Alquijay by Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Center

• Decision Date: 13 November 1984
• Docket Number: S-ROOSEVELT
• Citation: 473 N.E.2d 244,483 N.Y.S.2d 994,63 N.Y.2d 978
• Parties: , 473 N.E.2d 244 Lydia R. ALQUIJAY, an Infant, by Her Parents and Natural Guardians, Josefina Z. ALQUIJAY and Salome Alquijay, et al., Appellants, v. ST. LUKE'HOSPITAL CENTER et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 994

483 N.Y.S.2d 994

63 N.Y.2d 978, 473 N.E.2d 244

Lydia R. ALQUIJAY, an Infant, by Her Parents and Natural

Guardians, Josefina Z. ALQUIJAY and Salome

Alquijay, et al., Appellants, v. ST. LUKE'S-ROOSEVELT HOSPITAL CENTER et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 13, 1984.

Geraldine J. Gould, New York City, for appellants.

Howard R. Cohen, New York City, for St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Center, respondent.

Norman Bard, Brooklyn, and Lawrence Kanterman, New York City, for Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 99 A.D.2d 704, 472 N.Y.S.2d 2, should be affirmed, with costs.

This appeal presents the question whether plaintiff, an infant born with Down's Syndrome, can recover from defendant hospitals the extraordinary expenses she will incur for special care and services upon reaching majority. The basis for her claim is that defendants negligently performed an amniocentesis test on her mother during pregnancy to determine whether the fetus had any genetic abnormality, and their erroneous report that the mother would give birth to a normal male child induced her to carry to term instead of aborting the fetus, resulting in plaintiff's birth with a condition that will require special treatment throughout her lifetime. All other causes of action against defendants have been withdrawn, including the claims of plaintiff's parents for damages, which were time-barred. While Special Term denied defendants' motions to dismiss the infant's cause of action, the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, concluding, on the basis of Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807, that there is no cause of action for wrongful life and that the life of one such as plaintiff, born in an impaired state, does not constitute injury to the infant.

We agree with the Appellate Division that, while otherwise denominated, plaintiff's cause of action is in fact one for wrongful life, which is not legally cognizable in this State. Nor is there any anomally or inconsistency in the fact that plaintiff's parents might, if their own claim had been timely brought, have recovered their pecuniary expense for the care and treatment of their infant (Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-413, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807, supra ), although plaintiff herself cannot recover these same expenses after her majority. While plaintiff's parents might have...