Perkins v. Henderson, Civ. A. No. 95-182(CRR).

• Decision Date: 03 April 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 95-182(CRR).
• Citation: 881 F. Supp. 55
• Parties: William O. PERKINS, Petitioner, v. John S. HENDERSON, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

881 F. Supp. 55

William O. PERKINS, Petitioner, v. John S. HENDERSON, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 95-182(CRR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 3, 1995.

William O. Perkins, pro se.

Richard S. Love, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, Chief, Correctional Litigation Section, with whom Garland Pinkston, Jr., Acting Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, was on the brief, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge.

Before the Court in the above-entitled cause is the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petitioner's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus for lack of jurisdiction and on its merits. Upon careful consideration of the parties' pleadings, the entire record herein, and the applicable law with respect thereto, the Court will GRANT the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss upon jurisdictional grounds.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, convicted in 1977 in the District of Columbia Superior Court of rape and two counts of burglary, challenges the lawfulness of his continued custody at the Lorton Correctional Complex. Plaintiff alleges that the District of Columbia Board of Parole denied him due process and equal protection of the laws in basing its decision to deny him parole on allegedly false information and by failing to order a reconsideration hearing under 28 D.C.M.R. § 104.11. Plaintiff further maintains that the application of 1987 revisions to the parole guidelines in the Board's decision violated the bar against ex post facto laws.

II. DISCUSSION

The unique status of the District of Columbia precludes nearly all federal postconviction review of District of Columbia Superior Court criminal convictions. It also prevents federal courts from entertaining habeas corpus petitions filed by prisoners in the custody of District of Columbia officials.

Since prisoners sentenced in the Superior Court and incarcerated in District of Columbia facilities are not considered "state" offenders or prisoners in state custody, they may not seek federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 377, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 1227-28, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 395, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 1675, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 nn. 23, 24 (D.C.Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993, 107 S.Ct. 595, 93 L.Ed.2d 595 (1986).

And because they are not "federal" offenders, prisoners sentenced in the Superior Court may not file motions to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Swain, 430 U.S. at 377, 97 S.Ct. at 1227-28; Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 857 (D.C.App.1985) (Mack, J., concurring & dissenting).

The federal habeas corpus and post-conviction review that is available to District of Columbia prisoners is, in turn, limited by D.C.Code §§ 16-1901 and 23-110, which were enacted as part of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.¹ The former precludes the Court from entertaining the instant petition.

A. The two forms of postconviction relief available to prisoners sentenced in the Superior Court and in the custody of District of Columbia officials mirror those available to federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2241.

1. D.C.Code § 23-110 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

D.C.Code § 23-110 vests subject matter jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks upon Superior Court sentences in that court.² Thus, prisoners serving sentences imposed by the Superior Court must file motions challenging their sentences in that court; federal courts are generally without jurisdiction to entertain motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence imposed by the District of Columbia Superior Court. See Swain, 430 U.S. at 377-78, 97 S.Ct. at 1227-28; Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F.Supp. 1232 (D.D.C.1992).

D.C.Code § 23-110 is the functional equivalent of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.³ Section 2255, which authorizes the filing of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct federal sentence in the court that sentenced the prisoner, is distinguishable from habeas corpus. Section 2255 is available only to attack the imposition of a sentence; an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus.⁴ Accordingly, a § 2255 motion "may not be invoked for matters occurring subsequent to the judgment." Hartwell, 353 F.Supp. at 357. But, "if predicated on facts that existed prior to the imposition of sentence, a motion under section 2255 may encompass all the grounds that might be included in a habeas corpus petition." Id.; see Stirone v. Markley, 345 F.2d 473 (7th Cir.) (grounds for motion to vacate sentence under § 2255 encompass all grounds that might be set up in an application for habeas corpus predicated on facts that existed at or prior to time of imposition of sentence), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829, 86 S.Ct. 67, 15 L.Ed.2d 73 (1965).

"In a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be `inadequate or ineffective', the Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy shall remain open to afford the necessary hearing." United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222, 72 S.Ct. 263, 274, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952). Still, a decision on a § 2255 motion is ordinarily required before a federal court will entertain a habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.")

D.C.Code § 23-110 similarly provides that "an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to § 23-110 shall not be entertained by the Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion for relief under § 23-110 or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." D.C.Code § 23-110(g) (1981); see Alston, 590 A.2d at 513 ("Under D.C.Code § 23-110, a prisoner may seek to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence.").

If unsuccessful on his or her motion in the Superior Court, the prisoner may take an appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. D.C.Code § 23-110(f) (1981); see Garris, 794 F.2d at 725-26 ("A prisoner under a sentence imposed by the Superior Court ... may collaterally challenge the constitutionality of his or her conviction by moving in that court for vacatur of his or her sentence. The prisoner may also, if unsuccessful on his or her motion in the Superior Court, prosecute an appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals."). District of Columbia prisoners have no recourse to any habeas corpus review unless they can demonstrate that the § 23-110 remedy is "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of their detention. D.C.Code § 23-110(g) (1981); see Swain, 430 U.S. at 378, 97 S.Ct. at 1228 (Congress created postconviction remedy in District of Columbia sentencing court; § 23-110 does not merely require exhaustion of that remedy, rather, habeas petition may not be entertained elsewhere absent demonstration that remedy is inadequate or ineffective).

The determination of whether the remedy available to a prisoner under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective hinges on the same considerations enabling federal prisoners to seek habeas review:⁵ 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and D.C.Code § 23-110 are coextensive.⁶ However, even if § 23-110 proves inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's detention, a second hurdle must be overcome prior to obtaining federal habeas review: D.C.Code § 16-1901.

2. D.C.Code § 16-1901 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Distinguishable from § 2255 and D.C.Code § 23-110, see Alston, 590 A.2d at 514 (claims challenging the computation of a sentence may not be raised under D.C.Code § 23-110, rather "because such contentions concern the executive department's execution of a sentence, they must be raised in a habeas corpus petition"), habeas corpus is the sole remedy available to federal and state prisoners challenging the fact or duration of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841-42, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (habeas corpus the sole remedy for challenging imprisonment or seeking speedier release); Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 810 n. 5, 274 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 404 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1988) (habeas corpus the sole remedy for challenging parole eligibility); United States v. Monteer, 556 F.2d 880, 880-81 (8th Cir.1977) (prisoner's request for restoration of good time credits challenges manner of execution of sentence, not sentence itself, and must be brought by habeas corpus). Habeas corpus is also the exclusive avenue available to a District of Columbia prisoner challenging the manner of execution of a sentence, rather than the sentence itself. See Bennett v. Ridley, 633 A.2d 824, 827 (D.C.App.1993) (challenge to parole revocation must be brought as habeas corpus action); Alston, 590 A.2d at 514 (inmate's challenge to Executive Branch's execution of his sentence, rather than imposition of sentence, had to be raised in habeas corpus petition, rather than in motion to correct sentence); Jones v. Jackson, 416 A.2d 249, 251 (D.C.App.1980) (challenge to parole procedures must be brought as habeas corpus).

However, just as the ability of a prisoner to mount a collateral attack upon a Superior Court sentence is circumscribed by § 23-110, the habeas corpus relief available to prisoners incarcerated in District of Columbia facilities is circumscribed by D.C.Code § 16-1901.⁷

Habeas petitions are directed to a prisoner's custodian. S...