Alt v. Stoker
Decision Date | 12 March 1895 |
Parties | Alt, Plaintiff in Error, v. Stoker |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Error to Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas. Hon. Maurice Cramer Judge.
Affirmed.
J. W Limbaugh for plaintiff in error.
(1) The land in question was legally sold by the commissioner at private sale. Prior v. Scott, 87 Mo. 303; Pool v. Brown, 98 Mo. 675. (2) The objection that the paper offered in evidence was not sealed is not well taken. G. S 1865, p. 444, sec 4; Pease v. Lawson, 33 Mo. 35; G. S. 1865, p. 398, sec. 5; R. S. 1889, sec. 2388. A seal consisting of a piece of paper attached by mucilage at the end of the signature has been held sufficient. Turner v. Field, 44 Mo. 382. See, also, Lunsford v. Lead Co., 54 Mo. 426; Burnett v. McCluey, 78 Mo. 676. (3) Impression on paper alone, without wax or other tenacious substance, has been held a valid seal. Allen v. Railroad, 32 N.H. 446; Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472; Sprange v. Barnard, 2 Bro. C. C. 585; Reg. v. St. Paul, 7 Q. B. 232; Bradford v. Randoll, 5 Pick. (Mass.), 495; Hendee v. Pinkerton, 14 Allen (Mass.), 381. Use of the word "seal" in place of a seal has been held sufficient. 21 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, p. 884 and note 2.
Wilson Cramer for defendant in error.
(1) The act undertaken by commissioner, John R. Henderson, was the execution of a statutory power under a statute identical with the statute of 1835. (R. S. 1835, p. 142, sec. 7), which was passed upon by this court in the case of Harley v. Ramsey, 49 Mo. 309. In that case the court says: Harley v. Ramsey, 49 Mo. 309. (2) In the execution of the deed under consideration the commissioner uses neither seal nor scrawl. (3) The proper sealing of a deed was at that time just as essential to its effectiveness as the signing of the name of the grantor, and no one would contend for a moment that an unsigned deed conveyed title or could be introduced in evidence. (4) It is not claimed on behalf of plaintiff in error that the deed in question was sealed otherwise than under the seal of the county court. The acknowledgment can not supply the defect: First. Because the acknowledgment is no part of the deed, but simply the statutory admission of its execution. Second. Because the statute prescribes what the acknowledgment shall contain, and anything outside of this is mere surplusage. 1 Wag. Stat. 1872, p. 275, sec. 14.
This is an action of ejectment for forty acres of land situate in Cape Girardeau county. The land is a portion of a body of swamp land donated by the United States to the state of Missouri and by the state conveyed to said county by patent dated November 4, 1871.
Plaintiff claims title under a deed by John R. Henderson, commissioner of said county, duly appointed and authorized to act by the county court. This deed, when offered in evidence, on objection by defendant, was excluded by the court, on the ground that it was not properly sealed. No objection is made to the sufficiency of the deed in other respects. The attesting clause of the deed is as follows:
SEAL, MO.
Cape Girardeau, County, Mo."
This seal is to the left of, and just below the signature of the commissioner, and consists of a round, notched piece of green paper, of the style and size commonly used for that purpose, attached to the deed by mucilage or other tenacious substance, and upon which is impressed the seal of Cape Girardeau county, as aforesaid. The acknowledgment is as follows:
CIRCUIT COURT
hand and affixed the seal of said circuit
CAPE GIRARDEAU
court, at office in said county of Cape
COUNTY, MO.
Section 6 of said act of the general assembly of Missouri, dated March 10, 1869, under which said land was patented to the county, provides: "The several county courts shall have full power and control over all such overflowed and swamp lands patented to their respective counties under the provisions of this act, and to sell and dispose of the same in like manner and with like effect as now provided by the general statutes in relation to the conveyance of other real estate belonging to their respective counties." Sess. Acts, 1869, sec. 6, p. 67; 2 R. S. 1879, sec. 6205.
The "general statutes," in relation to the sale by county courts of "other real estate belonging to their respective counties," was at that time as follows: "The county court may, by order, appoint a commissioner to sell and dispose of any real estate belonging to their county; and the deed of such commissioner, under his proper hand and seal, for and in behalf of such county, duly acknowledged and recorded, shall be sufficient to convey to the purchaser all the right, title, interest and estate which the county may then have in or to the premises so conveyed." Gen. Stat. 1865, p. 444, sec. 4; 1. R. S. 1879, sec. 671, p. 110.
As to the sufficiency of sealing instruments the statute provided: "Every instrument of writing expressed on the face thereof to be sealed, and to which the person executing the same shall affix a scrawl by way of seal, shall be deemed and adjudged to be sealed." 1 Wag. Stat. 269, sec. 5.
I. An objection was made to the sufficiency of the sale and deed, on the ground that the commissioner had no power to sell, at private sale, as was done in this instance. The point has been decided otherwise and we do not understand that defendant now insists upon it. Pool v. Brown, 98 Mo. 675, 11 S.W. 743.
II. The sole question, then, is whether the deed was properly signed and sealed by the commissioner, so as to make it effective to pass the title from the county. There was no statutory scrawl, by way of seal, but a common law seal would be sufficient. Pease v. Lawson, 33 Mo. 35....
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