Alsever v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co.
Decision Date | 23 January 1902 |
Citation | 115 Iowa 338,88 N.W. 841 |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Parties | ALSEVER v. MINNEAPOLIS & ST. L. R. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Webster county; S. M. Weaver, Judge.
The defendant appeals from a judgment for damages. Affirmed.R. M. Wright, for appellant.
Botsford, Healy & Healy, for appellee.
The defendant's train had stopped at Burnside shortly after 12 o'clock m. May 25, 1899. Attached to the engine was a device known as the “McIntosh Blow-Off Cock,” used for the purpose of cleansing the boiler of sediment by forcing water through it from the bottom at great pressure. At that time the plaintiff, then eight years old, was standing, with other children, on the side of the corncrib, about 7 feet above the ground, and some 20 feet from the engine, looking at it through an opening. In operating the blow-off cock, hot steam or spray was thrown on the crib, and possibly on plaintiff, thereby so frightening her that she fell, breaking a leg. She then moved from the crib to a pile of cobs nearby. Her screams immediately brought her father, Cox, and the engineer. The father testified: The evidence of Cox was to the same effect. The objection interposed by defendant, that this formed no part of the res gestæ, was overruled. As the crib was on the depot grounds, the court held that the defendant owed no positive duty to plaintiff; and therefore this evidence was of controlling importance in determining whether the engineer, in blowing off the hot steam or spray, knew that plaintiff was in a place of danger. It will be noticed that the evidence tended to show that conversation occurred within a minute after the use of the blow-off cock, and as soon as the engineer could reach the point where the injured child was lying, to ascertain the result of what had been done. The opening of the blow-off cock, the rush of steam and spray, the scream of the child, the question of the father, the statement of the engineer, all within a few seconds, were so immediately connected as to constitute one transaction. What forms a part of the res gestæ must of necessity depend on the facts of each particular case. A mere account of a past occurrence, or purely an opinion of what has happened, is to be rejected. Declarations, to be received, should derive credit, not from the declarant, but from their connection with the principal fact of which complaint is made. The rule is concisely stated thus in Hadley v. Carter, 8 N. H. 40: “Where declarations of an individual are so connected with his acts as to derive a degree of credit from such connection, independent of the declaration, the declaration becomes part of the transaction, and is admissible in evidence.” In Felt v. Amidon, 43 Wis. 467-470, in quoting with approval from the case of Lund v. Inhabitants of Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. 36, the court said: The grounds upon which such statements have been received are generally concurred in. The difficulty has been in drawing a line with respect to lapse of time after, and the necessary connection with, the main act, so as to clearly distinguish between declarations which are admissible and those too remote and disconnected. In Keyes v. City of Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa, 509, 78 N. W. 227, the rule to be deduced from our decisions is said to be that “if they are near enough in point of time to the principal transaction to clearly appear to be spontaneous and unpremeditated, and free from sinister motives, and afford a reliable explanation of the principal transaction, they are admissible in evidence.” See Railway Co. v. Anderson (Tex. Sup.) 27 Am. St. Rep. 902, note (s. c. 17 S. W. 1039); also Wilson v. Southern Pac. Co. (Utah) 57 Am. St. Rep. 766, note (s. c. 44 Pac. 1040), where the true rule is accurately and comprehensively stated thus: “All declarations or exclamations uttered by the parties to a transaction which are contemporaneous with and accompany it, or which are made under such circumstances as will raise a reasonable presumption that they are the spontaneous utterances of thoughts created by or springing out of the transaction itself, or so soon thereafter as to exclude the presumption that they are the result of premeditation or design, and which are calculated to throw light on the motives and intention of the parties, are admissible in evidence as part of the res gestæ.” So immediately connected was the engineer's remark as to how it all happened with what preceded, that it was an explanatory exclamation, not merely an excuse or account of what had been done. The inquiry to which it was a response did not necessarily interrupt the connection. Indeed, the authorities put little stress on the circumstance. It is proper to be considered, however, in ascertaining the connection with the main fact, but not controlling. Neither can it make any difference that the statement was made by an employé or agent, rather than the principal or injured person. Declarations are received, as already pointed out, not on the credit or relation of the declarant, but because forming a part of the transaction; and it is immaterial by whom, if by some person whose conduct or condition, about which the statement is made, can be proven. Coll v. Transit Co. (Pa.) 37 Atl. 89. Nor is the fact that the statement was in the nature of an excuse enough alone to warrant its exclusion. The books indicate that many, if not most, of the declarations admitted as part of the res gestæ, are of this character. If in the nature of an excuse, however, the fact is important in determining whether the statement was spontaneous and unpremeditated, or a mere opinion or conclusion based on a completed transaction. The declarations, if made by the engineer,...
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Penas v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
... ... It is held that ... defendant's liability was for the jury, under proper ... instructions from the court. Barrett v. Minneapolis, St ... P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 106 Minn. 51, followed and applied ... D. J ... Keefe and Thos. C. Daggett, for appellant ... 675, 680, 80 N.W. 797. An employee ... of defendant blows a whistle ( Texas v. Scoville, 62 ... F. 730, 10 C.C.A. 479, 27 L.R.A. 179; Alsever v ... Minneapolis, 115 Iowa 338, 88 N.W. 841, 56 L.R.A. 748; ... but see Ballard v. Louisville, 128 Ky. 826, 110 S.W ... 296, 16 L.R.A ... ...
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Penas v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
... ... 121 Mich. 675, 680, 80 N. W. 797. An employee of defendant blows a whistle (Texas v. Scoville, 62 Fed. 730, 10 C. C. A. 479, 27 L.R.A. 179; Alsever v. Minneapolis, 115 Iowa, 338, 88 N. W. 841, 56 L.R.A. 748; but see Ballard v. Louisville, 128 Ky. 826, 110 S. W. 296, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1052), or ... ...
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