Alston v. DeBruyn

• Decision Date: 05 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 91-3927,91-3927
• Citation: 13 F.3d 1036
• Parties: Byron ALSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. Christian DeBRUYN, * et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1036

13 F.3d 1036

Byron ALSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. Christian DeBRUYN, ^* et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-3927.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 14, 1993.

Decided Jan. 5, 1994.

Dan Conley (argued), Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, WI, for plaintiff-appellant.

Wayne E. Uhl, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., Federal Litigation, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants-appellees.

Wayne E. Uhl, Deputy Atty. Gen. and Pamela Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Atty. Gen., Federal Litigation, Indianapolis, IN, for amicus curiae.

Before CUMMINGS, BAUER and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

Byron Alston, an Indiana state inmate, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). This appeal questions the propriety of that dismissal, which was with prejudice and without leave to amend the complaint. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint because Alston raised colorable claims and should have had the opportunity to cure the complaint's shortcomings by amendment.

I. FACTS

Alston, along with twelve other inmates, brought a pro se complaint styled as a "class action" under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that the conditions of confinement on the administrative segregation unit of the Indiana State Reformatory violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. Specifically, the complaint alleged (1) the denial of religious programs; (2) the denial of access to the law library and limited consultation with legal assistants; (3) the denial of due process in connection with the inmates' placement on administrative segregation; (4) the denial of educational, vocational, and rehabilitative programs; and (5) the inadequate preparation of food. Named as defendants were the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Corrections ("In Official Capacity"), the Superintendent of the Indiana State Reformatory, and two Reformatory employees. ¹ The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint with prejudice prior to service of process, finding it to be frivolous within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). The court denied the requests to proceed in forma pauperis and for class certification. Only Alston appealed the dismissal of the complaint, raising the first three claims set forth above.

II. DISCUSSION

The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d), authorizes federal courts to dismiss a claim filed in forma pauperis " 'if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.' " Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (quoting 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d)). In Neitzke, the Supreme Court held that a complaint is frivolous "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Id. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831-32. Section 1915(d) "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. Examples of legally frivolous claims include "claims against which it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit," and "claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist"; examples of factually frivolous claims are "claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. at 1833.

In Denton v. Hernandez, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992), the Supreme Court elaborated on the "clearly baseless" guidepost for determining factual frivolity:

[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them. An in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed, however, simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely. Some improbable allegations may properly be disposed of on summary judgment, but to dismiss them as frivolous without any factual development is to disregard the age-old insight that many allegations might be "strange, but true; for truth is always strange, Stranger than fiction."

Id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1733-34 (quoting Lord Byron, "Don Juan," canto 14, stanza 101).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a Sec. 1915(d) dismissal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1734. In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, the court of appeals may consider whether the plaintiff was proceeding pro se; whether the court inappropriately resolved genuine issues of disputed fact; whether the court applied erroneous legal conclusions; whether the court provided a statement of reasons explaining the dismissal; and whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Id. "[I]f it appears that frivolous factual allegations could be remedied through more specific pleading, a court of appeals reviewing a Sec. 1915(d) dismissal should consider whether the District Court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or without leave to amend." Id.; see Smith-Bey v. Hospital Adm'r, 841 F.2d 751, 758 (7th Cir.1988) (Sec. 1915(d) dismissal with prejudice is inappropriate where absence of sufficient facts in complaint is due to unskilled pro se plaintiff and amendment will cure deficiencies of complaint); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1179 n. 1 (7th Cir.1989) (same; quoting Smith-Bey ); see also Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir.1993) (construing Denton to suggest that Sec. 1915(d) dismissals generally are to be without prejudice).

A. The Denial of Access to Religious Programs

Inmates retain the right to exercise their religious beliefs. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). A prison regulation that infringes on an inmate's First Amendment rights is valid only "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). A prison "need make only reasonable efforts to afford the inmates an opportunity to practice their faith." Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir.1991). "In providing this opportunity, the efforts of prison administrators, when assessed in their totality, must be evenhanded." Id. at 686. Thus, if segregation was proper, all the defendants would need to establish is that Alston had "some opportunity" to exercise his protected rights. Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 44 (7th Cir.1978).

The complaint in this case alleged that inmates in the administrative segregation unit were denied access to religious programs. The complaint read, "We are giveing no kind of religious program on this unit, They never come on the unit, for those progarms." The district court found this claim to be frivolous. In so finding, the court stated:

Here, the reasonableness of controlling the movement of prisoners in A/S Unit and of controlling its environment cannot reasonably be doubted. The entire premise of assignment to A/S Unit is a finding by prison authorities that such assignment is necessary to maintain the inmate's safety and security. This identifies the legitimate and compelling penological goal underlying the actions to which the plaintiffs object in this action. Those actions, as alleged by the plaintiffs, are not an exaggerated or unreasonable response to the violence which has been described. Prison officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel. It would be entirely contrary to the principles expressed and repeated by the Supreme Court for a federal court to monitor or second-guess the decisions of prison administrators in determining whether and how long to impose a lockdown following repeated serious instances of inmate violence in a housing unit.

* * * * * *

Considering (1) the paucity of factual allegations here, stating that the plaintiffs have been denied the opportunity to attend unspecified group religious services organized by inmates or others from the general population, (2) the circumstances under which that denial has occurred and (3) the deference which must be accorded to the reasonable decisions of administrators such as the defendants here, the complaint fails to state an arguable claim that the plaintiffs' First Amendment right to the reasonable opportunity to the exercise of religious freedom has been infringed.

Alston v. Aiken, et al., No. IP 91 1269 C, Order at 5-6 (S.D.Ind. Dec. 20, 1991) (footnotes and citations omitted).

The district court's finding of frivolity constituted an abuse of discretion. The record is devoid of evidence concerning the Indiana State Reformatory's policy on religious practices and the need for the restrictions imposed on inmates confined in administrative segregation. Absent such evidence, the district court had no basis to conclude that the limitations on Alston's First Amendment rights were reasonable. The court's assumption that the defendants were justified in restricting Alston's religious freedom simply because he was in administrative segregation was improper. Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 3224, 106 L.Ed.2d 573 (1989); see, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 599 (7th Cir.1986) (absent evidentiary support, allegation that total ban on group religious activity following lockdown was reasonably related to security concerns was insufficient basis for summary judgment); Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir.1976) (prisoner's allegation that while in punitive...