Alston v. US, 90-835.
Decision Date | 30 April 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-835.,90-835. |
Citation | 590 A.2d 511 |
Parties | Calvin L. ALSTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Calvin L. Alston filed a brief pro se.
Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and Robert J. Spagnoletti, Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief for appellee.
Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and FERREN and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.
Calvin L. Alston appeals from a trial court order dismissing his pro se motion to correct sentence pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989). He argues that, upon conviction as an adult for second-degree murder, his sentence should have commenced immediately and thus begun to run concurrently with, rather than consecutively to, a sentence he was serving in California under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. He also claims he is entitled to good time credits for all time served. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the requested relief pursuant to § 23-110 or to consider the motion, alternatively, as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, we must affirm dismissal of the petition.
On July 18, 1984, Alston was charged with unlawful distribution of phencyclidine and cannabis, D.C.Code § 33-541 (1988), and unlawful possession of phencyclidine and cannabis with intent to distribute. Id. He pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession charge; the distribution charge was dropped. On August 21, 1985, Alston was sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration under the Federal Youth Corrections Act ("YCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (repealed 1984).1
On August 28, 1985, Alston and several codefendants were charged with kidnapping, armed robbery, and two counts of murder in the first degree. These charges arose out of events which had occurred before Alston received his YCA sentence. On October 25, 1985, Alston pleaded guilty to a single count of murder in the second degree, and the other charges were dropped. Alston was sentenced on the murder charge on June 18, 1986. The court rejected his request for sentencing under the YCA and instead imposed a prison term of 12 to 36 years. Because Alston had testified against several of his codefendants, the court requested that Alston be housed in a federal institution to protect his safety. Alston was sent to the Federal Correctional Institute in Terminal Island, California.
The prison authorities at Terminal Island refused Alston's request for parole from his YCA imprisonment so that he could begin serving his adult sentence immediately rather than consecutively. Because Terminal Island has no facilities for YCA offenders, however, Alston was housed with adult prisoners while he served his YCA sentence. Alston's YCA term expired on May 14, 1989, and he began serving his adult sentence on that date.
On February 23, 1989, Alston filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989). In the words of the trial court:
The trial court therefore dismissed the petition on May 29, 1990. Alston filed a timely appeal.
Under D.C.Code § 23-110, a prisoner may seek to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence on any of four grounds: (1) the sentence is unconstitutional or illegal; (2) the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is subject to collateral attack. Appellant does not claim the trial court lacked authority to impose an adult sentence consecutive to a YCA sentence. Nor does he claim that, in doing so, the court was legally required to assure that YCA treatment was preserved pending execution of the adult sentence.4 Rather, appellant argues that, either as a matter of law or of equity, his YCA time served (without segregation from adult prisoners) should be converted into adult time and made subject to good time credits. Compare Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 F.2d 714 (3d Cir.1989), and Johnson v. Rodgers, 756 F.2d 79 (10th Cir.1985), with Scott v. United States, 778 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).5 Specifically, we understand appellant to be seeking (1) full credit on his adult sentence for YCA time served—in effect making the adult sentence retroactively concurrent with the YCA sentence—and (2) good time credits for all time served, as though that time was served under an adult, not a YCA, sentence.
Appellant's first argument, for a concurrent sentence, could have been—but was not—timely brought under Super.Ct. Crim.R. 35(b) ( ) as a matter for trial court discretion. In this case, however, the 120-day time limitation for making a Rule 35 motion has long since expired. Thus, the trial court no longer would have jurisdiction under this rule even if appellant had invoked it. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 454 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C.1982).
In any event, as we understand appellant's motion and supporting memorandum, he does not seek discretionary relief under Rule 35. Nor does he seek, alternatively, an order clarifying that the trial court had really intended to impose the adult sentence concurrently with the YCA sentence. Rather, he accepts the fact that the trial court imposed a lawful, adult sentence consecutive to his YCA sentence. He thus argues for a change of sentence based on new circumstances. Specifically, he argues for legal or equitable relief in the form of retroactive imposition of a concurrent sentence, coupled with good time credits, based on the fact that (1) despite a YCA sentence he had never been segregated from adult prisoners in California, see Johnson, 756 F.2d at 81, and (2) his second conviction formally transformed the balance of his YCA sentence into an adult sentence, see Lewis, 878 F.2d at 721.
Whatever their legal merit, these contentions, like claims by other prisoners challenging the computation of a sentence, may not be raised under § 23-110. Because such contentions concern the executive department's execution of sentence, not the trial court's imposition of sentence, they must be raised in a habeas corpus petition as the prisoners did in Lewis, Johnson, and Scott. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ( ); Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 274 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 404 n. 5, 864 F.2d 804, 810 n. 5 (1988) ( ); United States v. Monteer, 556 F.2d 880, 880-81 (8th Cir.1977) ( ); see also Brame v. Palmer, 510 A.2d 229 (D.C.1986) ( ).6 The trial court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction under § 23-110 to consider the relief appellant seeks.
If we were to treat appellant's motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus we would, once again, have to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. District of Columbia courts may grant habeas corpus relief only for prisoners incarcerated within the District or in District of Columbia correctional facilities, see D.C.Code § 16-1901; I.B. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Resources, 287 A.2d 827, 828-29 (D.C. 1972); Monteer, 556 F.2d at 881. A court may not grant such relief unless it has personal jurisdiction over the custodian of the...
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