issue is whether the record indicates the judgment is manifestly erroneous (clearly wrong). And if compensable injuries (when proven by a preponderance of the evidence and supported by the record)...